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Abstract
Evaluating the decision criteria for the prioritisation of South African dams for
rehabilitation in terms of risk to human lives.
In South Africa a large number of dams owned by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) need to
be rehabilitated. This study investigated the decision process involved in the prioritisation of dams
for rehabilitation. DWA developed a risk analysis methodology for defining the risks associated with
dam safety, expressed as the combination of the probability and consequences of dam failure. These
risks are evaluated using multiple acceptability criteria to assess risk to human life and the economic,
social, socio-economic and environmental impacts of dam failure. In this study, the criteria used in
the decision process to evaluate the acceptability of life safety risks were evaluated by comparing
to international best practice methods, where the acceptability of risk to human life is commonly
assessed as the expected number of fatalities against life safety criteria presented as FN-criteria on
an FN-diagram.
Dam rehabilitation should reduce the probability of dam failure, thereby reducing the risk to soci-
ety in terms of the expected lives lost. However, the rehabilitation works come at a cost and the level
of these investments are usually large. In addition, the rehabilitation of South African government
owned dams are financed by society and these financial resources are limited. Thus investments into
dam rehabilitation works should be worthwhile for society. Society’s Willingness to Pay (SWTP) for
safety was applied to South African dam safety to determine the acceptable level of expenditure into
life safety that is required by society.
Investments into improved safety levels are not always dictated by society, but could also be
driven by the decision maker or owner requiring an economically optimal solution for the rehabil-
itation. Economic optimisation accounts for considerations additional to life safety, including eco-
nomic motivations, damage costs of dam failure as well as compensation costs for lives lost. Often
economic optimisation would govern the decision problem. Also, the DWA current evaluation does
ii
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not take the cost of rehabilitation into account in any way. Thus, FN-criteria that primarily evaluates
life safety, but also incorporates a measure of economic efficiency, were suggested in this study.
iii
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Uittreksel
Evaluering van die besluitnemingskriteria vir die prioritisering van Suid-Afrikaanse
damme vir rehabilitasie in terme van risiko teenoor menselewens.
In Suid-Afrika moet ’n groot aantal damme wat deur die Departement van Waterwese (DWA) besit
word gerehabiliteer word. Hierdie studie het die besluitnemingsproses ondersoek wat toegepas word
om damme te prioritiseer vir rehabilitasiewerke. DWA het ’n bestaande metodologie wat gebaseer is
op risiko-analise. Die risikos wat verband hou met damveiligheid word deur die metode bepaal en
word uitgedruk as die kombinasie van waarskynlikheid en die beraamde gevolge van damfaling.
Hierdie risikos word geëvalueer teenoor verskeie kriteria wat die aanvaarbaarheid van risikos teenoor
menselewens en die ekonomiese, sosiale, sosio-ekonomiese en omgewingsimpakte van damfalings
assesseer. In hierdie studie word die kriteria wat gebruik word in die besluitnemingsproses om die
aanvaarbaarheid van risikos teenoor menselewens te bepaal geëvalueer deur die kriteria te vergelyk
met metodes wat internasionaal as beste praktyk beskou word. Internasionaal word die aanvaar-
baarheid van risikos teenoor menselewens oor die algemeen as die verwagte aantal sterftes teenoor
lewensveiligheidskriteria FN-kriteria op ’n FN-diagram geassesseer.
Dam rehabilitasiewerke behoort die waarskynlikheid van damfaling te verminder, sodoende ver-
minder die risiko teenoor die samelewing in terme van verwagte sterftes. Die rehabilitasiewerke
vereis finansiële beleggings, en hierdie beleggings is gewoonlik groot. Verder word die rehabilitasie
van Suid-Afrikaanse damme wat deur DWA besit word deur samelewing gefinansier en hierdie fi-
nasiële hulpbronne is beperk. Dus moet hierdie beleggings die moeite werd wees vir die samele-
wing. Die samelewing se bereidwilligheid om te betaal ("SWTP") vir veiligheid word toegepas in Suid-
Afrikaanse damveiligheid om die aanvaarbare vlak van beleggings vir ’n verbeterde veiligheid teenoor
menselewens wat deur die samelewing vereis word te bepaal.
Beleggings in verbeterde damveiligheidsvlakke word egter nie altyd bepaal deur die samelewing
nie, maar kan ook gedryf word deur die besluitnemer of eienaar wat ’n ekonomies optimale oplos-
sing vir die rehabilitatiesewerke vereis. Ekonomiese optimering neem oorwegings addisioneel tot
iv
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lewensveiligheid in ag, insluitend ekonomiese motiverings, skade kostes as die dam faal, sowel as
vergoedingskostes vir die verwagte sterftes. Ekonomiese optimering beheer dikwels die besluitne-
mingsprobleem. Verder neem die huidige DWA besluitnemingssproses in geen manier die kostes
van rehabilitasie in ag nie. Dus word FN-kriteria wat hoofsaaklik veiligheid teenoor menselewens
evalueer, maar wat ook ’n mate van ekonomiese doeltreffendheid insluit, voorgestel in hierdie studie.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background to the study
The Department of Water Affairs (DWA) is a national governmental department who currently owns
314 dams across South Africa (Segers, 2012). According to Oosthuizen et al. (2010), most of the dams
were designed and constructed many years ago by DWA itself, with dam building reaching its peak
in the 1980’s. Since then there has been a shift in dam engineering from the design of dams to the
maintenance and rehabilitation of dams in terms of their safety.
To endorse dam safety in South Africa the dam safety legislation was implemented in 1987. The
purpose of the legislation, according to the National Water Act, Act No. 36 of 1998 (DWA, 1998):
"...is to improve the safety of new and existing dams with a safety risk to reduce the potential harm to
the public, damage to property or to resource quality..."
The legislation requires evaluations to take place at regular intervals to assess the current state
of a dam in terms of its purpose and safety. In addition, it has become standard to perform a risk
analysis as part of the regular dam safety evaluations completed in accordance with the legislation.
The risk analysis methodology developed by DWA combines the probability of dam failure and
the associated consequences to define the risks. These risks are evaluated using multiple acceptabil-
ity criteria to assess risk to human life and the economic, social, socio-economic and environmental
impacts in case of dam failure. If the risks do not comply with the criteria, the rehabilitation of the
dam may be recommended to improve its safety.
According to a report compiled by DWA, in the years 2004/2005, 166 of the 314 government owned
dams were identified to be in need of rehabilitation works (Segers, 2012). The report further stated
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that of the 166 dams; 20 dams were removed from the list since the initial deficiencies were found
to not warrant any action and 25 dams were identified to be of low importance to society and it was
therefore not justified to invest into dam safety rehabilitation works.
Since the years 2005/2006 a dam safety rehabilitation programme was initiated by DWA and 19 of
the dams in need of rehabilitation works have been rehabilitated in full. For an additional 9 dams, the
civil works of rehabilitation works were completed, but the mechanical refurbishment works are still
outstanding. The remaining 94 dams in need of rehabilitation works are in different stages of design,
construction, planning or requires further assessments before action could be taken. In Table 1.1, a
summary of the expenditure for the rehabilitation works conducted by DWA is provided. The total
expenditure up until the 2011-2012 financial year is estimated to be more than R 1.5 billion.
Table 1.1: Summary of expenditure of dam rehabilitation works performed by DWA (Segers, 2012)
Financial Year Total Expenditure
2005-2006 R 2,171,229
2006-2007 R 56,484,041
2007-2008 R 240,956,004
2008-2009 R 383,597,900
2009-2010 R 365,667,000
2010-2011 R 300,805,613
2011-2012 (estimated) R 161,804,000
TOTAL R 1,511,485,787
1.2 Research problem
The Department of Water Affairs (DWA) recently identified the need for reviewing the acceptability
criteria used to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works. DWA specifically required the criteria used in
the decision process to establish acceptability of assessed risk to human life to be evaluated.
When a dam is rehabilitated, it is expected for the probability of dam failure to be reduced and
consequently the risk to human life should be reduced. However, these rehabilitation works come at
a cost. The South African government finances rehabilitation works via public taxes or public charges
and the level of these investments are large. Since it is society who essentially finance the rehabilita-
tion of dams, it should be ensured that these investments into life safety are actually worthwhile for
society. In this sense it must be noted that the societal resources that can be allocated to improving
life safety through dam rehabilitation works are limited. If the cost of reducing the risk to human life
through the dam rehabilitation works is disproportionate to the actual reduction in risk to life, these
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resources may need to be redirected in other sectors, for example into health care, transportation
services or education, to improve the quality of life of society.
However, investments into dam rehabilitation works are not always driven by society’s prefer-
ences for life safety, but are often dictated by the decision maker or owner’s preferences taking other
considerations in addition to life safety into account. These additional considerations may account
for the profitability of the project or the economic, environmental or other impacts in case of dam
failure.
In light of evaluating South African dams for rehabilitation works, the following research questions
were developed:
1. What should the acceptability criteria for risk to human life be?
2. What is the acceptable level for investments into life safety required by society?
3. Are further investments into rehabilitation works, in addition to investments for life safety, jus-
tified based on the preferences of the decision maker or owner?
1.3 Existing approaches
Three major existing approaches may be used to assess the acceptability of risk to human life, if
the investment into reducing risk to human life is required by society, and if further investments is
justified on behalf of the decision maker or owner’s preferences. These approaches include:
• Conventional criteria for human safety
Conventional criteria for human safety assess the risk to human life without explicitly evalu-
ating the costs of the safety measure. The risk to human life is commonly expressed as the
expected fatalities per year. This is the most commonly applied criteria and are generally cali-
brated by analysing safety levels of previous projects (Lentz, 2007).
• Utility-based criteria for human safety
Instead of independently evaluating the risk to life imposed by a dam and the investment cost
into reducing the risk to life, a joint indicator may be used which unites both aspects. This may
be achieved through socio-economic utility theory where utility is a measure of its own, but
can equally be transformed into other units, such as life expectancy or income.
Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) is a utility function which may be used as an effective tool
to determine the acceptable level of expenditure that is required by society in exchange for
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a reduction in risk to human life (Pandey et al., 2006). It determines a lower boundary for
investments into risk reduction measures, by considering society’s preference for exchanging
money for life years.
• Economic optimisation
Investments are not only driven by life safety concerns, but are often driven by economic con-
siderations.
Economic optimisation primarily considers the interests of the decision maker or owner and
is of little interest to society. It evaluates the costs of a safety measure, requiring a maximised
monetary net benefit at the lowest cost. This may be achieved by economically optimising the
profitability of a project, where the profitability of a project is determined by subtracting the
investment cost for the safety measure and the damage costs in case of failure from the benefit
of the safety measure. Although it does not evaluate the acceptability of risk to human life, the
damage costs in case of failure include compensation costs for loss of human life.
1.4 Aim of the study
This study will aim at evaluating the decision criteria for the prioritisation of South African dams for
rehabilitation works in terms of risk to human lives. In addition, this study will propose additional
decision tools regarding the level of investments into dam rehabilitation works. This will be done by
applying the three major existing approaches discussed in section 1.3. The research methodology
will be as follows:
• The current acceptability criteria for risk to human life used in South African dam safety will be
evaluated by comparing to conventional criteria used internationally.
• The SWTP utility function is proposed to determine the lower bound for acceptable invest-
ments into life safety through dam rehabilitation works required by society.
• Economic optimisation is proposed as an additional decision tool to evaluate if investments
into dam rehabilitation works, above and beyond the SWTP threshold, are justified according
to the decision maker or owner’s preferences.
• Conventional acceptability criteria for life safety do not incorporate the investment costs for
rehabilitation works. Considering the recommendations for investments through SWTP and
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economic optimisation, it is proposed to develop a single-evaluation criteria to primarily eval-
uate life safety risks, but also with some measure of economic efficiency incorporated.
1.5 Outline of the study
The chapter outline is as follows:
Chapter 2 - Risk-based decision making in dam safety management
In Chapter 2 existing literature regarding the topic of this study are reviewed. A brief overview of
the importance of dams and dam safety are provided. The management of dam safety, both inter-
nationally and in South Africa, are discussed. The use of risk-based tools to aid decisions regarding
the adequacy of dam safety levels are considered. Finally, the main principles and preferences which
should be considered when evaluating risks to human life are reviewed.
Chapter 3 - Development and application of conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human
life
In Chapter 3 a theoretical background of conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human life are
provided. Thereafter, the development and application of conventional acceptability criteria for risk
to human life on an international level in different industries and also specifically in dam safety are
discussed.
Chapter 4 - Evaluation of South African dam safety acceptability criteria to assess risk to human
life
In Chapter 4 the current acceptability criteria used in South African dam safety for life safety risks are
evaluated by comparing to international best practice criteria identified in Chapter 3. South African
case studies of government owned dams which were recommended for rehabilitation works by DWA
are evaluated in terms of the acceptability criteria proposed in this chapter to assess if the original
decision to rehabilitate was justified.
Chapter 5 - SWTP as a lower bound constraint on dam safety levels
In Chapter 5, Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) is suggested as an additional tool to evaluate if a
investment into life safety through dam rehabilitation works is required by society. Firstly, a theoret-
ical background on SWTP as a utility function is provided. Thereafter, the SWTP concept is applied
to South African dam study and SWTP criteria are developed for evaluating dams for rehabilitation
works. The same case studies that were evaluated in terms of conventional acceptability criteria for
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risk to human life in Chapter 4, are evaluated in terms of SWTP criteria to identify if rehabilitation
was required by society.
Chapter 6 - Economic optimisation as a decision tool for the evaluation of South African dam re-
habilitation works
Lastly, economic optimisation is applied as an additional decision tool to evaluate if further invest-
ments into dam rehabilitation works, in addition to SWTP requirements for life safety, is justified.
Firstly, a theoretical background on economic optimisation is reviewed. Thereafter, economic opti-
misation criteria relevant to this study is developed. The South African case studies of government
owned dams are assessed in terms of the proposed criteria to evaluate if the investment is economi-
cally beneficial. The economic optimisation results are compared to the recommendations for reha-
bilitation works through conventional acceptability criteria for risk to life and SWTP criteria.
Finally, a single-evaluation criteria is proposed to primarily evaluate life safety risks, but also with
some measure of economic efficiency incorporated.
Chapter 7 - Conclusions and recommendations
An overview of the main findings when developing the decision tools proposed in this study is pre-
sented. In addition, the results obtained when evaluating the South African case studies in terms of
the proposed decision tools are discussed. Finally, a summary of the main conclusions and recom-
mendations regarding evaluating South African dams for rehabilitation works is presented.
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Chapter 2
Risk-based decision making in dam safety
management
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the importance of dams and the management
of dam safety. Existing knowledge on the use of risk analysis methods to aid decision making with re-
gards to dam safety are presented. Additionally, factors which need to be considered when evaluating
life safety risks are investigated.
The chapter is structured as follows:
• A brief overview of the importance of dams, dam safety and the management of dam safety is
provided.
– A background of dams, the elements of a dam, the types of dams encountered and the
purposes of a dam are presented to outline the importance of dams in general.
– Dam safety and dam failure are defined. Typical causes and examples of dam safety re-
lated incidents which have occurred in South Africa and internationally are presented.
– The importance of dams and dam safety stresses the need for managing dam safety. Some
international dam safety organisations are listed. The management of dam safety in South
Africa, with specific reference to the development of the dam safety legislation, is dis-
cussed.
• The management of dam safety includes evaluating and making decisions regarding the safety
levels of a dam. Risk analysis methods are useful in guiding the decision making process.
7
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– The concept of engineering decision making and the use of risk-based decision tools to
aid decisions regarding dam safety are discussed.
– A generic framework for making decisions based on risk is presented.
– The application of risk-based decision making methods in international and South African
dam safety are discussed.
• Dam safety risks which are estimated through risk analysis methods should be evaluated against
decision criteria to determine the acceptability of the risk. In this study, decision criteria for
evaluating the acceptability of assessed risk to human life imposed by dams are investigated.
In establishing life safety criteria, some important aspects need to be considered:
– The difference between assessing life safety on an individual or societal level is discussed.
– The fundamental and ethical principles that need to be taken into account when evaluat-
ing risk to human life are presented.
– Preferences that may influence decisions regarding life safety are discussed.
• A concluding summary is provided.
2.2 Importance of dams, dam safety and management of dam safety
In the following section the importance of dams to society are highlighted. Examples of dam safety
related incidents are presented to stress the need for the proper management and control of dams in
terms of their safety.
2.2.1 Background of dams
A dam is a man-made barrier which is built in order to hold back water and form an artificial lake or
reservoir behind it (Tancev, 2005). The barrier has an upstream and downstream face with the up-
stream face the side where the water is retained and the downstream face the opposite side situated
in the direction in which a river flows.
As an example, a photograph of Hoover Dam is shown in Fig. 2.1. It is located in the Black Canyon
of the Colorado River in the United States of America (USA) and was constructed between the years
1931 and 1936 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR, 2012). It is a 221.4 meters high
concrete dam in the form of an arch and can hold up to 35 billion cubic meters of water in Lake Mead
behind it (Vilander, 1999).
8
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Figure 2.1: Hoover dam constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation in the USA (WePhotographer, 2004)
The barrier is the main element of a dam, but additional structures or facilities, also called appur-
tenances, are incorporated to control the discharge of water and to ensure the dam operates safely.
The additional structures or facilities could include; spillways, outlet works, internal drainage sys-
tems to control seepage and internal galleries and shafts (Novak et al., 2007).
Dams can be classified into two general groups based on the principal construction material
used; embankment dams, constructed from natural materials such as earth and rock, and concrete
dams, constructed from concrete but could also be constructed from masonry or stone. Embank-
ment dams most commonly have a trapezoidal cross-sectional shape and are constructed by means
of dump filling the earth and/or rock which may be obtained locally (Tancev, 2005). In Fig. 2.2,
Sterkfontein Dam, situated in the Free State province of South Africa, is shown as an example of an
embankment dam. In contrast to embankment dams, concrete dams typically have different face
slopes, with generally a steep downstream side and an almost vertical upstream side (Novak et al.,
2007). Less construction material is needed for concrete dams since the horizontal force can be re-
sisted by the self-weight of the concrete, i.e. gravity holds it down to the ground and stops the water
from pushing it over. The main types of concrete dams are; gravity dams, typically having a triangu-
lar cross-section, buttress dams, consisting of a thin slab and a series of supports on the downstream
side of the dam, and arch dams, curved in shape with the top point of the arch pointing back into
water and resisting the pushing force of the water (Tancev, 2005). Hoover dam, illustrated in Fig. 2.1
9
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is an example of an arched concrete dam. It must be noted that dams may also be constructed as
composite dams, utilising a combination of embankment and concrete dams.
Figure 2.2: Example of an embankment dam, Sterkfontein Dam in South Africa (DWA, 2012)
According to Novak et al. (2007), embankment dams are mostly encountered, since mainly local
materials are used to construct the dam and it is more economical and technologically sufficient.
Embankment dams also prove to be more adaptable to site conditions, whereas concrete dams may
require very specific conditions for the foundation.
Novak et al. (2007) further states that each dam is a unique structure which is not only dependent
on site specific conditions for the foundation but also depends on the geology, material character-
istics, catchment flood hydrology and much more. Therefore, in selecting an appropriate site for
designing and constructing a dam, expertise from many different disciplines, for example structural
and fluid mechanics, geology, flood hydrology and hydraulics, are needed.
Dams are useful in serving a number of purposes. Through storing water from a river behind
a dam, the water could become available for use in dry periods. Historically, through the increased
reliability of water available for the growth of agriculture, more irrigation systems were implemented.
The continuous availability of water therefore allows for an increase in wealth of a society which in
turn results in human development (ICOLD, 2005). In addition, a dam may reduce the severity of
flooding downstream of the dam. This allows for increased living space downstream of the dam as
shown in Fig. 2.3. Also, the recreational possibilities of a dam may attract people to live nearby the
dam.
The main purposes of a dam, as outlined by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD,
2012), are listed:
10
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Figure 2.3: Town situated downstream of a dam
• Irrigation:
Dams could supply water for agriculture and as the world’s population is growing an increased
food demand stresses the need for water supply for irrigation purposes .
• Hydropower:
Dams may be constructed to generate electricity, which may be a sufficient renewable energy
resource for society.
• Water supply:
Dams may be needed to supply water for both domestic and industrial use. Since hydrological
cycles may be unpredictable, water storage in dams are essential for providing a consistent
supply of water during water shortages.
• Flood control:
Dams regulate river levels and control flooding downstream of a dam and in the case of flood-
ing, dams can store the flood volume and release it in a controlled manner.
• Inland navigation:
Inland navigation includes rivers that have been developed with dams and reservoirs to trans-
port goods. In comparison to highway and rail, inland navigation allows for large loads to be
transported at a fuel efficient manner.
• Recreation, fish farming and other purposes
In summary, dam engineering relies upon many different scientific principles as well as informed
engineering judgement and therefore it is a unique specialized field with a broad basis (Novak et al.,
2007). Also, in addition to the number of roles dams play in a society, the main purpose of devel-
oping a large dam is to enhance the welfare of society. As populations grow economic development
increases the demand for the consumption of water and consequently the need for storing water in
dams is becoming more important.
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2.2.2 Dam safety and incidents relating to dam safety
Dams play an important role in enhancing the quality of life of society, but the safety of dams is also
important as dam failure may lead to disastrous consequences, such as the loss of human lives and
significant financial losses.
Defining dam safety and dam failure
Dam safety cannot be defined explicitly and consequently many variations of definitions for dam
safety may exist. The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) is an international non-
governmental organisation which allows the exchange of knowledge and experience in dam engi-
neering between nations (ICOLD, 2012). ICOLD describes "dam safety" in Bulletin 59 on "Dam Safety
- Guidelines" (1987) as follows:
"the safety of a dam manifests itself in being free of any conditions and developments that could lead
to its deterioration or destruction. The margins which separate the actual condition of a dam, or the
conditions it is designed for, from those leading to its damage or destruction is a measure of its safety"
Another example of a definition of dam safety is provided by the Water Management Branch of
the Province of British Columbia in Canada in their dam safety guidelines for inspection and main-
tenance of dams (2011). According to the guidelines a "safe dam" is a:
"Dam which does not impose an unacceptable risk to people or property, and which meets safety crite-
ria that are acceptable to the government, the engineering profession and the public."
Alternatively, dam failure can also be defined, but the definitions for dam failure could also vary.
ICOLD defines "dam failure" in Bulletin 99 on "Dam Failures - Statistical Analysis" (1995) as follows:
"Collapse or movement of part of a dam or its foundation, so that the dam cannot retain water. In
general, a failure results in the release of large quantities of water, imposing risks on the people or
property downstream."
12
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Typical causes of dam failure
ICOLD has compiled a list of causes of dam failures. The list is extensive, but some failure types as
obtained from Bulletin 99 (ICOLD, 1995) include:
• Inadequate design
• Failure due to the dam foundation due to the following factors; inadequate site investigation,
seepage, internal erosion, sliding and shear strength.
• Failure due to the dam materials including the following contributing factors; permeability,
ageing and compaction.
• Failure due to the unforeseen actions of exceptional magnitude such as; precipitation, waves
on the reservoir, earthquakes, uplift, overtopping or strong blasting nearby.
• Failure due to the structural behaviour of the body including; insufficient slope protection,
seepage and internal erosion.
• Failure due to the appurtenant works such as; insufficient spillway capacity, internal erosion,
mechanical strength or excessive flow rates.
In South Africa, Nortje (2002) has compiled statistics on the causes of dam failures or severe dam-
age as recorded by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) from 1987 to 2001. According to Nortje
(2002), inadequate spillway capacity is the major cause of dam failure in South Africa. Another im-
portant cause of failure or severe damage is due to erosion/undermining of spillways during floods.
Some case studies of dam safety related incidents in South Africa resulting in either loss of life or
narrow escapes of human beings are presented in Table 2.1 as obtained from Nortje (2002):
Table 2.1: Examples of dam safety related incidents in South Africa (Nortje, 2002)
Location Incident Year No. of lives lost
Lydenburg Flooding Partial failure of Lydenburg Town
Dam due to high intensity rainfall
2001 6 lives lost
Lake Mzingazi Flooding
near Richards bay
Breach of dam wall due to high
intensity rainfall
2000 3 lives lost
Boomryk Dam near
Levubu
Breach of dam wall due to high
intensity rainfall
2000 2 lives lost
Windsor Dam near
Ladysmith
Unauthorised opening of sluice gate 1998 4 lives lost (children
playing downstream)
Klein Kariba near
Warmbath
Upstream dam failed due to piping 1996 No lives lost (30 people
swiftly evacuated)
Kruin Dam near
Grabouw
Dam failed due to piping 1994 No lives lost (60 people
evacuated)
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Some examples of dam failures that occurred internationally are presented:
1. South Fork Dam in Pennsylvania: Failed 31 May 1889
The failure of this earthfill dam resulted in 2209 human fatalities and the damage was esti-
mated to be 17 million U.S. Dollars. It is believed that the dam failed due to bad maintenance,
a clogged spillway and heavy rainfall (ASDSO, 2012).
2. Banqiao Reservoir Dam in China: Failed in 1975
The dam failure was preceded by heavy rainfalls due to a typhoon. The dam was 118m high
and had a storage capacity of 492 million cubic meters. It is estimated that there was more
than 150 000 human fatalities, 26 000 fatalities were directly related to the flooding, and the
other fatalities were due to related causes, such as health epidemics due to contaminated water
(Britannica, 2012).
3. St. Francis Dam, California: Failed on 12 March 1928
St. Francis Dam collapsed, with the left side giving way first. This dam failure resulted in more
than 600 fatalities and more than 5.5 million U.S. Dollars in damages (ASDSO, 2012). In Fig.
2.4 a photo of the failed dam is shown.
Figure 2.4: Photo of failed St. Francis Dam, California (Cervin, 2008)
4. Malpasset Dam in France: Failed on 2 December 1959
Malpasset dam was an arch dam which failed due to foundation failure. The geological study
of the region was not thorough. A tectonic fault was later found as the most likely cause for
the disaster. The dam failure resulted in 421 fatalities and the damage was estimated to be 68
million U.S. Dollars (Reporter, 2012).
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5. Vaiont Dam in Italy: Failed on 9 October 1963
This double curvature arch dam failed due to a landslide in the dam basin, leading to almost
2000 human fatalities (Genevois and Ghirotti, 2005).
6. Camara Dam in Brazil: Failed on 21 June 2004
Heavy rain preceded the failure of Camara Dam, which resulted in 5 fatalities (Charles et al.,
2011).
In summary, dam safety related incidents are a reality and by studying previous case studies,
internationally and in South Africa, it is observed that there are serious cases of human fatalities
and loss of downstream property caused by dam failures. This necessitates the need for the proper
management and control of dam safety.
2.2.3 Management of dam safety internationally and in South Africa
In this section an overview of how dam safety is managed internationally and in South Africa is pro-
vided.
Overview of dam safety management internationally
On an international level dam safety is strongly influenced by the standards provided by the Interna-
tional Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), where as aforementioned, ICOLD is a non-governmental
organisation allowing the exchange of knowledge and experience in dam engineering between differ-
ent countries (ICOLD, 2012). Another international organisation, the World Commission on Dams
was established in 1998. Their purpose is to research the environmental, social and economic im-
pacts of the development of dams.
Some dam safety organisations, specific to certain countries, are listed:
• IALAD (Integrity Assessment of Large Dams) - an European dam safety group representing
the following countries: Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia,
Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
• ANCOLD (Australian National Committee on Large Dams) - representing Australia
• B.C. Hydro and Water Management Branch, in province of British Columbia - representing
Canada
• SANCOLD (South African National Committee on Large Dams) - representing South Africa
• CHINCOLD (Chinese National Committee on Large Dams) - representing China
• USCOLD (United States Committee on Large Dams)- representing the USA
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• USBR (United States Bureau of Reclamation)
In addition to the international dam safety organisations providing dam safety standards, each
country may have further authorities which manage the safety of dams. These may include the gov-
ernment, regulators or dam owners. Therefore, each country have their own dam safety standards
specific to their own circumstances.
Overview of South African dam safety management
In South Africa, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) is a national governmental department which
is the custodian of and is responsible for all aspects of law regarding water resources. According to a
DWA progress report, the Department currently owns 314 dams and weirs across South Africa (Segers,
2012). Before the 1970’s there was no official dam safety program in South Africa. During this period
only the odd dam safety inspection took place (Oosthuizen et al., 2010).
Two major dam accidents in Europe in the 1950’s and 1960’s drew more attention to dam safety
in South Africa, including the failure of the Malpasset Dam in France in 1959 and the slope failure
of Vaiont Dam in Italy 1963. Both dam failures resulted in large numbers of human lives lost and
considerable financial losses. In consequence, it was decided by DWA to establish a dam safety pro-
gramme, which included the promulgation of the dam safety legislation in South Africa (Oosthuizen
et al., 2010).
South African dam safety legislation
The South African dam safety legislation was implemented in 1987, following the insertion of Sec-
tion 9(C) relating to dams with a safety risk in the National Water Act, 1956 (Act 54 of 1956) in 1984
and also after the publication of Dam Safety Regulations in Government Notice R.1560 on 25 July
1986. The Dam Safety Office (DSO) was established as part of DWA in the years 1985/86 to ensure
the implementation of the dam safety legislation. The previous Water Act, 1956 (Act 54 of 1956) was
replaced by the National Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998) and a whole chapter of this act is dedicated
to the "Safety of Dams". In summary, the dam safety programme in South Africa is enforced by the
following legislation:
• Sections 117 to 123 (Chapter 12) of the National Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998). Hereafter
referred to as the Act.
The seven sections of Chapter 12 of the Act regarding the "Safety of dams" consist of; defini-
tions, control measures for dams with a safety risk, responsibilities of approved professional
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persons, registration and factors to be considered when declaring a dam with a safety risk, ex-
emptions and regulations regarding dam safety.
• The Dam Safety Regulations as published in Government Notice R.1560 of July 1986. Hereafter
referred to as the Regulations.
The general requirements of the Regulations are summarised:
– Classification and registration of dams
– Procedures for construction, enlargement, alterations or repair of dams with a safety risk
– Procedures for first filling of dams
– Requirements regarding operation and maintenance of dams
– Dam safety evaluation of dams with a safety risk
– Decommissioning of dams with a safety risk
– Approval of professional persons and professional teams including register
Purpose of South African dam safety legislation
The purpose of the South African dam safety legislation, according to the Act (DWA, 1998):
"...is to improve the safety of new and existing dams with a safety risk to reduce the potential harm to
the public, damage to property or to resource quality..."
A "dam with a safety risk" is defined by the Act and depends on how much water the dam can
contain and the wall height. The definition therefore acts as a first sieve, excluding smaller dams
with a low hazard potential of lesser importance.
The Act further requires that dams with a safety risk should be registered and classified. A dam
is classified in accordance with the Regulations based on the combination of the size class and the
hazard potential rating of the dam as shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Category classification of dams with a safety risk in South Africa according to Dam Safety Regulations
as published in Government Notice R.1560 of July 1986 (DWA, 1986)
Size class Hazard potential rating
Low Significant High
H = maximum wall height(m) PLL=0 PLL≤10 PLL>10
PEL: minimal PEL: significant PEL: great
Small (5<H<12) Category I Category II Category II
Medium (12≤H<30) Category II Category II Category III
Large (H≥30) Category III Category III Category III
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The size classification is based on the maximum wall height with the limits shown in Table 2.2.
The hazard potential is based on the potential loss of life (PLL) and potential economic loss (PEL) in
case of dam failure, where the PLL and PEL are considered independently and the highest of the two
determines the hazard potential rating. The limits for hazard potential classification are also shown
in Table 2.2.
The limits for the PEL are not defined explicitly in the Regulations and the typical values used by
Chemaly, 1997 cited in Nortje (2002) are shown:
Minimal 0 to 2 million Rand
Significant 2 to 20 million Rand
Great More than 20 million Rand
It must be noted that only the size and hazard potential influence the classification of dams and
not the present structural condition of the dam. This category classification determines the level
of control over dams with a safety risk. For example, in the case of Category II and III dams, the
involvement of an approved professional person (APP) is required when a dam is being evaluated for
safety, designed or constructed, where an APP is a person registered with the Engineering Council of
South Africa (ECSA).
Dam safety evaluations according to the Regulations
The Regulations require regular inspections or evaluations of a dam with a safety risk. These evalua-
tions are required at 5 yearly intervals to check whether the dam is still in a serviceable condition and
if it still is capable to perform the function for which it is intended.
For a dam safety inspection/evaluation; the adequacy of the spillway capacity and the stability
of the dam is evaluated, the maintenance and operation of the dam is assessed, the consequences of
overtopping, including the estimated loss of life, economic losses and other impacts in case of dam
failure are assessed, the corrective measures needed and the urgency of these measures are provided
in the dam safety evaluation report. Further requirements regarding the dam safety evaluations are
provided in the Regulations.
Revised dam safety regulations
According to Nortje (2010), revised dam safety regulations are in the process of being published by
DWA. A draft for the new regulations were published on 1 September 2009 and were open to public
comment, where comments were received and incorporated.
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In summary, in South Africa the dam safety legislation is responsible for improving the safety
of new and existing dams with a safety risk by determining the level of control over these dams. In
addition, regular dam safety evaluations are required by the legislation and these evaluations could
stress the need for rehabilitation works at a dam to improve its safety.
2.3 Risk analysis to aid decision-making regarding dam safety
The management of dam safety includes evaluating and making decisions regarding the adequacy of
dam safety levels. To guide the decision-making process, risk analysis methods may be used.
In this section the concept of engineering decision making and the use of risk-based tools to
aid the decision problem are discussed. The term "risk" is formally defined and the framework for
decision making based on risk is presented. Lastly the application of risk-based decision making
methods in international and in South African dam safety are discussed.
2.3.1 Risk-based decision making
Objective of engineering decision-making
In section 2.2.3 it is highlighted that internationally there are organisations responsible for setting
standards and for evaluating existing dams regarding its safety. If a dam is found to be inadequate in
terms of safety, the decision to rehabilitate the dam may be recommended. However, this decision
problem may be more complex than anticipated. The following questions may arise: "At what level
is a dam considered to be ’unsafe’ and should it be rehabilitated?", "What is an acceptable amount
to invest into rehabilitation works, especially if dam is a government owned dam and investments
into safety works are made on behalf of the public?". To provide some answer to these questions, the
main requirements of an engineering facility should be considered.
From the perspective of the owner (private or public) the optimal decision regarding an engineer-
ing facility would be one which produces the highest economic benefit. From a societal perspective,
the facility should intend to benefit the quality of life of the individuals of society. On a societal level,
a beneficial engineering facility is a facility which is (Faber, 2009):
• economically efficient in serving a purpose,
• safe for individuals of society, and
• does not have adverse effects on the environment.
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These requirements are set by the principle of sustainable development which requires decision-
making to involve the joint consideration of society, economy and environment (Brundtland et al.,
1987). The principle was influenced by the realisation that our world’s current population is growing
and the consumption of resources are becoming more and more stressed (Mihelcic and Zimmerman,
2010).
Sustainable development is also defined as development "that meets the needs of the present
without comprising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland et al.,
1987). Therefore, in making decisions regarding engineering facilities it should be kept in mind that
our generation should not leave the burden of too short-lived structures to future generations. In
addition, our generation should ensure that financial resources are allocated optimally and not more
is used than is really available (Faber, 2009).
Another factor which should be considered when making decisions regarding engineering facil-
ities, is the case where an engineering facility is financed by the public via taxes or public charges.
Since it is society who pays, they should enjoy the benefit received from the facility (Faber, 2009).
In summary, it must be noted that when decisions regarding an engineering facility are made, the
decision problem may be very complex and may involve prerequisites set by the owner or by society.
Risk-based decision-making
As aforementioned, from a societal perspective engineering facilities should intend to benefit the
quality of life of individuals of society, jointly considering the society, economy and the environment.
From the owner’s perspective decisions regarding investments into engineering facilities should be
made in order to provide the largest possible economic benefit. If the facility provides no benefit it
should not be realised at all (Faber, 2009). In order to evaluate the benefits received from an engineer-
ing facility, the decision problem may be considered from a risk management point of view, where
risk management is the process of making decisions based on risks. Risks are the consequences if
an event at a facility occurs combined with the probability or likelihood of the event occurring. The
term "risk" indicates that there is uncertainty or lack of knowledge associated with an event, its con-
sequences, or likelihood (Faber, 2009).
Risk (R) is often expressed as the product of the probability that the event will occur (P) and the
consequences (C) if the event occurs, as shown in Eq. 2.3.1:
R = P ·C (2.3.1)
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As an example, the decision problem of rehabilitating a dam, consisting of two decision alterna-
tives, is considered: the decision to rehabilitate the dam, or the decision to do-nothing and thereby
not rehabilitate the dam.
For the "rehabilitate" option, the probability of the dam failing should be lowered. The conse-
quences in case of dam failure most likely would remain the same as before the rehabilitation works
were implemented, or possibly might be lowered. In effect, the risk as the combined probability and
consequence is reduced. This decision alternative benefits society in that the safety of the dam is im-
proved. Considering the owner’s perspectives, the risk of economic losses is also reduced. However,
to rehabilitate a dam comes at a cost. If the probability of failure is not reduced adequately enough
in comparison with the cost, the alternative may not be justifiable.
If the "do-nothing" alternative is chosen there is no benefit in terms of safety since the probability
of dam failure remains the same. However, there are no costs associated with this alternative.
In effect, the advantages of each decision alternative should be weighed against each other and
the most beneficial option should be preferred. The decision problem with the two decision alterna-
tives is summarised in Table 2.3.
In the following section, a generic framework for decision-making based on risk is presented.
Table 2.3: Interrelation of cost and safety associated with two different decision alternatives when considering
a dam for rehabilitation works
Decision Alternative Probability
of Failure
Consequence of
dam failure
Safety risk Costs of Decision
Alternative
No Rehabilitation High High High No costs
Rehabilitation Lowered High, Or possibly
lowered
Lowered Costs of
rehabilitation
2.3.2 Framework for risk-based decision making
A framework for risk management as obtained from Holický (2009b) is shown in Fig. 2.5. Risk man-
agement consists of risk assessment and risk control. Risk assessment consists of performing a risk
analysis, where the risks are estimated from identified hazards, and the evaluation of the risks in
terms of acceptance criteria to decide which risks need treatment. Risk control involves decision
making with regards to the treatment of the evaluated risks. In addition this step also involves con-
sistently monitoring the risks for continuous improvements.
Hazard identification involves determining the sources of risk and the events which may have an
impact on the facility. A hazard is defined by the ISO/IEC (1999) Guide 51 regarding safety aspects as
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Figure 2.5: A framework for risk management (Holický, 2009a)
a: "potential source of harm", where harm could include: "physical injury or damage to the health of
people, or damage to property or the environment". This step also includes modelling of the relevant
hazard scenarios, where hazard scenarios are a sequence of events for a given hazard which may
lead to the undesirable consequences (Holický, 2009b).
Next, the risk is estimated by determining the consequences and the probability of a hazardous
event occurring. The probability analysis includes determining the chance or likelihood for a partic-
ular event to occur within a certain period of time (e.g. in one year). Through a consequence analysis
the possible outcomes of an undesired event are determined. These may include human fatalities
or injuries, financial losses or environmental damages (Holický, 2009b). The risk is expressed as an
expected value, being the product of the probability and the consequences as shown in Eq. 2.3.1.
Risk is thus a measure of the danger that the undesired events present to humans, the environment
or economic values (Holický, 2009b).
Different levels of risk analyses may be conducted; the study may be qualitative or quantitative
in nature. For a qualitative risk analysis, the magnitude of the potential consequences and the likeli-
hood that the consequences will occur are expressed using words, while for a quantitative risk anal-
ysis numerical values are used.
Next in the risk management process the risks that were estimated are evaluated to make deci-
sions on what risks need treatment, and what the extent and nature of the treatment should be. This
step involves comparing the risks estimated through the risk analysis against acceptance criteria.
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Multiple criteria may be used to evaluate the acceptability of different risks, for example risk to
human life (expected fatalities or injuries), financial impacts (expected economic losses), environ-
mental impacts (expected environmental damages), obtained from the risk analysis. Risk accep-
tance criteria are generally based on regulations, standards, experience and theoretical knowledge
(Holický, 2009b).
The following risk treatment options for risks with negative outcomes, as obtained from the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS 4360:2004 (2004) on "Risk Management", should be con-
sidered:
• Avoid the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives rise to the risk,
for example by decommissioning an existing dam.
• Reduce (prevent) the probability of occurrence which would reduce the likelihood of negative
outcomes. As an example, in dam safety this could be done through structural measures or
dam safety management activities such as monitoring, surveillance and periodic inspections.
• Reduce (mitigate) the consequences which would reduce the extent of the losses. For example,
in dam safety this could be done through emergency evacuation planning or by relocating the
population at risk.
• Transfer the risk. This involves sharing the risk with another party, for example by contractual
arrangements.
• Retain (accept) the risk. After all the different risk treatments are applied, there will be residual
risks that are retained and may require risk financing (e.g. insurance).
According to the Australian and New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS 4360:2004 (2004) on "Risk Man-
agement", it is essential to communicate and consult the basis on which decisions are made to
the stakeholders throughout the risk management process, where the stakeholders may include the
owner (private or public) or society. Stakeholders make judgements on risks based on different per-
ceptions such as values, needs, assumptions, concepts and concerns. Since these views can impact
the decisions made in the risk management process, it is important to integrate these perceptions
into the process.
In the following section the application of risk-based decision making methods in international
and in South African dam safety are discussed.
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2.3.3 Use of risk assessment in international dam safety
The ICOLD Bulletin 130 on "Risk Assessment in Dam Safety Management" (2005) outlines the current
international application of risk assessment in the management of dam safety. It is based on re-
sponses to a survey by respective ICOLD member countries. Information was collected for 24 coun-
tries, where the collected information was divided into two broad categories as shown:
• information related directly to risk management (analysis, evaluation, assessment)
• related information like legislation, guidelines, references etc.
The application of risk management in dam safety was further subdivided into the following cate-
gories:
• Risk analysis (the generation of information on risks)
– Standards Based Approach (SBA)
– Qualitative risk analysis
– Quantitative risk analysis
• Risk evaluation (principles for deciding the significance of risks)
• Applications of risk assessment to decision recommendations
Standards Based Approach (SBA) is the traditional approach in dam engineering where risks are
controlled using established standard engineering practice and safety coefficients. Risk analysis are
not used explicitly through SBA, but risk and safety are considered implicitly in developing design
loads and coefficients used in standards. All of the 24 member countries which responded to the
ICOLD survey use this method. Also, 12 of the countries only use SBA and do not use qualitative and
quantitative risk analysis in dam safety management. Some countries using only SBA, classify dams
according to the hazardous nature of the dam and the potential consequences in case of dam failure
without performing a further risk analysis (ICOLD, 2005).
Qualitative risk analysis does not use absolute values to describe the magnitude of the proba-
bility of an event and the associated consequences, but instead word form, descriptive or numeric
rating scales are used (ICOLD, 2005). The most simple form of qualitative risk analysis used by re-
sponding member countries is the "ranking" technique, where dams are ranked and prioritised for
risk reduction measures. In addition, other qualitative risk analysis methods, such as the Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), have
been used by less than half of the responding countries. These methods are formal qualitative risk
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analysis techniques which are widely used in other industries with the application to dams slowly
increasing.
Quantitative risk analysis uses numerical values as a representation of the actual magnitude of
the probability of an event occurring and its associated consequences. According to the ICOLD Bul-
letin 130 (2005), only a limited number of responding countries use quantitative risk analysis tech-
niques in dam safety management. Formal methods which include the First Order Second Moment
(FOSM), Monte Carlo Simulation and full mathematical integration, where all variables are integrated
over their full ranges. Other formal methods include the quantitative event tree or fault tree which
may also give a mathematical representation of risk. These techniques are used in a varying or lim-
ited degree amongst the countries, mostly by a small group of specialists or consultants within the
country.
Risk evaluation considers acceptability criteria for risk to life for individuals and society, it also
considers criteria for other risks such as financial or environmental risks. According to the ICOLD
Bulletin 130 (2005), acceptable or tolerable risk should be determined through a political process
based on societal values. From the responding countries, some legislators (e.g. Netherlands) estab-
lish risk criteria. In other countries the regulators (e.g. UK HSE), professional bodies (e.g. ANCOLD)
and dam owners (e.g. US Bureau of Reclamation) establish risk criteria for dam safety. From the 24
responding countries, 11 show a view on risk evaluation, where these countries include: Australia,
Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom,
the USA, Norway and Sweden (ICOLD, 2005).
The applications of risk assessment to decision recommendations is where the the complete
risk assessment framework is considered and consequently dam safety decisions are made. Of the
responding countries, half rely completely on the Standards Based Approach for risk management
and control.
One method which considers the complete risk assessment framework is PortFolio Risk Assess-
ment (PFRA), which considers a group of dams for dam safety risk management where a single owner
or regulator is responsible. According to the Glossary of the ICOLD Bulletin 130 (2005), "portfolio risk
assessment" is defined as follows:
"A particular form of risk assessment or analysis, which aims to make a comparative estimation of
risks over all of, or many of, the dams of a single owner or single regulatory or other jurisdiction..."
Of the responding countries, the following countries use PFRA: Australia, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, South Africa and the USA.
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The information collected from the ICOLD member countries regarding risk management are
provided in the ICOLD Bulletin 130 (ICOLD, 2005). In addition, an overview of related information
regarding guidelines, legislation and research in progress on risk assessment in dam safety manage-
ment as obtained from the responses from the countries is also presented in the Bulletin.
2.3.4 Use of risk assessment in South African dam safety
As discussed in section 2.2.3, an official dam safety programme was implemented with regards to
regulating the safety of the South African dams in 1986. According to Oosthuizen et al. (2010), in ad-
dition to the establishment of the dam safety legislation, a risk-based decision model for evaluating
the safety of government owned dams was developed by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA). Al-
though it is not currently required by the dam safety legislation, it has become standard to perform
a risk analysis as part of the regular dam safety evaluations completed in accordance with the leg-
islation. However, as discussed in section 2.2.3, the dam safety regulations were revised and are in
the process of being published and a significant change in the revised dam safety regulations include
that a risk analysis and/or risk assessment may be required to be carried out in case of applications
for licence to construct and in the case of dam safety evaluations for Category II and III dams (Nortje,
2010).
Through the risk analysis the expected probability of dam failure and the consequences in case
of dam failure are combined to define the risks which are evaluated in terms of acceptability criteria.
The basic steps of the risk analysis methodology are as follow (Oosthuizen et al., 2010):
• Determine the probability of dam failure.
• Perform a dam break analysis.
• Determine the consequences in case of dam failure.
• Evaluate the estimated risks against multiple acceptability criteria.
• Determine priorities using the multi-criteria decision model.
The estimated risks are presented on five impact diagrams (as shown in Fig. 2.6), with the x-
axis representing the consequence in case of dam failure and the y-axis the annual probability of
occurrence. A sixth diagram is used by DWA to represent the risk level. The risks are evaluated as
unacceptable or acceptable in terms of acceptability criteria, which are presented as a dividing line
on the diagrams.
26
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 2.6: Impact and risk level diagrams used by Department of Water Affairs (DWA) (Hattingh and Oost-
huizen, 2009)
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Note that DWA estimates an interval for the probability and the consequences in case of dam
failure, representing the level of confidence of the data. The maximum and minimum value of the
interval is used to plot the risks in the form of a block on the impact and risk level diagrams as shown
in Fig. 2.6.
The following expected risks are assessed against the multiple acceptance criteria as obtained
from Oosthuizen et al. (2010), Hattingh and Oosthuizen (2009), Oosthuizen (2002) and Oosthuizen
et al. (1991):
• Population at risk
The number of people exposed to a dambreak flood and the probability of dam failure is ex-
pressed as the expected risk to human life on a population at risk diagram.
• Financial impact
The financial losses due to a dam failure include both direct and indirect financial losses. Both
the direct and indirect financial losses and the associated probability of dam failure are pre-
sented on a financial impact diagram.
Direct financial losses may include the damage to the infrastructure, loss of agriculture and
costs of emergency relief. The indirect financial losses are not only applicable to the flooded
area downstream of the dambreak. This may include loss of future benefits from the dam and
the loss of future earnings for humans.
Certain financial losses may be wrongly interpreted, for example, the loss of future benefits
and the replacement costs of the dam. When a dam breaks, the future benefits of the dam is
lost and the value of these benefits is equivalent to the "value of the dam". If a dam is being
rebuilt or replaced, the costs and benefits should be evaluated as a new project on its own. It is
recommended by DWA that either the loss of future benefits or the replacement costs of a dam
should be included in the financial losses.
• Social impact
For the social impact the importance of the water provided by the dam for the society is judged
subjectively. The relevant population density, the available water per capita and alternative
sources of water guide the decision regarding social impact.
28
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
• Socio-economic impact
The socio-economic impact is quantified subjectively. The gross geographical product of the
relevant area, i.e. the income or payment received from agriculture, mining and manufacturing
through the dams’ existence, and the gross geographic product per capita are used to quantify
the socio-economic importance of the dam.
• Ecological impact
The ecological impact of a dam failure is also quantified subjectively. Environmental studies
conducted by DWA assisted in defining categories for the ecological impact depending on the
influence on the river and the loss of bio mass in case of dam failure.
• Risk level
The risk level diagram is used in combination with the impact diagrams created for the popula-
tion at risk, financial losses and social, socio-economic and ecological impacts in case of dam
failure. The x-axis represents the expected loss of life per exposed hour. This therefore only
applies to humans directly exposed to the hazard and may include fishermen, motorists and
workers in the downstream area of the dambreak. Using actual historical data, the loss of life is
predicted from the population at risk and assumptions related to the warning time available to
the population at risk in case of a dam failure. The y-axis of the risk level graph represents the
annual risk of both direct and indirect financial losses.
The risk analysis methodology have been updated and refined continuously by DWA as discussed
in Oosthuizen et al. (1991), Oosthuizen and Elges (1998), Oosthuizen (2000), Oosthuizen et al. (2002),
Oosthuizen and Hattingh (June 2007) and Oosthuizen (2009).
In summary, when dams are evaluated in terms of their safety the decision problem may be con-
sidered from a risk management point of view. If risks are evaluated as unacceptable in terms of
risk acceptance criteria, treatment measures such as rehabilitation works may be recommended to
reduce the level of risk imposed by the dam and improve the safety of the dam.
In this study, in light of evaluating South African dams for rehabilitation works, the criteria against
which the acceptability of risk to human life are evaluated (i.e. the population at risk diagram in
Fig. 2.6) are investigated. In the following section the underlying principles of risk evaluation and
decision making specifically with respect to risk to human life are discussed.
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2.4 Risk evaluation and decision making with regards to life safety
When establishing acceptability criteria for risk to human life, the preferences of the relevant stake-
holder, either the owner or society, should be considered. If a facility fails, the owner (public or pri-
vate) faces the consequences of financial losses. From a societal point of view, the most serious con-
sequence of failure is fatalities (Lentz, 2007). Thus, when decisions regarding risk to human life is of
concern, the values, needs, concepts and concerns of society need to be incorporated. In this section,
the main aspects of defining life safety criteria are discussed.
2.4.1 Individual versus societal risk
From an engineering perspective, societal risk is purely the relationship between the probability of
occurrence and the the number of people suffering a level of harm from a specific hazard (Ball and
Floyd, 1998). However, there should be a distinction between risk to an individual (termed "individ-
ual risk") and risk to a group of people (termed "societal risk"). Formal definitions for individual and
societal risk are provided as obtained from the Institution of Chemical Engineers (1992) cited in Ball
and Floyd (1998):
• "Individual risk is the frequency at which an individual may expect to sustain a given level of
harm from the realisation of specified hazards."
• "Societal risk is the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering from
a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified hazards."
The difference between individual and societal risk is demonstrated by considering an example
of risk to residents close to a hazardous facility:
• Individual risk - For a person close to a hazardous facility the chance of 1 fatality may be 1 in
100 000 per year due to an incident at the facility.
• Societal risk - For residents close to a hazardous facility the chance of 1 fatality or more may
be 1 in 100 000 per year due to an incident at the facility.
When considering dam safety, the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines
individual and societal risk in Bulletin 130 on "Risk Assessment in Dam Safety Management" (2005) as
follow:
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• Individual risk:
"Individual risk is the increment of risk imposed on a particular individual by the existence of a
hazardous facility. This increment of risk is in addition to the background risk to life, which the
person would live with on a daily basis if the facility did not exist or, in the context of dam safety,
if the dam did not fail."
• Societal risk:
"The risk of widespread or large scale detriment from the realisation of a defined hazard, the
implication being that the consequence would be on such a scale as to provoke a socio/political
response, and/or that the risk (i.e. the chance combined with the consequence) provokes pub-
lic discussion and is effectively regulated by society as a whole through political processes and
regulatory mechanisms.
Such large risks are typically unevenly distributed, as are their attendant benefits. Thus the con-
struction of a dam represents risk to those close by and a benefit to those further off, or a process
may harm some future generation more than the present one. The distribution and balancing
such major costs and benefits is a classic function of Government, subject to public discussion
and debate."
According to Ball and Floyd (1998), in the past, societal risks have only been related to the people
directly associated with the accident. However, over the years societal risk is considered in a broader
framework, and is defined as the total harm to the population as described by the ICOLD definition
for "societal risk" above. Therefore, societal risk is most commonly judged at a national level.
In this study, the need for rehabilitation works to reduce the risk to human life imposed by South
African government owned dams are considered. Since the dams are owned by the government, the
rehabilitation of these dams are funded by society by means of public taxes or charges. Further, the
loss of life in case of dam failure would provoke a socio/political response and public discussion.
Hence, when establishing acceptability criteria for evaluating risk to human life imposed by South
African government owned dams societal risk should be considered.
2.4.2 Fundamental and ethical principles of life safety
The fundamental importance of ensuring life safety to society may be highlighted by considering
the rights of humans. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly and is the foundation of the international human rights
law. In the Declaration the moral obligation to treat all human beings as equal are highlighted. In
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addition, the right of safety to human beings are highlighted. To demonstrate these requirements,
article 1, 3 and 7 of the Declaration are quoted (the full text of the declaration may be obtained from:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml, 2012).
Article 1
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."
Article 3
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person"
Article 7
"All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration
and against any incitement to such discrimination."
The fundamental principles of human rights highlighted by the UDHR should always be abided when
formulating life safety criteria. In addition, the value of human life could be considered from a philo-
sophical point of view. There are a number of ethical principles which influence decisions regarding
life safety and three principles as obtained from Lentz (2007) are outlined. These principles include:
Kant’s categorical imperative, the concept of intangibility of human life and the concept of utilitari-
anism.
Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative was formulated by Immanual Kant’s (1724-1804) argument that the fun-
damental principle of morality is based on a standard of rationality (Johnson, 2012). Thereby, the
foundational moral principle is the demands of each person’s own will. Among his formulations the
following two formulations as obtained from Lentz (2007) are shown:
1. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a uni-
versal law."
In other words, always act in such a way that you will be willing for it to become a general law
that everyone else should do the same in the same situation.
2. "Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in others, always as an end, and never
merely as a means."
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In other words, people should always be treated as valuable - as an end in themselves - and
should not just be used in order to achieve something else.
Intangibility of human life
The intangibility of human life principle is derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition where man is
understood to be the counterpart of God and human life is seen as holy. The intangibility principle
stresses the infinite value of life:
"The value of any human life is higher than that of a non-human life or that of an unenlivened
object."
"When each life is of infinite value, each fraction of life must equally be of infinite value. In conse-
quence, the value of each human life is equal, regardless of age, health or remaining life expectancy."
Utilitarianism
The ethical theory known as utilitarianism was established in the 18th century by the philosopher
and reformer, Jeremy Bentham (Lentz, 2007). His principle of happiness interprets pain and pleasure
as the only absolutes in the world. This lead to the central principle of utilitarianism:
"the greatest good for the greatest number"
In order to prevent that society benefits on the expenses of others, the utilitarianism principle is
subject to a major constraint . This constraint is implemented by means of the Kaldor-Hicks Principle
which states that:
"A policy is to be judged socially beneficial if the gainers receive enough benefits that they can com-
pensate the losers fully and still have some net gain left over."
From an engineering perspective, the utilitarianism principle is implicitly taken into account by
using quantitative risk analysis as the basis of their decisions. Such processes of decision making
implies using numerical values and ultimately prices with respect to human life. This stands in con-
tradiction with the principle of intangibility where human life is considered to be of infinite value.
However, despite the fact that each human life should be considered to be of infinite value, societal
resources are limited and should be prioritised (Faber, 2009).
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2.4.3 Preferences in life safety decision making
In addition to decisions regarding life safety being subjected to fundamental and ethical principles,
preferences of the individual and society may affect the decision. These preferences are outlined.
Individual and societal preferences
When establishing acceptability criteria for risk to human life, it must be noted that the viewpoint of
what is acceptable risk for an individual may differ greatly from what is acceptable for society (Faber,
2009). Each individual has their own perception of risk, or in other terms, their own preferences. An
individual decides to undertake an activity, weighing the risks against the direct and indirect personal
benefits (Vrijling et al., 1998). Individual preferences depends on each individual’s situations (status,
wealth, education, family etc.) (Faber, 2009). From a societal point of view, an activity is acceptable
in terms of the trade-off between risk and benefit for the total population (Vrijling et al., 1998).
The preferences of an individual may be in contradiction with societal preferences, but if the
acceptability of risk imposed by a engineering facility to human life is considered, the preferences of
the society is more of interest than the preferences of an individual (Faber, 2009). However, although
acceptability criteria should be viewed from a societal angle, the basic human rights of individuals as
expressed by the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in section 2.4.2 should still be protected.
Individual and societal preferences should not be confused with individual or societal risk. These
preferences purely influence the basis on which acceptability criteria for risk to individuals or society
may be established.
Voluntary and involuntary risk
Another important aspect is the degree of voluntariness with which a decision is taken and the risk is
accepted. From the point of view of an individual, the public is more tolerant to a greater risk from a
voluntary action than to a lower risk from an involuntary action.
According to Diamantidis (2008), this pattern of preferences regarding voluntary and involuntary
risks are revealed in accident statistics, where according to individuals of society, working in a fac-
tory is an involuntary activity, driving a car is a neutral (between voluntary and involuntary) activity
and mountaineering is a completely voluntary activity. According to accident statistics, the probabil-
ity of losing one’s life in normal daily activities such as driving a car or working in a factory appears
to be much lower than the overall probability of losing one’s life when partaking in a purely volun-
tary activity such as mountaineering. However, individuals are less tolerant to involuntary activities
(Diamantidis, 2008).
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When societal decisions involving risk are made, the individuals may still have an opinion in
accordance with their own standards, but their influence on the final outcome of the societal decision
is democratically limited. Individuals might thus feel a sense of involuntariness and may therefore
have a critical attitude towards societal decisions. Hence, risk acceptance criteria cannot be based on
one absolute level of acceptability, but may be subject to the degree of voluntariness (Vrijling et al.,
1998).
Risk aversion
Risk aversion is the additional public opposition to an event which kills a large number of people over
a series of smaller events which collectively result in the same number of fatalities. Risk aversion is
influenced, not only by accidents itself, but also by the attention brought about by media and politics
(Vrijling et al., 1998). According to HSE (2001) the societal awareness of risk from an event which kills
a large number of people may be amplified by the dramatisation of the issue and the use of value-
laden terminology and images by the media.
2.5 Concluding summary
Dams play a number of roles in our society, including enhancing the quality of life of our society.
However, dams are inherently associated with safety issues. Both internationally and in South Africa
there are serious cases of dam failures which have caused human fatalities and economic losses. This
stresses the need for the proper management and control of dam safety.
Internationally there are a number of organisations responsible for providing standards for the
management of dam safety. In South Africa, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) is the custodian
of a large number of dams and is responsible for all aspects of law regarding dam safety.
The South African dam safety legislation requires regular dam safety evaluations of dams which
are classified with a safety risk. In addition to the establishment of the dam safety legislation, a risk-
based decision model for evaluating the safety of dams has been developed and is currently applied
by DWA.
For a specific dam, the DWA risk analysis methodology combines the estimated probability of
dam failure and the different consequences of dam failure to quantitatively define risks. These risks
are evaluated against multiple acceptability criteria to assess the risk to human life and the economic,
social, socio-economic and environmental impacts in case of dam failure. If the risks are evaluated
as unacceptable in terms of the criteria, the rehabilitation of dams to improve their safety may be
recommended.
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DWA recently identified the need for reviewing decision criteria for the prioritisation of South
African dams for rehabilitation. More specifically DWA required the criteria for acceptability of as-
sessed risk to human life to be evaluated.
When establishing life safety criteria, the preferences of the relevant stakeholder should be con-
sidered. In South African dam safety acceptability criteria for risk to human life should be developed
at a societal level since the rehabilitation of government owned dams are financed through public
taxes and charges. In addition, the failure of a dam would provoke a political response and public
discussion.
When decisions regarding societal risk is of concern, the fundamental and ethical principles of
life safety should be considered. Further, the values, needs and concerns of society need to be incor-
porated.
In Chapter 1 it was identified that internationally a major existing approach for assessing risk to
human life, is through the use of conventional acceptability criteria for human safety, where the risk
to human life is most commonly expressed as the expected fatalities per year. Therefore the output
from the risk analysis concerning risk to human life is a quantitative measure of consequence, the
estimated number of fatalities in case of dam failure, and the associated probability of dam failure.
This form of criteria are generally calibrated by analysing the safety levels of previous projects.
In the following, Chapter 3, the development and application of conventional acceptability crite-
ria for risk to human life is provided. In Chapter 4, the current acceptability criteria for risk to human
life used in South African dam safety are evaluated by comparing the criteria to international best
practice methods identified in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Development and application of
conventional acceptability criteria to
assess risk to human life
3.1 Introduction
In this study the current acceptability criteria for risk to human life used in South African dam safety
by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) are evaluated by comparing to international best practice
methods. DWA expresses risk to human life quantitatively as the combination of the probability of
dam failure and the population at risk in case of dam failure (as shown in Fig. 2.6 in Chapter 2).
Thus, in order to compare, international methods for quantitatively evaluating risk to human life are
reviewed.
An existing approach for assessing the risk to human life of a project is through the use of con-
ventional criteria for human safety, where risk to human life is most commonly expressed as the
expected fatalities per year, i.e. the combination of the estimated probability and number of fatali-
ties. This form of criteria do not take the costs of the safety measure into account and are generally
calibrated by analysing safety levels of previous projects.
In this chapter existing literature on the use of conventional acceptability criteria to assess risk
to human life internationally in different industries and more specifically in dam safety are reviewed
to identify the international best practice method for comparison against South African dam safety
criteria.
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The chapter is structured as follows:
• A theoretical background of conventional criteria for risk to human life are presented.
– The quantitative representation of conventional criteria for life safety as FN-criterion lines
on FN-diagrams are discussed.
– The evaluation of risk to human life as FN-curves against FN-criterion lines are discussed.
In addition, the mathematics of constructing FN-curves are presented.
– Additional factors which should be considered when defining FN-criterion lines are pre-
sented. These factors include whether risk to human life should be judged as "tolerable"
or "acceptable" and "As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)".
• The historical development of conventional criteria for risk to human life are reviewed.
– The development of quantitative risk to human life criteria from the 1960’s to the 1990’s
are presented as obtained from a report on "Societal Risks" presented by Ball and Floyd
(1998).
– A brief overview on the development and application of societal risk criteria in the UK,
Hong Kong and in the Netherlands are provided as presented in the findings of the report.
• The application of the criteria internationally in different industries and more specifically in
dam safety are discussed.
– The current application of conventional criteria internationally in different industries,
and more specifically in Europe, is discussed with specific reference to a paper presented
by Trbojevic (2005).
– The current application of conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human life in-
ternationally in dam safety is presented as obtained from the International Commission
on Large Dams (ICOLD) Bulletin 130 on "Risk Assessment in Dam Safety Management"
(2005).
• Finally, a summary of the main findings is provided and the recommended life safety criteria
for comparison against South African dam safety criteria are discussed.
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3.2 Theoretical background of conventional criteria for life safety
As aforementioned, conventional criteria to assess risk to human life most commonly express risk
to human life as the expected fatalities per year. Therefore, the output from a risk analysis concern-
ing risk to human life is a quantitative measure of the probability of occurrence and the associated
consequence, the estimated number of fatalities.
According to Faber (2009), the most commonly used format to quantitatively assess risk to hu-
man life is against risk acceptance criteria presented as FN-criterion lines on an FN-diagram. FN-
diagrams have a double-logarithmic scale with the x-axis representing the number of fatalities (N)
and the y-axis representing the annual frequency (F) of N or more fatalities occurring (Kroon and
Maes, 2008). A double logarithmic scale is used since the range of the values obtained for F and N
can span multiple orders of magnitude.
In this section the most important features of FN-criteria presented on FN-diagrams and the
evaluation of the risk to human life as FN-curves against FN-criterion lines are discussed.
3.2.1 FN-criteria for risk to human life
A demonstrative example of an FN-diagram with two different FN-criterion lines are shown in Fig.
3.1. If the risk to human life is located below the FN-criterion line the risk is acceptable and con-
versely if the risk is located above it is unacceptable.
FN-criterion lines are mostly defined by two properties; the intersection with the y-axis (for N=1)
and the slope of the line. The properties of the criterion lines shown in Fig. 3.1 are defined as follow:
• Intersection with y-axis (N=1):
– For Criterion Line 1, if the frequency of 1 or more fatalities occurring is higher than 0.001
per year (i.e. 1 in 1 000 per year), it is unacceptable.
– For Criterion Line 2 if the frequency of 1 or more fatalities occurring is more than 0.0001
per year (i.e. 1 in 10 000 per year), it is unacceptable.
• Both FN-criterion lines have the same slope of -1.
Criterion Line 1 is located one factor of 10 higher than Criterion Line 2, leading to a higher risk
to human life being accepted by Criterion Line 1. Thus, the risk acceptability criteria set by Criterion
Line 1 is less stringent than Criterion Line 2.
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Figure 3.1: Illustrative FN-diagram demonstrating two different FN-criterion lines
The slope of the line represents the degree of risk aversion of the society (Kroon and Maes, 2008).
As aforementioned in section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, risk aversion is the additional public opposition to
an event which kills a large number of people over a series of smaller events which collectively result
in the same number of fatalities.
According to Ball and Floyd (1998), most FN-criterion line have slopes which are between -1 and
-2. A slope of -1, is termed ’risk neutral’ and the weighting preference of preventing large accidents
is proportional to the number of fatalities. If the slope is higher, for example -2, the society is ’risk
averse’ and the acceptance criteria are more stringent on the number of fatalities.
3.2.2 FN-curves
To assess the risk to human life against FN-criteria, the results from a quantitative risk assessment is
obtained, typically in the form of a predicted probability of occurrence (f) and the predicted number
of fatalities (N) for the occurrence of an event. Note that the risk to human life could be plotted in
two ways (CCPS, 2009):
• Non-cumulative frequency basis
These diagrams are called fN-diagrams, and the risk is plotted as the discrete frequency, f, on
the y-axis, of experiencing exactly N fatalities, on the x-axis.
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• Cumulative frequency basis
These diagrams are called FN-diagrams, and the risk to human life is plotted as the cumulative
frequency, F, on the y-axis, of experiencing N or more fatalities, on the x-axis.
However, societal risk criteria are most commonly expressed as FN-criteria and therefore risk to
human life is expressed as an FN-curve on an FN-diagram. According to Ball and Floyd (1998), if the
results are depicted on an fN-diagram, the results are not readily interpretable.
To construct an FN-curve, a list of events, E, and their associated frequencies, f, and conse-
quences, N, are compiled and sorted by decreasing value of N. For each event, the cumulative fre-
quency is calculated as the sum of the preceding frequencies. For example for an event, N3, the
cumulative frequency is F3 = f1 + f2 + f3. Since the events are sorted by decreasing value of N,
therefore (N1 > N2 > N3), F3 is the cumulative frequency of all events causing at least N3 fatalities.
Hence, the frequency of N3 or more fatalities occurring is F3. The method for calculating cumulative
frequencies, FN pairs are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: FN calculations from predicted frequency of occurrence, f, and the predicted number of fatalities, N
for the occurrence of an event, E (CCPS, 2009)
Event Event frequency (per year) Event consequence Cumulative frequency (per year)
E1 f1 N1 F1 = f1
E2 f2 N2 F2 = f1 + f2
E3 f3 N3 F3 = f1 + f2 + f3
... ... ... ...
En fn Nn Fn = f1 + f2 + f3 +...+ fn
An illustrative example of an FN-curve, representing the modelled risks obtained from a Euro-
tunnel Safety Case for a Channel Tunnel, is shown on an FN-diagram in Fig. 3.2 Evans and Verlander
(1997). The FN-curve is located between two different FN-criterion lines, the negligible and intoler-
able line in the ALARP region. These concepts are described in the following section.
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Figure 3.2: FN-curve for a Channel Tunnel assessed against FN-criteria (Channel Tunnel Safety Case, 1994,
p.172 in Evans and Verlander, 1997)
3.2.3 Tolerability of risk
A risk can be judged as "acceptable" or "tolerable", however it must be noted that the two terms
do not necessarily have the same meaning. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of the United
Kingdom suggests in their document, "Reducing risk, protecting people", that tolerable risk refers to a
risk that society as a whole is willing to live with so as to secure certain benefits (HSE, 2001). Tolerable
risk should be a risk worth taking and should be properly controlled. Tolerable risk would however
not be acceptable to everyone since everyone would not necessarily agree to have the risk imposed
on them. According to Melchers (2001), if a risk is tolerated, it does not mean that a risk is regarded
as negligible, but instead it refers to a risk being kept under review and further reduced if possible.
HSE (2001) also suggests a generalised framework for the tolerability of risk which considers the
principles on which risk criteria are based and also resembles the decision process people use in
"everyday life". The framework is represented by means of a downward triangle as shown in Fig. 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: HSE tolerability of risk framework (HSE, 2001)
The increasing level of risk is represented by the width if the triangle. Further, three different
regions of risk are presented in the tolerability of risk framework. These regions are described by HSE
(2001) as follows:
1. "Unacceptable risks near the top of the triangle - in this region risks would be regarded as un-
acceptable whatever the benefits unless they can be reduced to fall in a lower region or there are
exceptional reasons for the activity or practice to be retained.
2. Broadly acceptable risks near the bottom of the triangle - risks falling into this region are gen-
erally regarded as insignificant and adequately controlled and would not usually require further
action to reduce risks unless reasonably practicable measures are available.
3. Tolerable risks between the other two regions - risks in this region are typical of the risks from
activities that people are prepared to tolerate in order to secure benefits, in the expectation that:
a) the nature and level of the risks are properly assessed and the results used properly to deter-
mine control measures; AND
b) the residual risks are not unduly high and kept as low as reasonably practicable (the ALARP
principle); AND
c) the risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet the ALARP criterion."
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The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle is a more fundamental approach for
setting tolerable risk levels. The term "reasonably" implies goodness, care and consideration, while
"practicable" refers to what can be done or is feasible. Indeed many actions can be implemented to
reduce risk, but only provided if the financial resources and benefits are sufficient. The joined term
"reasonably practicable" is not defined explicitly in legislation, but according to Melchers (2001) it
can be interpreted as the degree of risk balanced against time, cost and physical difficulty of imple-
menting risk reduction measures.
According to HSE (2001) the implementation of the ALARP principle requires a "gross dispropor-
tion" test. The gross proportion is between the cost of an additional risk reduction measure, where
the cost is considered in broad terms and may include time and effort in addition to the monetary as-
pects, and the estimated amount of risk reduction. If the cost of the safety measure is placed on one
scale, and the amount of risk reduction is placed on the other scale, and it can be shown that the one
is disproportionate to the other, it could be argued that the implementation of the safety measure to
reduce risk was not reasonably practicable.
The framework for the tolerability of risk presented by HSE (2001) can be used similarly when
evaluating the acceptability of risk to human life against FN-criterion lines. In Fig. 3.2, the FN-curve
obtained from the Eurotunnel Safety Case is located between two different FN-criterion lines, the
negligible and intolerable line. If the risk is located below the negligible line, the risks may be re-
garded as broadly acceptable. If the risk is located above the intolerable region, it should under no
circumstances be accepted. In between the two criterion lines the ALARP region is defined. In this
region risks are regarded as tolerable only if they are reduced to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP).
In the following section, the historical development of FN-criteria internationally and in different
industries are discussed.
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3.3 Historical development of societal risk criteria
According to Ball and Floyd (1998), the need for societal risk criteria may be traced back to the 1960s
and 1970s, where quantitative risk assessment techniques to evaluate major hazards were first ap-
plied. The outputs of the assessments, as the probability of an event occurring against the conse-
quences in case the event occurs, demanded some criteria against which they could be assessed.
The report on "Societal Risks" presented by Ball and Floyd (1998) was commissioned by the Health
and Safety Executive (HSE) of the United Kingdom (UK) and presents an overview of the development
and application of societal risk criteria over 30 years. The report specifically focusses on the develop-
ment of criteria in the UK, Hong Kong and in the Netherlands. A brief overview of the findings in the
report are presented in the following.
3.3.1 Developments in the United Kingdom
According to Ball and Floyd (1998), in the 1960’s the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom (UK),
UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), was the first industry to develop acceptance criteria. The
criteria was based on the relationship between the size and the acceptable frequency of releases of
radioactive iodine from nuclear accidents which originated in the so-called Farmer Curve, as shown
in Fig. 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Farmer Curve developed by th UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in the 1960s (Ball and Floyd,
1998)
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Figure 3.5: Revised Kinchin curve proposed by the UK Atomic Energy Authority for nuclear power plants in
1982 (Ball and Floyd, 1998)
Another major first influence in the development of societal risk criteria, was by the Advisory
Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH, 1976 cited in Ball and Floyd (1998)):
"in a particular plant a serious accident was unlikely to occur more often than once in 10,000 years i.e.
10−4 per year ... this might perhaps be regarded as just on the borderline of acceptability.
A serious accident was never defined, but has often been taken (by practitioners) as 10 or more
fatalities (Ball and Floyd, 1998). This defined singular FN-point for acceptability (10, 10−4). The UK
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) further developed societal risk criteria from a single point criterion
to FN-based societal criteria for nuclear power plants as shown in Fig. 3.5.
In the 1980’s, research into the "tolerability of risk" from nuclear power stations was commis-
sioned by the HSE. The report presented by the HSE in 1988 presented useful information on the
tolerability of risk framework and could also be applied to other industries than the nuclear power
plant industry. This framework focussed mostly on individual risk and no attempt was made to fur-
ther develop FN-criteria. However, in the report a discussion on the "tolerability" of major accidents,
with particular reference to the risks associated with the Canvey Island and the Thames Barrier, was
presented.
The works presented by the HSE provided a basis for setting risk criteria in the transport risk
study published by the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances (ACDS). The proposed societal
criteria is shown on the FN-diagram in Fig. 3.6. These societal risk guidelines incorporated an ALARP
region with the negligible level of risk located three factors of 10 lower than the intolerable level.
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Figure 3.6: FN-criteria developed by the UK Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances (ACDS, 1991 cited
in Ball and Floyd (1998))
The Offshore Safety Division within the HSE also proposed societal risk criteria to be used in
offshore situations as shown in Fig. 3.7. The criteria were developed using the individual risk criteria
presented by the HSE report in 1988 and incorporates an ALARP region similar to the societal risk
criteria developed by ACDS.
Figure 3.7: FN-criteria developed by the Offshore Safety Division within the HSE (1991 cited in Ball and Floyd
(1998))
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The "tolerability of risk" framework was revised by the HSE, accounting for developments since
1988, and a report was reissued in 1992 and thereafter in 2001 in the report "Reducing Risk, Protecting
People".
The properties of the FN-criteria shown in Fig. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 are summarised in Table 3.2 with
respect to the industry to which the criteria may be applied to, the different zones defined on the
FN-diagram, the anchor point to define the FN-criteria, the slope of the line, and the consequence
(N or more fatalities) and frequency (F) cut-off points.
Table 3.2: Characterisation of FN-criteria shown in Fig. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 as developed in the UK (Ball and Floyd,
1998)
Revised Kinchin curve
(1982)
ACDS - UK (1991) UK Offshore (1991)
Application one nuclear reactor in
the UK
"identifiable community" close
to a dangerous goods transport
route in the UK
offshore installations
Zones 2 - above and below
suggested "permissible"
criteria lines
3 - Intolerable, ALARP,
Negligible
3 - Intolerable, ALARP,
Acceptable
Anchor
point
None specified 2 × 10−4 per year for 500 or
more fatalities (lower limit of
"intolerable"), upper limit of
"negligible" 1000 times lower
"Tolerable" individual
risk of 1 × 10−3 per year,
"Broadly acceptable"
individual risk of 1 ×
10−6
Line slope -1 -1 -1 and -1.3 for tolerable
and broadly acceptable
lines respectivey.
Consequence
cut-off
None specified None 1000
Frequency
cut-off
1 × 10−7 per year 1 × 10−8 per year 1 × 10−8 per year
Trbojevic (2005) additionally describes the evolution of societal risk criteria in the UK, from the
1980s and extending into the 2000s. The evolution of the upper tolerable risk level is shown in Fig.
3.8.
• In 1981 a Canvey Report presented by the HSE, suggested that an event with 1500 fatalities and
a frequency of 2× 10−4 per year can be judged as intolerable. The proposed slope for FN-criteria
was -1, implying no risk aversion, based on historical records for the chemical industry.
• In 1991, the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) proposed an upper tolerable risk
level through the point, 500 fatalities and a frequency of 2× 10−4 per year, and a slope of -1.
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• In 2001, the HSE in their document Reducing risk, protecting people, suggested that 50 fatalities
and a frequency of 2× 10−4 per year may be judged as intolerable risk (HSE, 2001). The slope of
the FN-criteria is also -1.
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of the upper tolerable risk level in the UK (Trbojevic, 2005)
In Fig. 3.8 the corresponding fatalities for a frequency of 2× 10−4 per year, as described for each
situation above, is shown. It is interesting to note that upper tolerable risk level became more strin-
gent as the years progressed. This could be attributed to experts gaining more experience and knowl-
edge in the trends and acceptability of hazards occurring and thereby concluding that the criteria
may become more stringent.
For the societal risk criteria proposed by the HSE (2001), the broadly acceptable level of risk is
suggested to be three factors of 10 lower than the upper tolerable risk level.
3.3.2 Developments in Hong Kong
In 1981 the Hong Kong government commissioned a study associated with hazardous installations
on the Tsing Yi Island which were within close proximity of residential apartment blocks (Ball and
Floyd, 1998). The study stressed the need to oversee risk management of such facilities with particu-
lar regard to land-use planning. Additional studies in the 1980’s of other hazardous facilities further
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stressed the need. In 1987 societal risk criteria based on the ACMH criterion point and the Kinchin
criteria developed in the UK, were formalised as part of "Interim Risk Guidelines" published by a Gov-
ernment Committee. The societal risk criteria are shown in Fig. 3.9. The singular point of (10,10−4)
as proposed by the ACMH in 1976 is incorporated and in addition, for N = 1 000 fatalities or more, a
risk with a potential for greater loss of life is not acceptable.
Figure 3.9: Societal risk criteria proposed by Hong Kong for hazardous installations in 1988 (Ball and Floyd,
1998)
These societal risk guidelines proposed by Hong Kong as shown in Fig. 3.9 were revised in 1993,
incorporating an ALARP region. The acceptable risk level was defined two factors of 10 lower than
the unacceptable risk level with the ALARP region located within, as shown in Fig. 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Revised societal risk criteria proposed by Hong Kong for hazardous installations in 1993 (Ball and
Floyd, 1998)
Following the UK’s lead, the Hong Kong Government commissioned two transport of dangerous
goods studies. These studies led to proposed societal risk criteria in 1997 for the transport of danger-
ous goods, including LPG and Chlorine, as shown in Fig. 3.11 and 3.12.
The properties of the Hong Kong FN-criteria shown in Fig. 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 summarised in
Table 3.3. The same properties that were tabulated for UK criteria are shown for Hong Kong criteria.
Figure 3.11: Societal risk criteria proposed by Hong Kong for transport of dangerous goods in 1997, LPG (Ball
and Floyd, 1998)
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Figure 3.12: Societal risk criteria proposed by Hong Kong for transport of dangerous goods in 1997, Chlorine
(Ball and Floyd, 1998)
Table 3.3: Characterisation of FN-criteria shown in Fig. 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 as developed in the Hong Kong
(Ball and Floyd, 1998)
Hong Kong (1988) Hong Kong (1993) Hong Kong DG
Transport - LPG
(1997)
Hong Kong DG
Transport -
Chlorine (1997)
Application development of,
or near to, a
Potentially
Hazardous
Installation
Those close to a
Potentially
Hazardous
Installation (in
Hong Kong)
Those close to a
LPG transport
routes (in Hong
Kong)
Those close to
Chlorine transport
routes (in Hong
Kong)
Zones 2- Unacceptable
and Acceptable
2- Unacceptable,
ALARP, Acceptable
2- ALARP,
Acceptable
2- Unacceptable,
ALARP, Acceptable
Anchor
point
1 × 10−4 per year
for 10 or more
fatalities
1 × 10−4 per year
for 10 or more
fatalities (lower
limit of
’unacceptable’ - as
before).
Acceptable limit
100 times lower
Based on existing
Potentially
Hazardous
Installations (PHI)
and number of
LPG PHIs
Acceptable limit
100 times lower
than unacceptable
limit
Line slope -1 -1 -1 -1
Consequence
cut-off
1000 fatalities 1000 fatalities 1000 fatalities 1000 fatalities
Frequency
cut-off
1 × 10−9 per year 1 × 10−9 per year 1 × 10−9 per year 1 × 10−9 per year
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3.3.3 Developments in the Netherlands
Following accidents involving hazardous materials which occured in Europe, the Province of Gronin-
gen in the Netherlands issued societal risk criteria in 1978 as shown in Fig. 3.13. The FN-diagram
consists of an unacceptable zone, a zone for further assessment and evaluation, and an acceptable
region. For N < 1 the slope of the criteria is -1, therefore risk neutral. For N > 1, the slope of the FN-
criteria is -2, thereby incorporating risk aversion. In addition, for the lower limit of unacceptability,
at N = 1 000 fatalities or more a risk with a potential for greater loss of life is not acceptable. For the
upper limit of acceptability, the consequence cut-off is at N = 10 fatalities.
Figure 3.13: Societal risk criteria proposed by the Province of Groningen in the Netherlands in 1978 (Ball and
Floyd, 1998)
During the 1980s, numerous risk studies conducted by the Dutch Government, led to the formu-
lation of formal societal risk criteria as shown in Fig. 3.14. The FN-diagram consists of three regions,
an unacceptable region, a region where reduction is desired and an acceptable region. The slope of
the FN-criteria is -2, thereby incorporating risk aversion.
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Figure 3.14: Societal risk criteria proposed by Dutch Government in the 1980s (Ball and Floyd, 1998)
In 1996, the criteria were revised and the acceptable region was removed since it was understood
that the "acceptable" line was of limited value to land use planners. Instead an As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) region is defined. The revised criteria are shown in Fig. 3.15.
Figure 3.15: Revised societal risk criteria proposed by Dutch Government in 1996 (Ball and Floyd, 1998)
Based on the studies in Hong Kong on the transport of dangerous goods, societal risk criteria were
proposed in 1995/1996 in the Netherlands as shown in Fig. 3.16.
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Figure 3.16: Proposed societal risk criteria for transport of dangerous goods by Dutch Government in 1996
(Ball and Floyd, 1998)
The properties of the Netherlands FN-criteria shown in Fig. 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 are sum-
marised in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Characterisation of FN-criteria shown in Fig. 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 as developed in the Nether-
lands (Ball and Floyd, 1998)
Groningen Curve (1978) Netherlands (1980s) Netherlands (1996)
Application a facility handling dangerous
goods (in the Netherlands)
Those close to existing
hazardous facilities (in
the Netherlands)
Those close to existing
hazardous facilities (in
the Netherlands)
Zones 3 - Unacceptable, Further
assessment and evaluation,
Acceptable
3- Unacceptable,
Reduction Desired,
Acceptable
2- Societal risk to be
reduced, ALARA
Anchor
point
1 × 10−4 for 10 or more
fatalities (for unacceptability
level of risk)
1 × 10−5 per year for 10
or more fatalities (lower
limit of ’unacceptable’),
1 × 10−7 per year for 10
or more fatalities (upper
limit of ’acceptable’)
1 × 10−5 per year for 10
or more fatalities
Line slope -1 for 0.01 to 1 fatality and -2
for >1 fatality
-2 -2
Consequence
cut-off
1000 (lower limit of
unacceptability) 10 (upper
limit of acceptability)
1000 fatalities 1000 fatalities
Frequency
cut-off
1 × 10−10 per year 1 × 10−9 per year 1 × 10−9 per year
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3.3.4 Concluding summary regarding the historical development of FN-criteria
There appears to be many points of similarity between the FN-criteria as it developed from the 1960s
to 1990s in the UK, Hong Kong and Netherlands. The societal risk criteria have been developed for
risks associated with large scale facilities, including hazardous installations such as nuclear and off-
shore facilities, and transport of dangerous goods. Although developed for different industries, the
criteria are interlinked, in particular due to the slope of the criterion lines and the defined anchor
points.
With regards to the slopes of criterion lines, the UK and Hong Kong use a slope of -1, which resem-
bles risk neutrality. On the other hand, the Netherlands have adopted a slope of -2, incorporating risk
aversion. However, Ball and Floyd (1998) found that there is no compelling rational for the view of in-
creasing societal aversion, and therefore a slope of -1, representing risk neutrality, is recommended.
In addition it can be seen that most of the criteria define three regions for risk:
• risks that are so high that they are to be judged as unacceptable/intolerable;
• risks that are so low that they are to be judged as acceptable/negligible;
• risks in between where the trade-off between risks and benefits need to be considered (e.g.
using ALARP).
According to Ball and Floyd (1998), to facilitate the comparison between the criteria, the limit for
"intolerability" may be comparable to "unacceptabile and "acceptable" may be compared to "negli-
gible".
The upper limit of tolerability is often set at 10−4 for 10 or more fatalities (or 10−5 in the Nether-
lands). The acceptable/negligible line tends to be located two or three factors of 10 (100 or 1000)
lower on the frequency (F) scale.
In addition, it must be noted that for some criteria, such as the criteria developed in Hong Kong,
the criteria are truncated vertically and thus an upper limit for the potential loss of life is defined.
56
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.4 Application of societal risk criteria
The historical development of FN-criteria was reviewed in the previous section. In the following,
the current application of conventional criteria internationally in different industries and also more
specifically in international dam safety are discussed.
3.4.1 International societal risk criteria
Trbojevic (2005) compares societal risk criteria for different countries in Europe, including the Nether-
lands, Czech Republic, the UK and France, as described:
Netherlands
The Dutch criteria were developed in 1996, as described in section 3.3 and illustrated in Fig. 3.15. A
slope of -2 is assumed for the FN-criteria, thereby incorporating risk aversion.
Czech Republic
The upper tolerable risk level of risk in the Czech Republic for existing installations corresponds to
the criterion used in the Netherlands. For new installations the FN-criteria are more stringent and is
one factor of 10 lower on an FN-diagram.
UK
As presented in section 3.3, in 2001 the HSE suggests in their document "Reducing risk, protecting
people" (also referred to as R2P2), that 50 fatalities and a frequency of 2× 10−4 per year may be judged
as intolerable risk (HSE, 2001). The slope of the FN-criteria is -1.
In 2004, the HSE in their document "Guidance on ’as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) De-
cisions in Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)", shows acceptability criteria for societal risk
in a risk matrix. Trbojevic (2005) uses the risk matrix to define two FN-criterion points; (1, 10−3) and
(100, 10−6). The slope for the FN-criterion is -1.5, thereby incorporating some risk aversion.
France
The French criterion depends on the minimum distance of the specified level of harm from the haz-
ard source. Trbojevic (2005) assumes a constant frequency of 1× 10−7 per year over the full range of
fatalities for the FN-criterion.
The FN-criteria described for the different countries in Europe are compared against each other
in Fig. 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of societal risk criteria in Europe (Trbojevic, 2005)
The criteria defined in the Netherlands and Czech Republic for existing installations coincide,
while the Czech criteria for new installations are one factor of 10 more stringent. For the COMAH
criteria defined in the UK and the criteria defined in the Netherlands and Czech Republic for existing
installations, the FN-point for one fatality (N = 1) coincides. The main difference in the criteria may
be attributed to the different degrees of risk aversion implemented in terms of the slopes assumed
for the FN-criteria. For the French criterion line, if the frequency is higher than 1× 10−7 per year, the
risk is judged as unacceptable. For a low number of fatalities, this criteria may require uneconomical
safety measures.
3.4.2 Application of societal risk criteria in international dam safety
In the previous two sections, the historical development and application of FN-criteria internation-
ally in different industries were discussed. The criteria were defined for large scale facilities, including
hazardous installations, such as nuclear and offshore facilities, and the transport of dangerous goods.
However, the criteria from one industry may not always be directly applied to another industry since
it could be impracticable to accept the same safety levels. Thus, the application of FN-criteria in in-
ternational dam safety are reviewed to define international best practice criteria to compare to South
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African dam safety criteria.
The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) published Bulletin 130 on "Risk Assess-
ment in Dam Safety Management" (2005) which outlines the current application of risk-based meth-
ods in international dam safety. It includes responses to a survey completed by respective ICOLD
member countries. The outline of the collected information for 24 countries are presented in section
2.3.3 of Chapter 2. Within the collected information, the application of risk evaluation techniques to
establish acceptability criteria for risk to human life are described.
From the 24 responding countries, 11 show a view on risk evaluation, where 9 of the countries
explicitly discuss risk criteria. These countries include: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom and the USA (ICOLD, 2005). Norway
and Sweden raise concerns over risk evaluation. A basic outline of the views of the responding coun-
tries are outlined as obtained from the ICOLD Bulletin 130 (2005).
Australia
According to ICOLD (2005), tolerable risk levels have not yet been established for dams by the govern-
ment or by regulatory agencies. For other industries there are examples of tolerable risk level policies
that have been implemented by legislation, such as the criteria established in the state of Victoria in
the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations and in the state of New South Wales by the regulator
for land use planning (LUP).
The Australian Committee On Large Dams (ANCOLD), a organisation responsible for providing
dam safety standards, proposes tolerability criteria for risk to human life in their "Guidelines on Risk
Assessment" (2003). FN-criteria are defined for new and existing dams as shown in Fig. 3.18. The FN-
criterion line for new dams is one factor of 10 more stringent than for existing dams. According to
ANCOLD (2003), the marginal cost of reducing risk for an existing dam is generally more than for new
dams. Thus, by weighing the costs and benefits against each other it is not reasonably practicable to
reduce the risk of existing dams to the same levels as new dams.
The criterion lines are truncated horizontally, i.e. for 100 or more fatalities a limit is set for the
annual frequency of occurrence. According to ANCOLD (2003), technology does not allow for the
construction of dams with smaller probabilities of failure and thus it is impracticable to reduce dam
safety levels to more stringent criteria.
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Figure 3.18: ANCOLD proposed FN-criteria for new and existing dams (Adapted from ANCOLD (2003))
According to ICOLD (2005), one regulator, the New South Wales Dam Safety Committee (NSW-
DSC), were prepared to consider the results of risk assessments in dam safety, but this has not been
endorsed by any policies. However, in 2006 the Committee suggested tolerable risk criteria in their
"Risk Management Policy Framework" which are based primarily on a critical review of the ANCOLD
guidelines for new and existing dams. The NSW-DSC FN-criteria for new and existing dams are illus-
trated in Fig. 3.19 and Fig. 3.20 respectively. A negligible risk level is located two factors of 10 lower
than the tolerable risk level.
A limit is set for the potential of losing more than 1000 lives, since the Committee believes it
would be seen as catastrophic by society at an international scale and the economic costs of such
large tragedies would be great. A limit is also set for the probability of occurrence, since it becomes
increasingly difficult to reliably estimate the frequency of fatalities occurring at low levels. The FN-
diagram for existing dams, shown in Fig. 3.20, also requires a full SBA when the probability of failure
becomes very low and the number of fatalities become very high. The SBA refers to the Standards
Based Approach, where risks are controlled using established engineering practice and standards, as
discussed in section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.19: New South Wales Dam Safety Committee FN-criteria for new dams (Adapted from NSW-DSC
(2006))
1.E-7
1.E-6
1.E-5
1.E-4
1.E-3
1 10 100 1000 10000
F ,
 
a n
n
u
a l
 
f r e
q u
e n
c y
 
o
f  N
 
o
r  
m
o
r e
 
f a
t a
l i t
i e
s
N, number of fatalities due to dam failure
Risks are intolerable
Important Note: Where fatalities 
are expected in the event of dam 
failure, consultation with the 
affected public is recommended as 
part of the final decision process
Full SBA required as 
a minimum - final
DSC decision based 
on critical review of 
benefits and risks
Risks are negligible
Risks to be as low 
as reasonably 
practicable
(ALARP)
Limit of tolerability
Figure 3.20: New South Wales Dam Safety Committee FN-criteria for existing dams (Adapted from NSW-DSC
(2006))
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Canada
In Canada the scientific validity of quantifying the probability of dam failure for decisions regarding
life safety and consequently the values and use of risk analysis methods are questioned by dam own-
ers and regulators. Thus, no formal life safety criteria for dams exists in Canada, but instead they rely
on traditional dam engineering practices for improving dam safety.
It must be noted that some risk assessment activities have been developed, but have been aban-
doned. They include (ICOLD, 2005)):
• "the abandonment of tolerable life safety criteria by BC Hydro in 1997, although they are still
erroneously widely quoted internationally;
• the use of necessarily limited embankment dam piping statistics from a population of dams to
derive the probability of failure of an individual dam; and
• the use of subjective probabilities within event trees."
Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic dams are categorised based on the potential consequences associated with
the existence of the dam, this is also referred to as a "Primary" risk assessment. The "Secondary" risk
assessment requires evaluating the actual technical state or local conditions at the dam, but these
results are not considered for categorising the dam.
A "Risk Analysis and Risk Evaluation System" determines a "Risk Assessment Factor", which is
based on the consequences of dam failure, including the number of lives lost, property losses, the
interruption of infrastructure downstream, the damages directly to the dam body, losses of profits,
and a range of environmental damages. The factor is quantified using dam break wave downstream.
However, no accepted tolerable life safety criteria exist for dams within Czech Republic.
Germany
According to ICOLD (2005) risk assessment does not have a long tradition in Germany, but an in-
creasing sensitivity towards environmental hazards and risks stressed the treatment of dam-related
risks. The draft of the revised German technical standards for dams, E DIN 19700-10/11, pursue a
concept where maximal safety is stressed and the assessment and mitigation of the remaining risks
are required. This standard applies semi-quantitative considerations and no formal quantitative life
safety criteria are defined.
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Netherlands
The Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment in the Netherlands have set risk cri-
teria for hazardous installations, transport routes and airports (ICOLD, 2005). The approach was
developed outside the framework of dams.
New Zealand
ICOLD (2005) states that there are no absolute life safety criteria available in New Zealand. The Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS 4360 (2004) on "Risk Management" notes that decisions
regarding risk acceptability and treatment are based on financial, social, technical, humanitarian and
other criteria which depend on the objectives and interests of the stakeholders (including the owner
and society). In addition, the standard notes that when assessing risk treatment options that risks
should be made As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Therefore, it is the responsibility of lo-
cal authorities or asset owners to ensure that risks, costs and benefits of risk reduction measures are
balanced to satisfy the needs of the societies they serve.
South Africa
The application of risk analysis and risk management to dam safety in South Africa have been de-
scribed in section 2.3.4 of Chapter 2. In order to provide guidelines to decision-makers on the ac-
ceptability of risks obtained from the risk analysis methodology, five impact graphs and a graph rep-
resenting the risk level was developed by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA). The estimated risks
are assessed against a dividing line on the graphs, defining the border between acceptable and unac-
ceptable risk. The six different graphs developed by DWA include; population at risk, social impact,
financial impact, socio-economic impact, environmental impact and the risk level graph, as illus-
trated in in Fig. 2.6 of Chapter 2.
United Kingdom
According to ICOLD (2005), the "tolerability of risk framework" for hazardous industries developed
by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom (UK) may be considered in dam
safety. Although it does not currently have a role in dam safety, some practitioners consider that the
framework may be used as a standard against which dam owners may be judged in the event of dam
failure or serious incident. The "tolerability risk of framework" has been described in section 3.2.3.
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USA
The use of risk assessment varies from no formal use to the adoption of risk assessment as a nor-
mal dam safety process in the United States of America (USA). Some instances where risk analysis
techniques are applied to dam safety in the USA are outlined by ICOLD (2005):
US Bureau of Reclamation
In 1997 the US Bureau of Reclamation suggested in their guidelines criteria for evaluating life safety
risks. In 2003 these guidelines have been replaced by revised "Guidelines for achieving public pro-
tection in dam safety decision making". The guidelines provide two measures, previously referred to
as the two-tier system. The first measure addresses individual risk, and the second addresses soci-
etal risk. The societal risk criteria are depicted on an fN-diagram. However, it must be noted that
fN-criteria should not be misinterpreted as FN-criteria (refer to section 3.2.2).
US Army Corps of Engineers
The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is responsible for 600 dams throughout USA. They are
applying risk assessments to the dams as part of a research and development program. Interim
guidelines presented by the USACE in 2009, "Interim Tolerable Risk Guidelines for US Army Corps
of Engineers Dams" include tolerable risk to human life guidelines (Munger et al., 2009).
The guidelines present FN-criteria for assessing societal risk. According to Munger et al. (2009),
the criteria were adapted from the criteria presented by ANCOLD and NSW-DSC, illustrated in Fig.
3.18, 3.20 and 3.19 earlier in this section. For new and existing dams the tolerable risk level is shown
in Fig. 3.21 and Fig. 3.22. Similar to the ANCOLD and NSW-DSC guidelines, the tolerable risk level is
one factor of 10 more stringent for new dams.
According to ICOLD (2005), Norway and Sweden raise concerns over risk evaluation but do not ex-
plicitly use FN-criteria. In Norway the dam safety profession concentrates on refining the estimation
of the probability of dam failure before developing more detailed consequence analyses and risk cri-
teria. In Sweden instead of calculated probabilities and the application of FN-diagrams, criticality
indices are determined and the owner decides from the nature and magnitude of the determined
criticalities to what level of higher safety the dam needs to be upgraded.
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Figure 3.21: USACE FN-diagram for new dams
(Munger et al., 2009)
Figure 3.22: USACE FN-diagram for existing
dams (Munger et al., 2009)
3.5 Summary of main findings
Internationally, the conventional method to quantitatively evaluate the acceptability of risk to human
life is against FN-critera on an FN-diagram, with the x-axis representing the number of fatalities (N)
and the y-axis the probability (F) of N or more fatalities occurring. The life safety risks are evaluated
against the FN-criteria, where the risks are expressed as the expected fatalities per year.
FN-criterion lines are mostly defined by two properties; its intersection with the y-axis and the
slope of the line. The intercept with the y-axis define the stringency levels of the criteria, i.e. if the
criteria intercepts the axis at a lower probability of occurrence, the criteria are more stringent. The
slope of the line represents the degree of risk aversion of society, i.e. the opposition of society to large
scale accidents over smaller scale accidents which collectively result in the same number of fatalities.
If the slope is -1 it represented "risk neutrality", whereas an increased slope, for example -2, describes
risk aversion.
In addition, different regions may be defined through FN-criteria; the broadly acceptable region,
where risks may be regarded as negligible, the intolerable region, where risks should not be accepted,
and the ALARP region within the other two regions, where risks may be regarded as tolerable only if
they are reduced to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable.
The implementation of ALARP requires that the costs of a safety measure and the amount of risk
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reduction are balanced against each other. If the costs are disproportionate to the reduction, it is
not reasonably practicable to implement the safety measure. Consequently it is not reasonably prac-
ticable to reduce risks to more stringent safety levels and a higher risk is accepted. Thus, although
FN-criteria do not explicitly evaluate the costs associated with safety measures, the stringency of risk
levels may implicitly incorporate the cost of reducing risks.
Historically there seems to be many points of similarity between FN-criteria as it developed in-
ternationally for different industries. With regards to the slope of FN-criteria, some industries in-
corporate the view of risk aversion. However, it is argued by Ball and Floyd (1998) that there is no
compelling rational for this view and a slope of -1 is preferred.
Although there are many similarities between international FN-criteria, the criteria from one in-
dustry may not always be readily applied to another industry, since it could be impracticable to ac-
cept the same safety levels. In dam safety, the application of life safety criteria in different countries
are presented by ICOLD (2005). According to ICOLD (2005), risk analysis methods are still gaining
acceptance in international dam safety. Although many countries present a view and acknowledge
that risk-based tools are useful within dam safety, there are many contradicting opinions and views.
This causes certain countries to be hesitant to clearly define quantitative FN-criteria for life safety.
In Australia, ANCOLD proposes FN-criteria for new and existing dams. The NSW-DSC in Australia
also defines FN-criteria for new and existing dams which are based on the ANCOLD criteria. In the
USA, the USACE defines FN-criteria for life safety which were adapted from the criteria developed by
ANCOLD and NSW-DSC.
For this study it was therefore decided to compare the South African dam safety criteria for risk to
human life to the life safety criteria developed by ANCOLD. This comparison will be done in the next
chapter.
The following properties of ANCOLD criteria, illustrated in Fig. 3.18, are summarised:
• The gradient of the ANCOLD criteria is -1, which implies risk neutral decision making, as rec-
ommended internationally.
• The criteria has a lower probability of occurrence cut-off and also defines different criteria for
new and existing dams, thus incorporating measures of reasonable practicality.
• ANCOLD criteria are based on engineering judgement, and implicitly incorporate additional
considerations, such as cost considerations for reasonable practice.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of South African dam safety
acceptability criteria for risk to human life
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was identified that a large number of dams owned by the Department of Water Affairs
(DWA) in South Africa are in need of rehabilitation works. A methodology using risk analysis to eval-
uate if dams should be rehabilitated have been developed and is currently applied by DWA. In this
methodology the probability and the consequences of dam failure are combined to define the risks.
These risks are evaluated using multiple acceptability criteria to assess the risk to human life and the
economic, social, socio-economic and environmental impacts in case of dam failure.
In this chapter, the criteria used in the DWA decision process to establish acceptability of assessed
risk to human life will be evaluated by comparing to international best practice methods identified
in Chapter 3.
Risk to human life is quantitatively defined by DWA as the combination of the probability of dam
failure and the population at risk in case of dam failure. The population at risk is the number of
people exposed to the dambreak flood in case of dam failure. Internationally, acceptability of risk
to human life is assessed using the estimated number of human fatalities in case of dam failure as
a consequence measure as opposed to the population at risk used by DWA. The expected number
of fatalities can be statistically predicted based on the population at risk and assumptions related
to the warning time available to the population at risk in case of dam failure. DWA uses their own
in-house developed prediction model for this purpose. The statistical basis for this model is not
documented and is therefore unknown. Other prediction models are available internationally which
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are based on the statistical analysis of data of dam failures and the associated fatalities (Hartford and
Baecher (2004)). In order to compare DWA risk criteria to its international counterparts it is necessary
to incorporate a suitable prediction model to convert "population at risk" to "expected number of
fatalities".
The chapter is structured as follows:
• Evaluation of South African dam safety criteria for risk to human life;
– by comparing to the international best practice method for assessing the acceptability of
risk to human life identified in Chapter 3,
– in terms of the international best practice method for predicting loss of life.
• South African case studies of dams are assessed in terms of the proposed evaluation criteria to
assess risk to human life.
• A summary of the main findings is provided.
4.2 Evaluation of South African dam safety criteria in terms of
international criteria
In Chapter 3 it was found that in international dam safety acceptability criteria for risk to human life
are not widely applied and are still in the process of gaining acceptance. However, a number of coun-
tries have based their criteria on the FN-criteria proposed by the Australian National Committee On
Large Dams (ANCOLD) as illustrated in section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3. South African dam safety criteria
are therefore compared to the ANCOLD criteria.
4.2.1 South African dam safety criteria compared to ANCOLD criteria
In this section the current dam safety criteria for risk to human life used by ANCOLD and in South
African dam safety are defined. Thereafter the ANCOLD criteria are compared to South African dam
safety criteria by finding the implied South African Warning Times (WTs) needed for South African
criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria.
4.2.1.1 ANCOLD acceptability criteria for risk to human life
The Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) depicts risk to human life on an FN-
diagram, with the estimated number of fatalities due to dam failure represented on the x-axis and the
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annual frequency of N or more fatalities occurring on the y-axis. The risk is evaluated in terms of its
acceptability according to FN-criteria defined by ANCOLD as shown in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: ANCOLD acceptability criteria for risk to human life for new and existing dams (ANCOLD, 2003)
The following properties can be observed from the ANCOLD FN-criterion lines shown in Fig. 4.1:
• Intersection with the y-axis (N=1):
– For Existing dams, if the frequency of 1 or more fatalities occurring is higher than 1E-3 per
year (i.e. 1 in 1 000 per year), it is unacceptable.
– For New Dams, if the frequency of 1 or more fatalities occurring is more than 0.0001 per
year (i.e. 1 in 10 000 per year), it is unacceptable.
– The criterion line for existing dams is one factor of 10 higher than the criterion line for
new dams and is therefore less stringent. According to ANCOLD (2003), the marginal cost
of reducing risk for an existing dam is generally more than for new dams, therefore it is
not reasonably practicable to reduce the risk of existing dams to the same levels as new
dams, as described in Chapter 3.
• Both FN-criterion lines have the same slope of -1 which resembles zero risk aversion. This
slope corresponds to what is generally accepted as good practice internationally, as described
in Chapter 3.
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• Both criterion lines are truncated horizontally, since technology does not allow for the con-
struction of dams with smaller probabilities of failure and it is impracticable to reduce dam
safety levels to more stringent criteria.
4.2.1.2 South African dam safety criteria for risk to human life
In South Africa, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) presents the risk to human life of a dam on a
population at risk (PAR) diagram, where the population at risk refers to the number of people exposed
to the dambreak flood in case of dam failure. The PAR-diagram, with the PAR represented on the x-
axis and the annual probability of the occurrence of dam failure on the y-axis, is shown in Fig. 4.2.
A criterion line is depicted on the PAR-diagram to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable
risk to human life.
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Figure 4.2: DWA acceptability criteria for risk to human life (Hattingh and Oosthuizen, 2009)
According to Hattingh and Oosthuizen (2009), the criterion line coincides with impact accepted
voluntarily in South Africa and was developed using statistics of construction accidents as well as
statistics of accidents from all modes of transport in South Africa. However, the statistical basis for
the development of the criteria are not documented and thus unknown.
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The following properties of the acceptability criteria for risk to human life can be observed:
• Intersection with the y-axis (PAR=1):
For PAR=1, if the frequency of 1 "human at risk" is more than 1E-1 (1 in 10) per year it is unac-
ceptable.
• The slope of the criterion line is -1.
It should be noted that this safety criterion differs significantly from the FN-diagrams used by
ANCOLD in that it uses population at risk (PAR) as a consequence measure instead of number of fa-
talities (N). To estimate the number of fatalities in the case of dam failure, DWA predicts what portion
of the population at risk will become fatalities, depending on warning time assumptions. However,
the estimated number of fatalities is not used in their risk evaluation.
This DWA prediction model collectively uses the PAR and the warning time (WT) available for the
PAR to escape the dambreak flood. The number of fatalities, expressed as the loss of life (LOL) by
DWA, can be estimated from the diagram shown in Fig. 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: DWA prediction model to estimate of loss of life based on population at risk and warning time
(Hattingh and Oosthuizen, 2009)
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The gradiënts of the lines in Fig. 4.3 represent different WTs, with smaller gradiënts associated to
larger warning times. The gradiënt of the line determines the relationship between PAR and LOL as
shown in Eq. 4.2.1:
LOL = ∆y
∆x
·PAR (4.2.1)
If the WT is increased, the gradiënt of the line decreases and the LOL estimated for a particular
PAR decreases. According to Hattingh and Oosthuizen (2009) actual historical data for dam failures
were used to develop the diagram shown in Fig. 4.3. However, the statistical basis used to develop
the prediction model is not documented and is therefore unknown.
4.2.1.3 Implied South African warning times for acceptability criteria to correspond to ANCOLD
criteria
Since two different consequence measures are used by ANCOLD and DWA in evaluating the accept-
ability of assessed risk to human life, i.e. the number of fatalities and population at risk respectively,
it is difficult to compare the criteria to each other. In order to compare, for a certain probability of oc-
currence the implied warning time that would result in the same number of expected fatalities (LOL
or N) from DWA criteria and from ANCOLD criteria is computed.
The following steps are followed to determine the implied South African warning times for DWA
criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria:
• ANCOLD criteria for new and existing dams: For the ANCOLD FN-criterion lines shown in
Fig. 4.1, the annual probability of occurrence and the corresponding number of fatalities (N),
which may also be expressed as loss of life (LOL), are obtained as shown in Table 4.1 for existing
dams and in Table 4.2 for new dams.
• South African dam safety criteria used by DWA: For the DWA-criterion line shown in Fig. 4.2,
the annual probability of occurrence and the corresponding population at risk (PAR) are ob-
tained and shown in both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
• For the different probabilities of occurrence, the LOL obtained from ANCOLD criteria may be
plotted against the PAR obtained from DWA criteria on a similar diagram used by DWA to pre-
dict the LOL for a particular PAR and a dambreak flood warning time (WT) as shown in Fig.
4.4. The position of the plotted points may be used to find the implied South African warning
times needed for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria for existing and new dams.
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The results for the implied warning times are summarised in in Table 4.1 and 4.2 for existing
and new dams.
Table 4.1: Existing dams - Implied South African warning times for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD
criteria
Probability of
occurrence (P f )
Loss of Life
(LOL)*
Population At Risk
(PAR)**
Implied South African
Warning Time (WT)
1E-1 - 1 -
1E-2 - 10 -
1E-3 1 100 >90 minutes
1E-4 10 1 000 ± 60 minutes
1E-5 100 10 000 30-45 minutes
1E-5 1 000 10 000 ± 10 minutes
1E-6 - 100 000 -
* From ANCOLD criteria for existing Dams (refer to Fig. 4.1)
** From South African dam safety criteria (refer to Fig. 4.2)
Table 4.2: New Dams - Implied South African warning times for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria
Probability of
occurrence (P f )
Loss of Life
(LOL)*
Population At Risk
(PAR)**
Implied South African
Warning Time (WT)
1E-1 - 1 -
1E-2 - 10 -
1E-3 - 100 -
1E-4 1 1 000 >90 minutes
1E-5 10 10 000 ± 75 minutes
1E-6 100 100 000 45-60 minutes
* From ANCOLD criteria for New Dams (refer to Fig. 4.1)
** From South African dam safety criteria (refer to Fig. 4.2)
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Figure 4.4: Implied South African warning times for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria for existing
and new dams
The implied warning times differ depending on the probability of occurrence of the dam failure
event. This is not logical as the warning time will depend on the type of dam, geology, warning time
systems and so forth, and not on the probability of dam failure.
The results obtained for the implied WTs are shown on the DWA PAR-diagram in Fig. 4.5 for
existing dams. For higher probabilities of occurrence large warning times are needed to adhere to
international best practice risk criteria. Therefore at higher probabilities of dam failure, DWA dams
are accepted at less stringent safety levels than ANCOLD criteria. For low probabilities of occurrence,
the warning times needed to adhere to ANCOLD criteria decreases. DWA therefore over designs for
low probability events and even for very small WTs DWA dams comply with ANCOLD criteria.
The implied WTs obtained for new dams are shown on the DWA PAR-diagram in Fig. 4.6. A similar
pattern may be observed where the WTs decrease as the probability of occurrence decreases. How-
ever, the overall implied South African warning times which should be available to the population
at risk such that DWA predicted loss of life corresponds to ANCOLD criteria are higher for new dams
than for existing dams. This is due to the fact that ANCOLD implements more stringent safety criteria
for new dams, while DWA makes no distinction between new and existing dams.
The DWA risk criteria thus has an inherent flaw, that by using PAR instead of N, the influence of
WT is excluded and inconsistent WT assumptions seem to be embedded in the current criterium.
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Figure 4.5: Implied South African warning times for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria for existing
dams illustrated on PAR-diagram used by DWA
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Figure 4.6: Implied South African warning times for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria for new
dams illustrated on PAR-diagram used by DWA
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4.2.1.4 Discussion of results obtained for the implied South African warning times:
Since ANCOLD and DWA use two different consequence measures to assess risk to human life, a
rational basis to compare the acceptability criteria was by determining the implied South African
warning times needed for the DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria. The warning times
which should be available to the PAR for the DWA predicted LOL to correspond to the LOL established
by ANCOLD criteria for new and existing dams are summarised in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Summary of implied South African warning times needed for DWA criteria to correspond to AN-
COLD criteria for new and existing dams
South African Dam Safety Criteria Warning Time (WT)
P f Population at risk (PAR) Existing Dams New Dams
1E-3 100 >90 minutes -
1E-4 1 000 ±60 minutes >90 minutes
1E-5 10 000 30-45 minutes ±75 minutes
1E-6 100 000 ± 10 minutes 45-60 minutes
In Table 4.3 it can be seen that the values obtained for the implied WTs for both new and existing
dams are inconsistent. For higher probabilities of occurrence, longer WTs are needed for the DWA
predicted LOL to correspond to the LOL established by ANCOLD criteria. However, in practice it must
be noticed that each dam break case is situation specific and often a high WT cannot be achieved.
For example, if a dam has an inadequate system in place to alert the population downstream of a
dam break, then a high WT can’t always be assured.
Since for higher probabilities of occurrence, higher WTs are needed for the DWA predicted LOL to
correspond to the LOL established by ANCOLD criteria and these high WTs cannot always be assured,
it can be concluded that a higher risk to human life is accepted by the South African dam safety
criteria. Therefore the criteria used by ANCOLD to assess the risk to human life are considered more
stringent, especially for new dams.
However, the implied WTs above were obtained using Fig. 4.4 and this DWA life loss prediction
model has no well documented rational scientific background which describes how it was developed.
Therefore, it may not be justified to use this graph. In the following section, the model used by DWA
to predict LOL for different warning times in case of dam failure is evaluated in terms of international
best practice methods for predicting loss of life.
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4.2.2 Evaluation of South African life loss prediction model for dam failure
To predict the loss of life (LOL) in case of dam failure, DWA uses the population at risk (PAR) and
the warning time (WT) available to the PAR to escape the dambreak flood. In this section, interna-
tional best practice methods for estimating LOL in the case of dam failure are investigated and a valid
method which similarly predicts the LOL for a PAR and WT available to the PAR in case of dam failure
is compared to the DWA prediction model.
4.2.2.1 Factors influencing loss of life in case of dam failure
There are different factors that influence the expected loss of life in case of a dambreak flood. Ac-
cording to Hartford and Baecher (2004) and Jia-Qian et al. (2009) the main factors are:
• Population at risk
• Warning times
• Flood severity
• Human response
According to Hartford and Baecher (2004), human behaviour may be highly variable and uncer-
tain and contains both physical and psychological dimensions. Hartford and Baecher (2004) further
notes that in the case of a dambreak flood, the survival of an individual downstream in the affected
area will depend on a range of choices that is available to the individual upon receiving warning of the
flooding. Since there are so much randomness in the psychology, physiology and physics of human
responses, models for predicting loss of life may have very large uncertainty bounds.
4.2.2.2 International methods for predicting loss of life from dam failure
According to Jia-Qian et al. (2009), Hartford and Baecher (2004) and Aboelata et al. (2003), the main
methods which may be used to estimate the lives lost in case of a dam failure include:
• Regression approaches developed by Lee et al. (1986), Brown and Graham (1988) and DeKay
and McClelland (1993).
• The object loss frequency approach by Graham (1999).
• Reiter (2001) proposes a GIS method for estimating life loss, the RESCDAM method.
• Simulation approach by Assaf and Hartford (2002).
• Aboelata et al. (2003) evaluates life loss in case of dam failure by using a GIS model.
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Regression approaches:
The Lee et al. (1986), Brown and Graham (1988) and DeKay and McClelland (1993) methods are em-
pirical methods for predicting life loss in case of dam failure. They are based on statistical analyses of
historical information. More specifically, a regression analysis is used where the relationship between
a dependent variable and one or more independent variables are determined. As the independent
variables are varied, the regression analysis shows how the dependent variable will change. For the
methods, the population at risk and the warning time available to the population are obtained from
historical flood records and these are used to derive relations to predict the loss of life.
The Brown and Graham (1988) method consists of three separate formulas which are used to
predict the LOL from PAR and WT as a categorical variable (Hartford and Baecher, 2004). However,
DeKay and McClelland (1993) states that there should be more significant interaction between the
WT and PAR to predict LOL and they suggest that WT should be used as continuous measure.
According to DeKay and McClelland (1993), the Lee et al. (1986) method uses a continuous mea-
sure of WT. This method reports results that are very similar to the Brown and Graham (1988) method,
but it is not limited to dam failures and estimates the LOL for a wider range of effects, including river-
ine flooding.
The DeKay and McClelland (1993) method uses the same historical data as the Brown and Gra-
ham (1988) method, but the historical record is revised and additional case studies are included. A
continuous measure of WT is used and the LOL predicted decreases exponentially with an increased
WT and increases nonlinearly with an increased PAR. The method also incorporates an additional
measure, the force conditions, which accounts for the depth and velocity of flood waters in case of
dam failure. For example, when the flood waters are swift, the predicted LOL is greater and this effect
is incorporated by a force variable.
According to DeKay and McClelland (1993), the Brown and Graham (1988) and Lee et al. (1986)
methods are the only other methods that estimate the loss of life using empirical data. DeKay and
McClelland (1993) further states that these methods are important contributors to literature but the
statistical procedures used are inadequate. The primary purpose of the work by DeKay and McClel-
land (1993) was to reanalyse the historical records of dam failures to develop a model for loss of life
using more justifiable procedures.
Object loss frequency (OLF) approach:
The Graham (1999) method is also referred to as the "object loss frequency" (OLF) approach (Hart-
ford and Baecher, 2004). The OLF is equivalent to a fatality rate or the fraction of lives lost from the
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people at risk. The OLF and loss of life in case of dam failure are based on historical cases of dam
failures. This method forms the basis of the US Bureau of Reclamation’s (USBR) "flood severity based
method" which qualitatively incorporates the hydrodynamics of the flood, i.e. the average depth and
velocity of the flood, the human reactions in terms of the warning time available and the "flood sever-
ity understanding", to determine what the OLF in case of dam breach flooding will be. This method
incorporates in addition to historical records, the physical processes and behaviour during the flood,
which are evaluated on the basis of engineering judgement.
GIS Approach:
The RESCDAM method presented by Reiter (2001) follows the same principles of the Graham (1999)
method, but uses a computer-aided GIS/public population register analysis to define the population
at risk and the impact on the population at risk, including the different flood severity zones, living
conditions and vulnerability of the population at risk. Aboelata et al. (2003) uses a similar approach,
a modular geographical information system (GIS) modelling system for estimating potential loss of
life from natural and dam-failure floods.
Simulation approach:
The simulation approach by Assaf and Hartford (2002) models a general emergency scenario envi-
ronment that is intended to provide information for emergency planning for floods (Hartford and
Baecher, 2004). It consists of logical statements set up by means of dam breach modelling and the
simulation of emergencies. How people respond to flood warnings incorporates the hydrodynamic
conditions which a person have to deal with in case of flooding. One output of the simulation process
is a probability distribution of loss of life for various different scenarios.
4.2.2.3 Comparison of DWA life loss prediction method to international best practice method
The DWA life loss prediction model was discussed in section 4.2.1 where the LOL could be predicted
from the PAR and WT available to the PAR in case of dam failure using the diagram shown in Fig.
4.3. According to Hattingh and Oosthuizen (2009) the diagram was developed using actual historical
data, however, there is no well-documented basis for the DWA life loss prediction model. Interna-
tional methods which similarly estimate the LOL from the PAR and WT based on historical data were
discussed and include the Lee et al. (1986), Brown and Graham (1988) and DeKay and McClelland
(1993) method. For this study the method proposed by DeKay and McClelland (1993) was chosen as
the most valid method to compare against the DWA methodology for predicting LOL, since:
79
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
• This method was developed using a collection of historical data of 25 case studies from the
1950’s onwards.
• The PAR considered for the case studies include a wide range, the PAR ranges from 5 000 to 58
000 people.
• The actual LOL is given against the predicted LOL for the different case studies in the study
by DeKay and McClelland (1993). In comparing the values, the predicted LOL approaches the
actual obtained values for the LOL.
• According to DeKay and McClelland (1993), the Brown and Graham (1988) and Lee et al. (1986)
methods are important contributors to literature but the statistical procedures used are inade-
quate and the work by DeKay and McClelland (1993) reanalysed the historical records of dam
failures to develop a more justifiable procedure for predicting life loss in case of dam failure.
In the following, a more detailed description of the method proposed by DeKay and McClelland
(1993) is provided and thereafter the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method is compared to the DWA
life loss prediction model.
DeKay and McClelland (1993) method :
The DeKay and McClelland (1993) method method uses a regression approach to estimate the LOL
from the population at risk (PAR) and the warning time (WT) in case of dam failure. In addition,
High Force (HF) and Low Force (LF) conditions are considered when determining the LOL. The HF
condition is used when the PAR is located in a canyon and the flood waters in case of dam failure are
very deep and swift. The LF condition is used when the PAR is located on a plain and the flood waters
are shallow and slow.
The two equations for determining the LOL for both HF and LF conditions are shown in Eq. 4.2.2
and Eq. 4.2.3 (DeKay and McClelland, 1993).
LOLHF = PARHF
1+13.277(PAR0.440HF )e[2.982(W THF )−3.790]
(4.2.2)
LOLLF = PARLF
1+13.277(PAR0.440HF )e[0.759(W THF )]
(4.2.3)
Where,
LOLHF and LOLLF = Loss of Life for High Force and Low Force conditions respectively
PARHF and PARLF = Population at Risk for High Force and Low Force conditions respec-
tively
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W THF and W TLF = Warning Time for High Force and Low Force conditions respectively
Eq. 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 may be simplified as shown in Eq. 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
LOLHF ≈ 0.075(PAR0.560HF )e[−2.982(W THF )+3.790] (4.2.4)
LOLLF ≈ 0.075(PAR0.560HF )e[−0.759(W THF )] (4.2.5)
Comparison of DeKay and McClelland (1993) method to DWA prediction model:
Both the DWA method and the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method use PAR and WT as input pa-
rameters to predict the LOL. For both methods the LOL is estimated for a range of PAR and the fol-
lowing WTs:
• Small WT: 0 minutes
• Medium WT: 30-45 minutes
• Large WT: 90 minutes
For the three sample WTs and over a logarithmic range of PAR the LOL is estimated through the
DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for both HF and LF conditions using Eq. 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. The
results are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Predicted loss of life over a range of population at risk and for 3 different warning times using the
DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for High Force (HF) and Low Fore (LF) conditions
Estimated Loss of Life (LOL)
Population At Risk Small WT: Medium WT: Large WT:
(PAR)
0 minutes
30-45 minutes
90 minutes30 minutes 45 minutes
HF LF HF LF HF LF HF LF
1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 13 1 3 1 2 1 1 1
100 44 1 10 1 5 1 1 1
1 000 159 4 36 3 17 3 2 2
10 000 577 14 130 9 62 8 7 5
100 000 2095 48 472 33 224 27 24 16
For a small WT and HF conditions, the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method overestimates the
LOL, i.e. the predicted LOL is more than the PAR, which is not credible. According to DeKay and
McClelland (1993), the predicted values will more often be too high than it is too low, since the for-
mulation is based on historical data obtained from the most severe flash floods.
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Note that DWA predicts the LOL for a WT interval, for example the LOL can be obtained over
a range of PAR and for a WT interval between 30-45 minutes. The DeKay and McClelland (1993)
method predicts the LOL for a specific WT. In order to compare, for the DWA model the LOL is ob-
tained over a WT interval (e.g. 30-45 minutes) and for the DeKay and McClelland Method (1993) the
LOL is obtained for the start and end value of the WT interval (e.g. for both 30 and 45 minutes).
The LOL predicted for a small WT (0 minutes) through the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method
is plotted against the range of PAR to compare to the DWA predicted LOL as shown in Fig. 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: DWA predicted LOL compared to DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for a small warning
time (0 minutes)
Below a PAR of± 20, the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for HF conditions gives unrealistic
LOL predictions, since the predicted LOL is more than the PAR. Above a PAR of ± 20, DWA overpre-
dicts the LOL in comparison to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for HF conditions. In
addition, the DWA method completely overpredicts the LOL compared to the DeKay and McClelland
(1993) method for LF conditions.
For a medium warning time (30-45 minutes), the predicted LOL obtained from the DeKay and
McClelland (1993) method are plotted against the PAR to compare to the DWA predicted LOL as
shown in Fig. 4.8.
82
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110
100
1 000
10 000
100 000
1 10 100 1 000 10 000 100 000
L o
s s
 
o
f  L
i f e
 ( L
O
L )
Population At Risk (PAR)
Warning Time in 
Minutes
30-45
DWA overpredicts LOL 
for  LF conditions and a 
WT of 30-45 min
45
45
30
30
Figure 4.8: DWA predicted LOL compared to DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for a medium warning
time (30-45 minutes)
The two methods give similar LOL predictions for HF conditions and a WT of 30-45 minutes, the
predictions are certainly within uncertainty bounds of each other. When the DeKay and McClelland
(1993) prediction for LF conditions is compared to the DWA predicted LOL for a WT of 30-45 minutes,
the DWA method severely overpredicts the LOL.
In Fig. 4.9, the LOL predicted through the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method and DWA method
are plotted against the PAR for a large WT (90 minutes). Below a PAR of ± 1 000 people, the DWA
method overpredicts the LOL compared to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) prediction for HF and
LF conditions. When the PAR is above ± 1 000 people, the DWA method underpredicts the LOL
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Figure 4.9: DWA predicted LOL compared to DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for a large warning
time (90 minutes)
In Fig. 4.10, the results obtained for a small, medium and large WT when the DWA predicted LOL
is compared to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) predicted values for HF conditions are summarised.
This is also done for LF conditions in Fig. 4.11. In both Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 it can be seen that DeKay
and McClelland (1993) predicts LOL values within a much more narrow range than the DWA model.
Further, DWA generally overpredicts the LOL for small and medium WTs and underpredicts the LOL
for large WTs. In addition, DWA severely overpredicts the LOL for a small and medium WT for LF
flood conditions.
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Figure 4.10: DWA predicted LOL compared to DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for HF conditions
1
10
100
1 000
10 000
100 000
1 10 100 1 000 10 000 100 000
L o
s s
 
o
f  L
i f e
 ( L
O
L )
Population At Risk (PAR)
DWA Lines
DeKay and McClelland
curves for LF conditions
Warning Time in 
Minutes
0
30-45
> 90
0
45
90
30
Figure 4.11: DWA predicted LOL compared to DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for LF conditions
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4.2.2.4 Discussion of results obtained when evaluating South African life loss prediction model
for dam failure
Comparing the DWA method and the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for predicting LOL, in-
consistent results were obtained since the DWA method either over or under predicts the LOL, de-
pending on the WT under consideration. However, some useful conclusions may be made.
Considering the results obtained for HF conditions, the following conclusions were made:
• For a small WT and as the PAR increases, it was found that the DWA method overpredicts the
LOL compared to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) prediction. This may lead to conservative
decisions regarding life safety in cases where severe consequences are expected, i.e. the DWA
prediction model unwittingly implies risk averse decision making.
• For a medium WT, predictions from DWA and DeKay and McClelland (1993) are similar.
• For a large WT and a small PAR, the DWA method overpredicts the LOL compared to DeKay
and McClelland (1993) predictions. This may lead to unnecessarily conservative decisions in
cases where low consequences are in fact expected.
When the DWA predicted LOL is compared to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) predicted values
for LF conditions it was observed that DWA in most cases severely overpredicts the LOL. DWA does
not distinguish between HF and LF conditions in their prediction model, but the DWA predictions
are more comparable to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) predictions for HF conditions and are too
conservative for LF conditions where low consequences are expected.
In summary, in cases where severe consequences are expected the current DWA criteria implies
conservative decision making regarding life safety. DWA is also conservative in life safety decisions
in cases where low consequences are expected. This may to some extent off-set the unconservative
life safety decisions of DWA that is implied when the DWA and ANCOLD criteria for assessing risk to
human life were compared in section 4.2.1, where the DWA criteria were observed to be less stringent
than the ANCOLD criteria at higher probabilities of failure.
In order to compare the DWA life safety criteria to the ANCOLD criteria it is suggested to incor-
porate the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method life loss prediction model to convert "population
at risk" to "estimated number of fatalities", since this prediction model has a well-documented and
rational scientific basis.
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4.2.3 Comparison of DWA acceptability criteria to ANCOLD criteria using the DeKay
and McClelland method for predicting loss of life
In section 4.2.1 the DWA acceptability criteria for risk to life were compared to ANCOLD criteria.
However, since two different consequence measures are used by DWA and ANCOLD, the DWA life
loss prediction model was used to determine the implied warning time needed for the predicted LOL
from DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria. In this section the DWA and ANCOLD criteria
are compared to each other, but instead of using the DWA prediction model to find implied WTs, the
DeKay and McClelland (1993) method is incorporated to convert "population at risk" to "loss of life".
This is useful since the DWA criteria can be directly compared to ANCOLD criteria.
To compare the criteria:
• For different probabilities of failure, P f , the population at risk (PAR) is obtained from the PAR-
diagram used by DWA as shown in Fig. 4.2.
• The PAR and an assumed WT are used to obtain the Loss Of Life (LOL) through the DeKay and
McClelland (1993) prediction model.
• The LOL is plotted against the P f to obtain the equivalent DWA FN-criterion line, which can be
compared to the ANCOLD FN-criteria.
For three sample probabilities of failure (P f ) and WTs, the LOL obtained for HF conditions are
shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: LOL estimated from DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for HF conditions
P f PAR*
LOL**
Small WT Medium WT Large WT
0 min 45 min 90 min
5E-5 2 000 235 26 3
5E-6 20 000 851 91 10
5E-7 200 000 3088 330 36
* PAR obtained from South African dam safety criteria for the P f (refer to Fig. 4.2)
** LOL obtained from DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for High Force conditions
(refer to Eq. 4.2.4)
The LOL are plotted against the corresponding P f as co-ordinate points on an FN-diagram. If a
line is drawn through all the points with a small, medium and large WT, DWA equivalent FN-criterion
lines could be obtained as shown for HF conditions in Fig. 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: ANCOLD FN-criteria compared to DWA equivalent FN-criterion lines for HF conditions
The LOL is obtained for LF conditions, using the same three sample probabilities of failure (P f )
and WTs as shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: LOL estimated from DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for Low Force (LF) conditions
P f PAR*
LOL**
Small WT Medium WT Large WT
0 min 45 min 90 min
5E-5 2 000 6 3 2
5E-6 20 000 20 11 7
5E-7 200 000 70 40 23
* PAR obtained from South African dam safety criteria for the P f (refer to Fig. 4.2)
** LOL obtained from DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for Low Force conditions
(refer to Eq. 4.2.5)
Similarly the LOL obtained for LF conditions is plotted against the corresponding probabilities of
failure (P f ’s) for different WTs to obtain DWA equivalent FN-criterion lines as shown in Fig. 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: ANCOLD FN-criteria compared to DWA equivalent FN-criterion lines for LF conditions
The following interpretations regarding the DWA equivalent FN-criterion lines are made:
• The DWA equivalent FN-criteria are different depending on the assumed warning time of the
dam under consideration and whether LF or HF conditions are expected.
• For HF conditions, illustrated in Fig. 4.12:
– If the WT is small, the equivalent DWA acceptability criteria are significantly less strin-
gent than the ANCOLD life safety criteria for new and existing dams. This implies less
conservative life safety decisions by DWA where severe consequences are expected.
– As the warning time increase, the DWA equivalent criteria become comparable to AN-
COLD criteria.
• For LF conditions, illustrated in Fig. 4.13:
– The DWA equivalent FN-criteria are more stringent than the ANCOLD criteria for existing
dams and are more or less comparable to ANCOLD criteria for new dams.
• The gradiënt of the DWA equivalent FN-criterion lines are steeper than the ANCOLD FN-criterion
lines, which have a slope of -1 equivalent to zero risk aversion, and thus portray higher risk
aversion.
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Discussion of results:
The DWA equivalent FN-criteria are different for different WTs. However, this should not be the case.
Acceptable risk to human life should not be a function of warning time (or for that matter, of whether
a HF or LF condition is expected). These things will influence the risk level but should not influence
the acceptability criteria.
ANCOLD acceptance criteria distinguish between criteria for new and existing dams: since the
marginal cost of reducing the risk for an existing dam is generally more than for new dams, less strin-
gent risk levels are accepted for existing dams. Only if it could be argued that in all or most small WT
systems it is significantly more costly to implement risk reduction measures, would there be a basis
for shifting the criterion line as a function of WT (similar to new vs. existing dam criterion lines).
However, when a dam is rehabilitated it is expected that the probability of dam failure will decrease,
but it is not expected to influence the WT available. Therefore, the costs of rehabilitation works are
independent of WT and consequently there is no basis for different acceptance criteria based on WT.
The gradiënt of the DWA criterion lines are steeper than -1, therefore implying that risk aversion
is incorporated. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, Ball and Floyd (1998) suggests that there is no
compelling evidence for the view of increasing societal aversion, and therefore a slope of -1, repre-
senting risk neutrality, is generally accepted as good practice internationally.
The DWA equivalent FN-criteria has no lower bound truncation of P f , as does the ANCOLD FN-
criteria, i.e. even though it may be impracticable to reduce the P f below 10
−6 according to ANCOLD
criteria, the DWA criteria requires this in many cases.
4.2.4 Final recommendation for DWA acceptability criteria for risk to human life
DWA uses population at risk as a consequence measure instead of lives lost, however, loss of life is
a generally accepted consequence measure used internationally as described in Chapter 3. Further,
since several factors influence how many of the PAR will be converted into LOL, including the WT
and the flood condition under consideration, this consequence measure introduces several incon-
sistencies in the implied DWA equivalent acceptability criteria. Also, the DWA life safety criteria has
no well-documented scientific basis which describes how it were developed.
These inconsistencies could be eliminated by switching to ANCOLD criteria for life safety. The
following properties may then be observed:
• In assessing risk to human life, ANCOLD uses the estimated number of fatalities as a conse-
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quence measure, which is most commonly used on an international level.
• The line position is not a function of WT or HF/LF conditions.
• A line slope of -1, representing risk neutrality and recommended internationally, is used.
• According to ANCOLD (2003) it is impracticable to reduce the safety levels of a dam of smaller
probabilities of failure. Thus a lower cut-off for probability of occurrence is used, i.e. the crite-
rion lines are truncated horizontally.
• The ANCOLD criteria are based on what is considered to be good engineering practice, based
on historically acceptable levels of safety and implicitly taking other considerations, for exam-
ple cost considerations into account, albeit on the basis of engineering judgement.
Switching to ANCOLD would not imply an enormous change in our current safety levels. How-
ever, it would imply a more consistent treatment of risk across the board of different WTs and flood
severity levels. Also, switching would not require more risk analysis effort than what is currently ex-
pended, since LOL is already included or estimated as part of standard risk estimation procedures
performed by DWA. However, it is proposed that the current DWA life loss prediction model is re-
placed by the DeKay and McClelland (1993) model, since this life loss prediction model has a well-
documented and rational scientific basis.
In the following section, case studies of South African dams that were identified to be in need of
rehabilitation works by DWA, are evaluated in terms of the ANCOLD criteria to identify if the need for
rehabilitation works are justified when assessing the risk to human life.
4.3 Evaluation of South African case studies of dams in terms of
proposed acceptability criteria for risk to human life
According to a dam safety rehabilitation progress report presented by the Department of Water Affairs
(DWA) (Segers, 2012), in the years 2004/2005, 166 of the 314 government owned dams were identified
to be in need of rehabilitation works. The need for rehabilitation works were stressed through dam
safety evaluations, which also included a risk analysis performed for the dams.
Of the South African government owned dams that were identified to be in need of rehabilitation
works, eleven case studies of dams are used in this study. For each of the case studies the risk to
human life estimated through the DWA risk analysis methodology are evaluated according to the
ANCOLD life safety criteria to identify if the decision to rehabilitate was justified.
The risk to human life, as the combination of the estimated initial probability of failure (P f ) be-
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fore the dam is rehabilitated and the estimated loss of life (LOL) in case of dam failure, were obtained
from DWA dam safety inspection reports. It must be noted that DWA estimates an interval for the P f
and the LOL, representing the level of confidence of the data. The maximum and minimum values of
the interval for the P f and the LOL for the eleven case studies are shown in Table 4.7.
Note that for Bospoort Dam two different scenarios were considered in the DWA risk analysis:
Case 1a, where the sluice gates were assumed to be functioning normally during failure, and Case 1b,
where the gates were assumed to not function normally during failure.
Table 4.7: Estimated initial probability of failure and LOL for 11 case studies obtained from DWA inspection
reports
Dam Estimated P f Estimated LOL Reference
Min Max Min Max
1a Bospoort Dam
1E-3 1E-2 9 13 Hattingh (2005)
(Gates Functioning)
1b Bospoort Dam
1E-2 1E-1 9 13 Hattingh (2005)
(Gates Not Functioning)
2 Klein Maricopoort Dam 1E-4 1E-3 3 5 Kelefetswe (2005)
3 Toleni Dam 5E-4 5E-3 2 3 Muller (2000)
4 Lakeside Dam 2E-4 2E-3 200 400 van Vuuren (2005),
Oosthuizen (1999)
5 Vaalkop Dam 2E-5 2E-4 35 350 Nightingale (2005),
Slabbert (2000)
6 Rust De Winter Dam 5E-5 5E-4 13 13 Coetzer (2003),
Nightingale (1994)
7 Makotswane Dam 3E-4 3E-3 5 8 Naidoo (2005)
8 Kromellenboog Dam 2E-4 2E-3 18 19 Segers (2005)
9 Albert Falls Dam 1E-4 1E-3 100 170 Nightingale (2004),
Hattingh (1996)
10 Glen Brock Dam 1E-3 1E-2 21 29 Brink (2006)
11 Wentzel Dam 1.11E-3 1.11E-2 156 312 de Lange (2002),
Hattingh (1994)
The risk to human life for the eleven case studies are presented on an FN-diagram by plotting the
probability of failure against the LOL as shown in Fig. 4.14. Due to the interval, the risk is presented
in the form of a block. The risk for the case studies are assessed against the ANCOLD acceptability
criteria, as illustrated in Fig. 4.14. Since existing dams in need of rehabilitation works are considered
in this study, the risk is evaluated against the acceptability criteria for existing dams proposed by
ANCOLD.
The risk to human life for case studies 2, 3, 5 and 6 are located close to or on the border of the
ANCOLD acceptability criterion line for existing dams. However, the majority of the risk to human
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Figure 4.14: Evaluation of risk to human life for DWA case studies in terms ANCOLD acceptability criteria for
new and existing dams
life for the case studies are located within the unacceptable region of the ANCOLD criteria and the
decision to rehabilitate the dams are justified.
4.4 Summary of main findings
In this chapter the South African dam safety criteria for risk to human life were evaluated by compar-
ing to international best practice methods.
In Chapter 3 it was identified that the life safety criteria proposed by ANCOLD are widely applied
in international dam safety. The ANCOLD criteria were thus chosen as valid criteria to compare to
the South African DWA dam safety criteria. However, the criteria could not be directly compared
since two different consequence measures are used by ANCOLD and DWA to assess risk to human
life, namely the loss of life and population at risk respectively.
DWA uses their own in-house developed model to predict what portion of the population at risk
will become fatalities, based on assumptions related to the warning time available to the population
at risk in case of dam failure. To compare the DWA and ANCOLD criteria, the implied warning times
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that would result in the same number of expected fatalities from DWA criteria and from ANCOLD
criteria were computed.
At high probabilities of failure the implied warning times needed for DWA criteria to adhere to
ANCOLD criteria were high. These large warning times cannot always be realistically assured. It was
thus concluded that at high probabilities of failure a higher risk to human life is accepted for DWA
dams, i.e. ANCOLD criteria have more stringent safety levels. For low probabilities of occurrence,
DWA overdesigns and even for very small warning times DWA dams comply with ANCOLD criteria.
The DWA in-house method for predicting loss of life was developed many years ago using historical
data and the statistical basis for the model is unknown. In order to justify the DWA life loss prediction
model, it was compared to another internationally developed and widely used method for predicting
loss of life.
The DWA model was compared to the DeKay and McClelland (1993) method for predicting loss
of life. The DWA method either over or under predicts the loss of life in comparison to the DeKay and
McClelland (1993) method, depending on the warning time and flood severity under consideration.
For cases where severe consequences are expected, DWA overpredicts the loss of life and thus implies
conservative decision making regarding life safety. DWA also overpredicts the loss of life in cases
where low consequences are expected, leading to very conservative life safety decisions. This to some
extent may off-set the unconservative decision making regarding life safety that was implied by the
warning times needed for DWA criteria to adhere to ANCOLD criteria.
It was proposed that the current DWA life loss prediction model should replaced by the DeKay and
McClelland (1993) model, since this life loss prediction model has a well-documented and rational
scientific basis.
The DeKay and McClelland (1993) method was used to convert "population at risk" to "loss of life".
In this way DWA equivalent FN-criteria were developed and could be directly compared to ANCOLD
FN-criteria.
In comparing the DWA equivalent FN-criteria to the ANCOLD criteria, it was seen that the DWA
criteria have several underlying inconsistencies, namely;
• different criteria were defined depending on the warning time and flood severity condition
under consideration,
• DWA criteria implies less conservative life safety decision making in cases where severe con-
sequences are expected and too conservative decisions in cases where low consequences are
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expected, and
• unrealistically low P f are expected in some situations, which may not be practically achievable.
These inconsistencies can be eliminated by switching to ANCOLD criteria, which already eval-
uates risk to human life in terms of the international norm by considering loss of life. Switching to
ANCOLD does not imply significant changes in the current dam safety levels used by DWA. However,
it would imply a more consistent treatment of risk across the board of different WTs and flood sever-
ity levels.Also, using ANCOLD criteria for risk to human life does not require more risk analysis effort
since loss of life is already estimated as part of the standard DWA risk analysis procedure.
South African case studies of government owned dams that were identified in terms of DWA accept-
ability criteria to be in need of rehabilitation works were evaluated according to ANCOLD criteria.
The majority of the risk to human life estimated by DWA for the case studies were evaluated as unac-
ceptable according to ANCOLD criteria. Thus, the rehabilitation of these dams are justified.
It must be noted however that the ANCOLD criteria are based on what is considered to be good en-
gineering practice, based on historically acceptable levels of safety and implicitly taking other con-
siderations, for example economic considerations into account, albeit on the basis of engineering
judgement.
In the following chapter, Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) is proposed as an additional decision
tool to assess if the rehabilitation of dams are justified. In this instance, only the societal preferences
for investments into life safety through the rehabilitation of a dam are considered.
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Chapter 5
SWTP as a lower bound constraint on dam
safety levels
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 the acceptability criteria used by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) in South Africa
to assess the risk to human life imposed by dams were evaluated by comparing to international best
practice methods. It was found that internationally the conventional method used to judge the ac-
ceptability of risk to human life is through the use of FN-diagrams, where the estimated probability of
dam failure is assessed in combination with the estimated number of fatalities in case of dam failure.
DWA does not evaluate risk to human life using FN-criteria and through investigation it was found
that their current procedures have implicit inconsistencies in the way risk is allocated. In order to
eliminate these inconsistencies it was proposed to switch to the FN-criteria defined by Australian
National Committee On Large Dams (ANCOLD) for new and existing dams.
When a dam is rehabilitated, it is expected that the probability of dam failure will be reduced and
consequently the expected risk to human life, as the combination of the probability of failure and the
estimated loss of life, should be reduced. However, these rehabilitation works come at a cost.
The rehabilitation of South African government owned dams is financed via public taxes or pub-
lic charges. In addition, the level of these investments are large. This could be demonstrated by
considering the expenditure for the rehabilitation of dams conducted by DWA.
Since 2005/2006, a dam safety rehabilitation programme was initiated by DWA and 19 dams iden-
tified by DWA to be in need of rehabilitation works have been rehabilitated in full (Segers, 2012). For
an additional 9 dams, the civil works of rehabilitation works were completed, but the mechanical
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refurbishment works are still outstanding. A further 94 remaining dams identified to be in need of
rehabilitation works are in different stages of design, construction, planning or requires further as-
sessments before action could be taken. In Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 a summary of the expenditure for
the rehabilitation works conducted by DWA since the years 2005-2006 is provided. The total expen-
diture up until the 2011-2012 financial year is estimated to be more than R 1.5 billion.
Since society essentially finances the rehabilitation of dams, it should be ensured that these large
investments into life safety are actually worthwhile for society. In this sense it must also be noted that
the societal resources that can be allocated to improving life safety through dam rehabilitation works
are limited. If the cost of reducing the risk to human life is disproportionate to the actual reduction
in risk to life through dam rehabilitation works, these resources may be redirected into other sectors,
for example into health care, transportation services and education, which may better the quality of
life of society, i.e. the same money may save more lives elsewhere.
Instead of independently evaluating the risk to life imposed by a dam and the investment cost
into reducing the risk to life, a joint indicator may be used which unites both aspects. This may
be achieved through socio-economic utility theory where utility is a measure of its own, but can
equally be transformed into other units, such as life expectancy or income. Societal Willingness To
Pay (SWTP) is a utility function which may be used as an effective tool to determine the accept-
able level of expenditure that is required by society in exchange for a reduction in risk to human life
(Pandey et al., 2006). It is a measure of society’s preference to exchange money for life-years, through
investments into risk reduction measures.
Investments are not always driven by safety concerns. Often investments are made for economic
reasons. In these cases, larger investments can be justified and its magnitude should be dictated by
economic optimisation. SWTP dictates that investments should be made into all effective life saving
measures, where "effective" implies a life saving measure where more lives per monetary unit is saved
than the SWTP threshold. Thus, the available technology or life-saving or risk reduction measures
available within a certain industry will significantly affect what is considered to be effective. SWTP
can thus be used to define a minimum level of investment into life safety for a given industry or
system. Higher levels of investments are allowed and should be made if it is economically desirable.
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In this chapter SWTP is suggested as an additional tool to assess if the investment into reducing
risk to human life through the rehabilitation of a dam is required by society. The chapter is structured
as follows:
• A theoretical background on SWTP as a utility function is provided.
– The principles on which the SWTP concept is based, are considered.
– The derivation of SWTP from the Life Quality Index (LQI) is described.
– The SWTP threshold for different technologies, projects or activities with different avail-
able life saving measures and associated costs is described.
• The SWTP concept is applied to South African dam safety to evaluate if an investment into life
safety through dam rehabilitation works is required by society.
– The SWTP-value which will be used for this study is described.
– Acceptability criteria based on the SWTP concept is developed for a case study of a South
African dam.
– The factors which may influence the stringency of the SWTP criteria are discussed, in-
cluding the SWTP-value used, the estimated investment cost for rehabilitation works and
the estimated improvement in life safety due to rehabilitation works.
• SWTP criteria are developed for additional case studies of South African dams. For each case
study the SWTP criteria have different levels of stringency due to different best practice tech-
nologies and associated costs available to reduce risk to life. The South African case studies of
dams are evaluated in terms of their respective SWTP criteria to determine if investments into
life safety are considered efficient by society.
• The SWTP criteria developed for the South African dam case studies are compared to ANCOLD
conventional criteria for assessing risk to human life. The fundamental differences between
the criteria are discussed.
• A summary of the main findings is provided.
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5.2 Background to SWTP
Since society essentially finances dam rehabilitation works, society should in some way benefit from
the rehabilitation works through an improvement of life safety. In addition, societal resources are
limited and the investments into dam rehabilitation works should be justified. The main question
which needs to be answered is: "How much can society afford to invest into improving life safety
through the rehabilitation of a dam?".
In order to provide some answer to this question, the Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) model
is suggested which determines the acceptable level of expenditure that is required by society in ex-
change for a reduction in risk to human life and without compromising the quality of life of a society
(Pandey et al., 2006).
In this section the principles on which SWTP is based are firstly considered and thereafter the
basic derivation of SWTP and the use of technology curves are discussed.
5.2.1 Principles on which SWTP is based
In broad terms, risk should be managed to serve public interest. The fundamental principles for
managing risk are summarised as four principles by Pandey and Nathwani (2004). The principles
form the basic foundation from which the SWTP concept is derived.
1. The Accountability Principle: "Decisions for the public in regard to health and safety must be
open, quantified, defensible, consistent and apply across the complete range of hazards to life."
When managing risks to life on society’s behalf, it should be ensured that the basis on which
decisions are made are the same. This principle provides a clear statement of what the public
has a right to expect and also provides support for decision makers.
2. The Principle of Maximum Net Benefit: "Risks shall be managed to maximize the total expected
net benefit to society."
This principle is based on the utilitarian concept of welfare which requires "the greatest good
for the greatest number". The efficiency of an investment into an activity to reduce risk to life
may be assessed by finding how much reduction in risk to life does the investment ensure, and
this may be compared to the reduction in risk to life obtained if the investment is redirected
elsewhere.
In addition the principle requires that all persons in a group should be treated equally. There-
fore this principle cannot be applied in the situation where some individuals can be identified
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to carry a higher burden of risk. In this case the impacts on an individual must be dealt with
separately. It must be noted that identifiable individuals may not be knowingly "sacrificed" to
the "greater good of the group".
3. The Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Principle: "A policy is to be judged socially beneficial if the
gainers receive enough benefits that they can compensate the losers fully and still have some net
gain left over."
This principle states that if a policy ensures that the losers are fully compensated, they are
by definition transformed into non-losers. In this case the policy should be "Pareto optimal",
thereby ensuring that an optimum or at least the neutral is achieved for all. These compen-
sating measures may include compensation in the form of money or relocation. The affected
individual is given the primary weight in choosing the form of the compensation measure.
4. The Life Measure Principle: "The measure of health and safety benefit is the expectancy of life
in good health."
When assessing the reduction in risk to human life, the net benefit should be assessed and max-
imised in terms of length of life in good health. Length of life in good health may be assessed
using life expectancy. Therefore if an investment into an activity to reduce risk to human life is
assessed, the increase in life expectancy is considered. Life expectancy is a reliable statistical
measure used universally.
It must be noted that the term "lives saved" is a misleading measure and "life expectancy" is
preferred. If a specific activity is expected to reduce risk to life, the relevant issue is not life or
death, but the reduction in the specific cause of mortality. Death is certain, it is only the timing
of mortality which is uncertain. Thereby a more meaningful and scientifically correct measure
is "life expectancy" instead of "lives saved" when the reduction of risk to life is assessed due to
an investment into an activity.
5.2.2 Derivation of SWTP
An investment to reduce the risk to life imposed by a technical facility may be compared to the So-
cietal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) for a marginal increase in life safety to evaluate whether the invest-
ment into life safety is worthwhile to society (Fischer et al., 2011). In effect, the marginal life saving
cost (how much is spent to increase life safety by a margin) is compared to the SWTP for a marginal
increase in life safety (how much should be spent to increase life safety by a margin).
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The Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) approach is based on the Life Quality Index (LQI). The
LQI is a function of two social indicators; the life expectancy at birth which represents longevity and
safety, and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person which represents the quality of life of a soci-
ety. According to Pandey and Nathwani (2004), both factors may be reliably obtained from statistical
data to quantitatively express the health and wealth of a nation.
In this section the basic derivation of the Life Quality Index (LQI) and Societal Willingness To Pay
(SWTP) is discussed as obtained from Pandey and Nathwani (2004).
The LQI may be formulated as shown in Eq. 5.2.1.
L =Gq E (5.2.1)
Where,
G = the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person ($/person/year)
E = the life expectancy at birth (years/person)
q = parameter which reflects the trade-off placed on the consumption and the value
attached to the length of life
The parameter q depends on the fraction of time spent producing G, and the remaining time,
the leisure time, available for the enjoyment of E. Therefore the parameter q is the ratio of average
work time to leisure time. If the parameter w corresponds to the amount of time spent producing
income that supports consumption and the remaining time (1-w) corresponds to the the leisure time
available to a person, the relationship used to estimate q may be represented as shown in Eq. 5.2.2:
q = w
(1−w) (5.2.2)
Where,
w = the fraction of time spent producing income that supports consumption
(1-w) = the remaining fraction of time corresponding to leisure time
A person can increase his/her leisure time by either reducing the time spent in producing G
and thereby sacrificing consumption, or by reducing risk to life in order to increase life expectancy
(Pandey and Nathwani, 2004).
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In order to have a better understanding on what the LQI concept is based, a brief derivation is
firstly provided and thereafter the development of SWTP from the LQI principle is provided.
Derivation of LQI:
According to Pandey and Nathwani (2004), the LQI concept is based on the general idea that a per-
son’s enjoyment of life, or utility, in an economic sense is dependant on a continuous stream of re-
sources available for consumption and the time to enjoy. Hence there are two determinants of life
quality; income to support consumption and the time to enjoy.
The lifetime utility for a person at a certain age is the total consumption over the remaining life
time. According to Pandey and Nathwani (2004) the expected value of a lifetime utility of a person
at age a is shown as the product of the utility function for consumption and the utility function for
longevity as shown in Eq. 5.2.3:
L(a)= u(c)e(a)= cq e(a) (5.2.3)
Where,
L(a) = lifetime utility of a person at age a
u(c) = utility function for consumption
e(a) = utility function for longevity
The utility function for consumption and longevity take certain factors into account as discussed:
Utility function for consumption:
For the utility function for consumption, u(c), a power utility function and constant consumption
rate, c, is assumed. This leads to the utility function for consumption becoming cq . The parameter
q is also referred to as the elasticity of utility regarding consumption. The parameter q is taken as
a constant regardless the level of consumption, leading to the consumption rate being the same for
rich and poor (Pandey and Nathwani, 2004).
The parameter q has been described above as the ratio of average work time to leisure time. In
this context, q is taken as the measure of tradeoff between the utility for consumption and utility
for longevity. According to Pandey and Nathwani (2004), in a well-developed country with a well-
developed economy and standard of living, an increase in life expectancy outweighs consumption
consideration, and hence the q parameter is typically very low. In opposition, for a poor country,
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a large consumption consideration outweighs an increase in longevity and hence the value for q is
typically high.
Utility function for longevity:
When the utility function for longevity, e(a), is determined a discount rate, or also commonly referred
to as the rate of time preference for consumption, is taken into account. This rate of time preference
for consumption compensates for the fact that individuals tend to undervalue the prospect of future
consumption in comparison to the current consumption (Pandey and Nathwani, 2004). This rate of
time preference for consumption should not be confused with the interest rate for inflation.
To determine the lifetime utility for a person at a certain age the basic formulation shown in Eq. 5.2.3
may be used. Pandey and Nathwani (2004) further describes that the quality of life of a population
at a societal level may be determined using the aggregate value of the lifetime utilities for all persons
in a society. The life quality of a society is determined by integrating the lifetime utility over the
distribution of population age and consumption rate. This takes into account for "the greatest good
for the greatest number" principle as described in the principle of maximum net benefit in section
5.2.1.
Integrating Eq. 5.2.3 over the lifetime of a person, the LQI may be derived as shown in Eq. 5.2.4.
For simplification, the consumption rate c is assumed to be equivalent to the GDP per person per
year, G. In addition, the age-distribution of a population, f(a), is taken into account.
LQI =
∫ T
0
L(a) f (a)d a = cq
∫ T
0
e(a) f (a)d a =Gq E (5.2.4)
E denotes the discounted life expectancy, averaged over the age-distribution of a population. This
ensures that the same value is placed on the preference for gaining life expectancy for a population.
Therefore equal weight is assigned to life years regardless of being young or old.
The diagram in Fig. 5.1 shows how the three components of the LQI concept relate to human
concerns: creation of wealth, duration of life, and time available to enjoy life in good health.
It must be noted that only a brief introduction to the development of the LQI concept has been
provided. The full derivation of the Life Quality Index (LQI) concept is formally described in Pandey
and Nathwani (2004). Further derivation and verification of the LQI concept are discussed in peer-
reviewed literature, such as in literature by Pandey et al. (2006), Ditlevsen and Friis-Hansen (2005),
Rackwitz et al. (2005) and in the Joint Committee of Structural Safety (JCSS) technical report by Rack-
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witz (2008). The development of SWTP concept from the LQI principle is discussed next.
Population 
GDP 
GDP per 
person 
Life Quality Index = GqE 
Work/Leisure 
Time Ratio 
Time Budget Demographics 
and discounting 
adjustments 
Risk Mortality 
G E q 
Life  
Expectancy 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual model of the Life Quality Index (LQI) (Pandey and Nathwani, 2004)
Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP):
An investment into an activity which leads to a reduction in risk to life will affect the LQI by leading
to an improved quality of life. Using Eq. 5.2.1 a small change in the LQI due to the implementation
of a project or regulation can be assessed as shown in Eq. 5.2.5 (Nathwani et al., 2008).
dL
L
= dG
G
+K dE
E
(5.2.5)
Where,
dG = the monetary cost of implementing the project (negative), or the monetary benefits
which arise from the existence of the project (positive)
dE = the change in life expectancy due to a change in the risk associated with the project
K = 1/q
From the net benefit criterion described in section 5.2.1 it is required for an investment into an
activity to reduce risk to life to be maximised. For an investment into life safety influencing both G
and E, the change in the LQI should be positive. Hence Eq. 5.2.5 can be rewritten to formally obtain
acceptability criteria as shown in Eq. 5.2.6.
dG
G
+K dE
E
≥ 0 (5.2.6)
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The LQI concept relates to the Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) concept where SWTP deter-
mines the acceptable level for an investment into reducing risk to life that is required by society
(Nathwani et al., 2008). SWTP therefore defines the lower boundary for acceptable decisions and
may be obtained as the exact value ( dLL = 0) of Eq. 5.2.6. If the terms are re-arranged, the SWTP for a
marginal increase in life expectancy may be obtained as shown in Eq. 5.2.7:
SW T P =−dG =GK dE
E
($/per son/year ) (5.2.7)
It must be noted -dG corresponds to an investment and therefore a loss of income, hence the
value is negative.
The marginal life saving costs for a project can be compared to SWTP for a marginal increase in
life safety and threshold criterion may be derived as shown in Eq. 5.2.8 (Fischer et al., 2011). Society
requires that an investment, -dG, into a life saving activity should at least be equal to the SWTP for a
marginal increase in life expectancy (Fischer et al., 2011), i.e. if the investment does not comply with
this criterion, it is not acceptable according to society.
−dG ≥ SW T P =GK dE
E
'GKCx dµ (5.2.8)
It must be noted that the dE/E parameter in Eq. 5.2.8 may not always be easily quantified. Instead
it may be calculated as the product of the mortality change (dµ) and a demographic constant (Cx )
which may be obtained from life tables presented by Rackwitz (2006). The demographic constant
takes age-averaging and discounting into account which have been discussed in the derivation of the
LQI concept above.
For age-averaging, two mortality reduction schemes may be considered; the Π-regime and the
∆-regime (Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez, 2011). The Π-regime is the case where the change in mor-
tality is proportional over the age distribution. It implies that persons who are more susceptible to
mortality (typically due to weakened physical state), are more subject to the phenomenon (Lentz,
2007). The ∆-regime is the case where the change in mortality is uniformly distributed over all ages.
It implies that a phenomenon will affect every member of a society, regardless of each individual’s
age (Lentz, 2007).
The investment into an activity to reduce risk to human life may be assessed against SWTP using
technology curves as discussed next.
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Technology curves:
If an investment is made into an activity to reduce risk to life, a technology curve may be obtained as
shown in Fig. 5.2. The shape of the curve depends on the effectiveness of life saving measures and
the cost therof. As the investment into life safety increases the risk to life is reduced.
For different activities, projects, technologies the curves are defined differently since the cost
of reducing the risk to human life are different for each activity/project/technology. For example,
if two different industries such as the dam safety and transportation industry are considered, the
best practice technologies available in one industry could result in higher risk reductions at lower
costs than for the other industry. The same could be observed within one industry, where different
solutions are available for reducing risk to life, however, the costs of the risk reducing solutions could
differ vastly.
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Figure 5.2: Reduction of risk to life with increased investment in life safety - Adapted from Fischer et al. (2011)
In Fig. 5.2 sloping lines meet each technology curve at a point of tangency. The gradiënt resem-
bles SWTP for a marginal increase in life safety and the point of tangency defines the lower bound for
acceptable investments into reducing risk to life as defined by society.
SWTP dictates that investments should be made into all life saving measures which are consid-
ered efficient by society, i.e. where more lives per monetary unit is saved than the SWTP threshold.
The region for efficient investments is shown in Fig. 5.3. SWTP thus defines the minimum level of
investment into life safety for a given industry or system. However, it must be noted that investments
are not always driven by safety concerns and additional investments for economic, environmental or
other reasons are allowed.
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Figure 5.3: Effective region for investments into life safety defined by SWTP - Adapted from Fischer et al. (2011)
Since each technology curve in Fig. 5.2 is different due to different available life saving measures
and associated costs, the point of tangency defined by SWTP is different for different systems and
industries. This leads to a different lower bound for investments into life safety to be considered
efficient by society, for each different dam rehabilitation project.
In the following section the SWTP concept is applied to this study and criteria are developed to
evaluate if an investment into reducing risk to life through the rehabilitation of a dam is required by
society.
5.3 SWTP acceptability criteria for the evaluation of South African dams
for rehabilitation works
The aim of this section is to develop an FN-criterion line that would define an absolute lower bound-
ary of acceptable safety, based on SWTP principles, i.e. all life saving strategies that are considered
efficient in terms of society’s preference to exchange money for life years must be implemented. Ad-
ditional safety measures may also be implemented, but this would be done based on other consider-
ations, such as economic optimisation.
5.3.1 Application of SWTP concept to South African dam safety
It is expected that an investment into dam rehabilitation works should decrease the probability of
dam failure and consequently the expected risk to human life, as the combination of the probability
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of failure and the estimated loss of life, should be reduced. Technology curves may be developed
for a dam in need of rehabilitation works using incremental values for the investment costs and the
corresponding reduction in risk to life to plot a locus of points on a similar graph as shown in Fig.
5.2. If incremental values are not available and only the final value for the investment cost and the
reduction in risk to life can be obtained for dam rehabilitation works, a "technology line" instead of
a "technology curve" can be defined as shown in Fig. 5.4. The slope of the technology line is defined
by the marginal cost (∆C) for a marginal decrease in risk to life (∆N).
To find whether the investment which has been made into life safety complies with SWTP re-
quirements, the "technology line" developed for dam rehabilitation works may be evaluated against
the gradiënt defined by SWTP for a marginal increase in life safety. If the gradiënt of the technology
line is steeper than the SWTP gradiënt, the investment is required by society. If not, the investment
is not required by society but may still be made based on economic, environmental, or other consid-
erations in addition to safety.
r i s
k  
t o
 
l i f
e ,
 
N  
investment cost into life safety, C 
SWTP 
1 
DAM
 
∆C 
∆N 
Figure 5.4: Scenario where the slope of the technology line for dam rehabilitation works is steeper than
gradiënt defined by SWTP
In Fig. 5.4, the slope of the technology line defined for the dam rehabilitation works is steeper
than the gradiënt defined by SWTP. The relationship between the slopes of the two lines are shown in
Eq. 5.3.1.
1
SW T P
≤ ∆N
∆C
(5.3.1)
The relationship in Eq. 5.3.1 may be re-arranged as shown in Eq. 5.3.2.
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SW T P ≥ ∆C
∆N
(5.3.2)
In Eq. 5.3.2 the investment cost per marginal life saved (∆C/∆N) is less than the SWTP. As defined
in section 5.2.2, an investment into life safety should at least be equal to SWTP for a marginal increase
in life expectancy (Fischer et al., 2011). Therefore the investment into life safety is efficient and should
be made. The lower boundary set by SWTP defines what investments are considered to be efficient
and all efficient life saving measures should be implemented.
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Figure 5.5: Scenario where the slope of the technology line for dam rehabilitation works is less steep than
gradiënt defined by SWTP
In Fig. 5.5 the scenario is considered where the slope of the technology line for a dam rehabili-
tation works is less steep than the gradiënt defined by SWTP. The relationship between the slopes of
the lines are shown in Eq. 5.3.3.
1
SW T P
≥ ∆N
∆C
(5.3.3)
The relationship in Eq. 5.3.3 is also re-arranged and the equation shown in Eq. 5.3.4 is obtained.
SW T P ≤ ∆C
∆N
(5.3.4)
In Eq. 5.3.4 the investment cost per marginal life saved (∆C/∆N) is more than SWTP. The invest-
ment into life safety is considered to be inefficient and is therefore not required in terms of the lower
boundary set by SWTP.
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Using the relationship shown in Eq. 5.3.4, the absolute value or the lower boundary for an invest-
ment into life safety through the rehabilitation of a dam as defined by SWTP may be found as shown
in Eq. 5.3.5.
1
SW T P
= ∆N
∆C
(5.3.5)
Re-arranging Eq. 5.3.5, the minimum required reduction in risk to life for an investment into life
safety to be considered efficient for a specified SWTP may be obtained as shown in Eq. 5.3.6.
∆N = ∆C
SW T P
(5.3.6)
Where,
∆N = the reduction in risk to human life due to the rehabilitation works [lives/yr]
∆ C = the cost of the rehabilitation works [R/yr]
SWTP = the Societal Willingness To Pay [R/life]
The units for the parameters in Eq. 5.3.6 are shown. Note that the estimated cost of rehabilitation
works (∆C) is annualised (R/yr). Applying basic economics theory, the Present Worth (PW) of the
investment cost, determined at the year of the design for the rehabilitation works, may be converted
to an Annual Worth (AW) as shown in Eq. 5.3.7 (Blank and Tarquin, 2008).
AW = PW.[ (1+ i )
n
(1+ i )n −1 ] (5.3.7)
Where,
AW = the Annual Worth of cost of rehabilitation works [R/yr]
PW = the Present Worth of cost of rehabilitation works [R]
i = the inflation rate [%]
n = the life time of the structure [yrs]
For the rehabilitation investment to be considered efficient, a minimum reduction in risk to hu-
man lives (∆N) are required. Considering the basic principle that expected risk is the product of
probability and consequence, the minimum reduction in risk to human life (∆N) could be expressed
as a function of the reduction in the probability of dam failure ∆P f (which depends on the effec-
tiveness of the rehabilitation strategy) and the estimated number of lives lost (LOL) in case of dam
failureas shown in Eq. 5.3.8.
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∆N =∆P f ×LOL (5.3.8)
Where,
LOL = Loss of Life [lives]
∆ N = the minimum reduction in risk to human life required for an investment into
rehabilitation works [lives/yr]
∆ P f = the reduction in probability in failure due to the rehabilitation works [1/yr]
This relationship implies that a rehabilitation investment may be considered inefficient because;
a) the rehabilitation strategy available is not effective, leading to a small reduction in the proba-
bility of dam failure ∆P f ,
b) the dam was already fairly safe, thus rehabilitation also leads to only a small improvement in
∆P f , or
c) the number of expected lost lives (LOL) in case of failure is already so low that the risk is con-
sidered acceptable.
The lowest number of expected lost lives (LOL) for which an investment into life safety is still
considered efficient by society is given by rearranging the relationship in Eq. 5.3.8 to obtain the rela-
tionship shown in Eq. 5.3.9.
LOL = ∆N
∆P f
(5.3.9)
The reduction in the probability of failure due to rehabilitation works (∆P f ) may be calculated
as the difference between the initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )) before rehabilitation works are
conducted and the final probability of failure (P f ( f i nal )) after the dam has been rehabilitated. This
relationship is shown in Eq. 5.3.10.
∆P f = P f (i ni t i al )−P f ( f i nal ) (5.3.10)
The initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al ) is estimated through the risk analysis methodology
developed by DWA to evaluate dams in term of their safety and aid decision making regarding reha-
bilitation works at South African government owned dams. The final probability of dam failure after
it has been rehabilitated (P f ( f i nal )) is assumed to be equivalent to a well-engineered dam with no
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known deficiencies. According to Oosthuizen (2002), the interval used by DWA for a well-engineered
dam with no known deficiencies is between 1E-5 and 1E-6 per year.
In summary, if the investment into life safety (∆C) is known, the minimum required reduction in
risk to human life (∆N) which will make the investment efficient in terms of society’s preferences may
be determined for a SWTP-value using Eq. 5.3.6. If the initial probability of dam failure (P f (i ni t i al ))
is known, the reduction in the probability of failure (∆P f ) may be determined from Eq. 5.3.10 as the
difference between the initial and final probability of failure. With both the minimum reduction in
risk to human life (∆N) and the reduction in the probability of dam failure (∆P f ) known, the lowest
number of lost lives (LOL) for which the investment would still be considered efficient by society may
be obtained from Eq. 5.3.9. In effect, to obtain the lower boundary for LOL for which society would
still require rehabilitation works, a SWTP-value, the investment cost into dam rehabilitation works
and the initial probability of dam failure before rehabilitation are required as input parameters.
In the following, the SWTP-value which will be used in this study is discussed. Thereafter, the
minimum LOL for which an investment into rehabilitation works are considered efficient by society
are determined for specific case studies of South African government dams.
The risk to human life estimated for the specific dam case study by the DWA risk analysis method-
ology may be assessed against the lower boundary of LOL for which an investment is required by
society. DWA estimates the risk to human life as the combination of the initial probability of failure
(P f ) and the predicted LOL in case of dam failure. For the initial probability of failure, if the LOL
estimated by DWA is more than the minimum LOL for which an investment into life safety is consid-
ered efficient by SWTP criteria, the investment into rehabilitation works is required by society. If the
LOL estimated by DWA is less than the minimum LOL required for an investment to be considered
efficient, the dam rehabilitation works is not required by society, but may still be considered based
on economic, environmental, or other considerations in addition to safety.
From this criterion point, SWTP criteria may be developed for a wider range of initial probabilities
of failure. The initial probability of failure is used to define the criterion point, since the proposed
investment is evaluated according to the risk that the dam poses before it is rehabilitated.
5.3.2 SWTP-value to be used for the study
In section 5.2.2 the derivation of the SWTP concept based on the Life Quality Index (LQI) is discussed.
The basis of the LQI and consequently the SWTP is that societal preferences with respect to invest-
ments into life safety can be described by jointly considering nation-specific social indicators for life
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expectancy at birth, GDP per person and the ratio between work and leisure time. In South Africa,
there are some factors which may cause the SWTP-value not to reflect the true preference of our
society.
Figure 5.6: Life expectancy vs GDP for different countries (Rackwitz, 2008)
Rackwitz (2008) demonstrates the relationship between the life expectancy at birth and GDP
per person for different countries by plotting the nation-specific life expectancy at birth against the
GDP per person. Fig. 5.6 demonstrates that the two factors are highly correlated across countries.
This trend may also be observed in similar plots presented by Lentz (2007) and Faber and Virguez-
Rodriguez (2011). The general trend observed for the data pairs, i.e. the life expectancy at birth and
GDP per person, may be used as criteria to assess if the development of an individual nation complies
with the underlying principles of LQI (Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez, 2011).
In South Africa the life expectancy at birth for citizens is low. This could be attributed to the HIV
epidemic observed in South Africa (StatsSA, 2011). In addition, the GDP per person for South Africa
is not purely dependant on the income produced through the work time of South African citizens but
is highly dependent on other factors, such as income produced from mining gold (StatsSA, 2012a).
Rackwitz (2008) plots the relationship between life expectancy at birth and GDP for South Africa.
Since the life expectancy is artificially low and the GDP is artificially high in South Africa the data
point is an outlier compared to the values obtained for other countries as shown in Fig. 5.6. The de-
velopment in South Africa therefore does not correspond to the underlying principles of LQI where a
joint development in the health and life safety (through life expectancy at birth) and wealth (through
GDP per person) is observed.
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In addition to the life expectancy at birth and GDP per person, the LQI is also a function of the
time necessary for work. The parameter q has been described in section 5.2.2 as the ratio of average
work time to leisure time. According to Fischer et al. (2011), the parameter can be derived based on
two main assumptions, namely that humans optimise their leisure to work ratio, and that the frac-
tion of time spent for work observed in society is already in an optimal state. South Africa has a high
percentage of joblessness and correspondingly a low employment rate (StatsSA, 2012b). This low em-
ployment rate is not the preference of our society, but rather due to our unfortunate political history.
The low South African employment rate may lead to the wrong interpretation of the parameter q. It
may indicate a low value for work time (w), which in turn leads to a higher value for leisure time (1-
w). In effect the value for q will typically be low and this may be wrongly interpreted as South African
citizens preferring enjoyment of life (1-w) over spending time earning a higher income. This will in
turn lead to a SWTP value which indicates an artificially high preference to exchange money for life
years.
Since there are so many South African factors that violate the underlying assumptions of the LQI
derivation, the SWTP-value for South Africa may be a significant outlier in comparison to SWTP-
values obtained for other countries at similar levels of development. The SWTP-value for South Africa
may not be a true reflection of society’s preference regarding investments into life safety. Therefore,
it is proposed to instead use an Earth value for SWTP (ESWTP) as developed by Faber and Virguez-
Rodriguez (2011). According to Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011), the ESWTP is based on obser-
vations from 71 countries, representing more than 70% of the Earth population. Faber and Virguez-
Rodriguez (2011) further states that the ESWTP conforms well with the preferences underlying the
LQI principle, i.e. the joint development of health and life safety (life expectancy at birth), economy
(GDP per person) and the necessary time to work (described by q as the ratio of work time to leisure
time).
Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011) developed different values for ESWTP, based on a discount
rate (also referred to as the rate of time preference for consumption) and a mortality reduction scheme.
The application of the rate of time preference for consumption and mortality reduction scheme
has been discussed in the derivation of SWTP in section 5.2.2. According to Arrow (1995) a rate of
time preference for consumption of 3% can be commonly assumed. In addition a uniform mortal-
ity reduction scheme (∆-regime) is assumed which indicates that mortality is distributed uniformly
over all ages (Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez, 2011). Taking the discount rate and mortality reduc-
tion scheme into account, the ESWTP obtained from Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011), is $US
517,000/life.
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In order to apply the ESWTP to South Africa, U.S. Dollars are converted to the South African
currency, Rand. The yearly average exchange rates for converting U.S. Dollars to Rand were obtained
from the International Revenue Service (2012) from the years 2006 to 2011, since the investment
costs for rehabilitation works for case studies of South African dams considered later in this study
were estimated within this time frame. The average of the exchange rate values for the 6 years were
$US 1 = R 7.83, which leads to an ESWTP of R 4.048 million/life.
5.3.3 Developed SWTP-criteria for South African dam safety
With a defined SWTP-value, the lowest number of lost lives for which an investment into dam reha-
bilitation works would be considered efficient by society may be determined, as described in section
5.3.1.
For different case studies of dams, the SWTP-criterion will lead to a different lower bound for
each dam. The technology curve for a dam defines how effective the rehabilitation work is to reduce
risk to lives. These curves are different for different dams leading to different a lower bound defined
by SWTP for each dam.
The computations described in section 5.3.1 is applied to a case study of a South African gov-
ernment owned dam that has been identified to be in need of rehabilitation works. The calculation
procedure is shown for Klein Maricopoort Dam. This dam was also evaluated using conventional
acceptability criteria for risk to human life in Chapter 4.
Firstly the minimum required reduction in risk to human life (∆N) for an investment into life
safety to be considered efficient is calculated using Eq. 5.3.6. In order to determine ∆N, the SWTP-
value and the estimated investment cost into rehabilitation works are required. The SWTP-value was
defined in section 5.3.2 as R 4.048 million/life. The investment cost of the proposed dam rehabili-
tation works obtained from the DWA design report for rehabilitation works is estimated as R 39.33
million (van Wyk et al., 2008b). In determining ∆N an annualised value for the investment cost is
needed. Therefore, the estimated cost for rehabilitation works, determined in the year 2008, should
be annualised over the life time of the dam.
The annualised cost (Annual Worth) of implementing the rehabilitation works are calculated
from the estimated investment cost (Present Worth value in 2008) using Eq. 5.3.7 illustrated in sec-
tion 5.3.1. The annualised cost, assuming an average life time of a dam of 50 years (n = 50 years) and
an inflation rate of 7% (i = 7%), is shown:
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AW = PW.[ (1+ i )
n
(1+ i )n −1 ]= (R 39.33mi l l .).[
(1+7%)50
(1+7%)50−1 ]=R 2.85mi l l ./yr (5.3.11)
With the known SWTP-value and annualised investment cost into dam rehabilitation works, the
minimum ∆N for an investment into dam rehabilitation works to be required by society is deter-
mined from Eq. 5.3.6 as shown:
∆N = ∆C
SW T P
= R 2.85mi l l ./yr
R4.048mi l l ./l i f e
= 0.704 l i ves/yr (5.3.12)
Next, the lowest number of expected lost lives (LOL) for which an investment is required by so-
ciety is calculated using Eq. 5.3.9. For this calculation the minimum reduction in risk to human life
(∆N) and the reduction in the probability of failure (∆ P f ) due to the dam rehabilitation works are
required as input parameters. The minimum∆N has already been determined for Klein Maricopoort
Dam as 0.704 lives/yr. However, the ∆ P f still needs to be determined as the difference between the
initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )), before the dam is rehabilitated, and the final probability of
failure (P f ( f i nal )), after the dam has been rehabilitated.
The initial probability of failure for Klein Maricopoort Dam was determined through the DWA
risk analysis methodology and the results of the risk analysis are included in the DWA dam safety
inspection report. DWA estimates an interval for the probability of failure (P f ) and the maximum
and minimum value of the interval for Klein Maricopoort Dam is estimated as 1E-3 and 1E-4 per year
(Kelefetswe, 2005).
The change in probability of dam failure is determined as shown in Table 5.1. P f ( f i nal ) is assumed
to be between 1E-5 and 1E-6 per year as defined in section 5.3.1. The final probability of failure
(P f ( f i nal )) is very small in comparison to the initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )), leading to the
change in probability of failure (∆P f ) being approximately equal to the P f (i ni t i al ).
Table 5.1: Calculation of the lower bound of expected lost lives (LOLlbound ) for which an investment into
rehabilitation works at Klein Maricopoort Dam is required by society
Max Min
P f (i ni t i al ) 1.00E-03 1.00E-04
P f ( f i nal ) 1.00E-05 1.00E-06
∆P f (Eq. 5.3.10) 9.99E-04 ≈ 1.00E-3 9.99E-05 ≈ 1.00E-4
LOLl bound * (Eq. 5.3.9) 712 lives 7112 lives
*Note that the LOL is always rounded up in order to be conservative.
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The lower bound of expected lives lost (LOLlbound ) for which an investment into rehabilitation
works at Klein Maricopoort Dam would still be considered efficient by society is determined using
Eq. 5.3.9 with the calculated ∆P f and ∆N as input parameters. The results are shown in Table 5.1.
Note that since DWA estimates an interval for the probability of failure, a maximum and minimum
value for the LOLlbound is determined.
The LOLl bound determined for an initial probability of dam failure, is assessed against the LOL
estimated by DWA for the same initial probability of failure through the DWA risk analysis. If the
LOL estimated by DWA is more than the LOLlbound developed using SWTP criteria, an investment
into rehabilitation works is considered efficient and is required by society. If the LOL estimated by
DWA is less than the LOLl bound , an investment into dam rehabilitation works is not efficient and not
required by society.
The maximum and minimum value estimated by DWA for the LOL is 3 and 5 as obtained from
the DWA dam safety inspection report for Klein Maricopoort Dam (Kelefetswe, 2005). Comparing
the LOL estimated by DWA to the LOLlbound shown in Table 5.1, it is seen that both the minimum
and maximum value of the LOL estimated by DWA is less than the interval obtained for LOLlbound .
Therefore, an investment into dam rehabilitation works at Klein Maricopoort Dam is not required by
society.
From this criterion point, i.e. for an initial probability of dam failure and the LOLlbound for which
an investment into rehabilitation works is required by society, acceptability criteria may be developed
for a wider range of initial probabilities of failure.
Either or both the maximum and minimum initial probability of failures and the corresponding
LOLlbound as obtained in Table 5.1 may be plotted as co-ordinate points on an FN-diagram. For
both the maximum and minimum initial probability of failures and the corresponding LOLlbound , a
criterion line may be obtained through the points on the FN-diagram. This results in a criterion line
with a slope of -1, i.e. zero risk aversion, which is generally accepted as good practice as described in
Chapter 3. For Klein Maricopoort Dam a line with a slope of -1 is plotted through the two co-ordinate
points as shown in Fig 5.7.
The risk to human life estimated by DWA through a risk analysis may be plotted on the FN-
diagram. If the risk to human life is located above the SWTP criterion line, the investment into re-
habilitation works to improve life safety is required by society. If the risk to human life estimated by
DWA is located below the line, the investment into rehabilitation works is not required by society.
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Figure 5.7: SWTP criterion line for Case Study 2 (Klein Maricopoort Dam)
For Klein Maricopoort dam, the maximum and minimum value for both the initial probability of
failure and the LOL are plotted on the FN-diagram as shown in Fig. 5.7. Due to the interval, the risk
to life is presented in the form of block, representing the level of confidence of the data. The expected
risk for Klein Maricopoort Dam is located below the SWTP criterion line, implying that an investment
into rehabilitation works to improve life safety is not required by society.
In the following, factors which may influence the position of the SWTP criterion line are investi-
gated.
5.3.4 Factors influencing the position of the SWTP criterion line
In section 5.3.3 a SWTP criterion line presented on an FN-diagram is developed for Klein Maricopoort
Dam. This criterion line is based on the lowest number of lives lost LOLl bound for which an invest-
ment into life safety is required by society. To determine the LOLl bound , a SWTP-value, the invest-
ment cost into dam rehabilitation works (∆C) and the initial probability of dam failure (P f (i ni t i al )) are
required as input parameters. Therefore, if these three factors are varied, the position of the SWTP
criterion line on the FN-diagram may be influenced. The influence of varying each of the three fac-
tors is investigated.
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The cost of rehabilitation works (∆C)
If the cost of the rehabilitation works are increased and decreased by a factor of 2 and 4, the position
of the SWTP criterion line will change as shown in Fig. 5.8. Decreasing the investment cost leads
to a smaller minimum reduction in risk to life (∆N) for an investment to be considered efficient by
society. This also leads to a decreased value for the lowest number of lives lost LOLlbound for which
an investment into life safety is required by society. Consequently the SWTP criterion line becomes
more stringent. If the implementation cost for rehabilitation works is increased, the balance between
the investment cost and reduction in risk to human life becomes disproportionate to each other.
Consequently the SWTP criterion line becomes less stringent.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of increasing and decreasing the cost of rehabilitation works on the position of the SWTP
criterion line
SWTP-value
If the SWTP-value is increased and decreased by a factor of 2 and 4, the position of the SWTP criterion
line will change as shown in Fig 5.9. For an increased SWTP-value the criterion line becomes more
stringent and for a decreased SWTP-value the criterion line becomes less stringent. It is expected
that the acceptability criteria become more stringent if the SWTP-value is increased, since society is
more willing to pay for a reduction in risk to life.
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It must be noted when the SWTP-value is increased by a factor of 2 and 4, the SWTP criterion
line are within one span (factor of 10) of each other. Thus, the criterion is not unduly sensitive to
the assumed SWTP-value. The criterion line is equally sensitive to changes in the SWTP-value or
changes in the estimated investment cost. As long as these values are accurate in terms of their order
of magnitude, the SWTP criterion seems to be sufficiently well defined to be of practical use.
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Figure 5.9: Effect of increasing and decreasing the SWTP-value on the position of the SWTP criterion line
Initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al ))
The influence of the initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )) on the SWTP criterion line is investigated
by increasing and decreasing the P f (i ni t i al ) by a factor of 10
1 and 102.
The lowest number of expected lost lives (LOLlbound ) for which an investment is required by
society is determined using the different values of the initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )). The
results for the LOLlbound for Klein Maricopoort Dam are shown in Table 5.2. If a criterion line is
obtained for each of the corresponding points on a FN-diagram, it is seen that an increase or decrease
in the P f (i ni t i al ) does not influence the position of the criterion line but defines different points on
the same SWTP criterion line as shown in Fig. 5.10.
120
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 5.2: Lower bound LOL for which an investment is required by society obtained for an increased and
decreased P f (i ni t i al )
P f (i ni t i al ) LOLlbound
1.E-01 8
1.E-02 71
1.E-03 712
1.E-04 7823
1.E-05 78222
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Figure 5.10: Effect of increasing and decreasing the initial probability of failure on the position of the SWTP
criterion line
In summary, the value of the investment cost into rehabilitation works and the value of SWTP
affects the position of the criterion line. If the investment cost is increased, the SWTP criterion line
becomes less stringent. If the SWTP-values is increased, the SWTP criterion line becomes more strin-
gent. The initial probability of failure does not have an effect on the position of the criterion lines,
but only defines different points on the SWTP criterion line.
For different case studies of dams the rehabilitation strategy of reducing risk to life is different,
thus the investment cost of reducing risk to life is dam specific. This leads to SWTP defining a dif-
ferent lower bound for an investment to be considered efficient by society at each dam. The SWTP-
criterion lines will therefore have different levels of stringency, depending on the rehabilitation strat-
egy for the specific dam.
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In the following section, SWTP criterion lines are developed for more case studies of South African
government owned dams and the risk to human life for each dam is assessed against the dam specific
criterion line.
5.4 Evaluation of South African case studies of dams in terms of
proposed SWTP-criteria
5.4.1 Development of SWTP-criteria for different case studies of South African dams
In this section SWTP criterion lines, similarly to the SWTP criterion line that was developed for Klein
Maricopoort Dam in section 5.3.3, are developed for different case studies of South African govern-
ment owned dams. The risk to human life estimated through the DWA risk analysis methodology for
the case studies is assessed against this criteria to determine if an investment into life safety through
rehabilitation works is required by society.
For this study, the same eleven case studies of South African dams that were identified to be in
need of rehabilitation works by DWA and were evaluated according to conventional acceptability
criteria for risk to human life in Chapter 4 are used. To develop the criterion lines based on SWTP,
the initial probability of failure and the investment cost of implementing rehabilitation works are
needed.
For each of the case studies the initial probability of failure before rehabilitation works are im-
plemented are obtained from the risk analysis performed by DWA as part of their inspection reports.
The initial probability of failure for the eleven case studies of dams are shown in Table 5.3 and corre-
sponds to the values used in Chapter 4.
In addition, the estimated cost of the rehabilitation works for each of the case studies is obtained
from the design report for the rehabilitation works. The estimated investment cost for rehabilitation
works for the eleven case studies are shown in Table 5.4.
The estimated cost (PW) of implementing rehabilitation works for the eleven case studies as ob-
tained from DWA design reports are annualised as shown in Table 5.5. The annualised cost (AW) of
implementing the rehabilitation works are calculated using Eq. 5.3.11, assuming an average life time
of a dam of 50 years (n = 50 years) and an inflation rate of 7% (i = 7%).
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Table 5.3: Estimated initial probability of failure for 11 case studies obtained from DWA inspection reports
Case
Dam Estimated P f (i ni t i al )study
nr.
Min Max
1a Bospoort Dam
1.00E-03 1.00E-02
(Gates Functioning)
1b Bospoort Dam
1.00E-02 1.00E-01
(Gates Not Functioning)
2 Klein Maricopoort Dam 1.00E-04 1.00E-03
3 Toleni Dam 5.00E-04 5.00E-03
4 Lakeside Dam 2.00E-04 2.00E-03
5 Vaalkop Dam 2.00E-05 2.00E-04
6 Rust De Winter Dam 5.00E-05 5.00E-04
7 Makotswane Dam 3.00E-04 3.00E-03
8 Kromellenboog Dam 2.00E-04 2.00E-03
9 Albert Falls Dam 1.00E-04 1.00E-03
10 Glen Brock Dam 1.00E-03 1.00E-02
11 Wentzel Dam 1.11E-03 1.11E-02
Table 5.4: Estimated investment cost for rehabilitation works are DWA dam case studies, obtained from dam
safety rehabilitation design reports
Case
Dam
Estimated investment
Referencestudy
cost (R)
nr.
1a Bospoort Dam R 84 342 339.28 Cameron-Ellis (2007)
(Gates Functioning)
1b Bospoort Dam R 84 342 339.28 Cameron-Ellis (2007)
(Gates Not Functioning)
2 Klein Maricopoort Dam R 39 330 000.00 (van Wyk et al., 2008b)
3 Toleni Dam R 23 662 252.68 Pienaar and Badenhorst (2007)
4 Lakeside Dam R 25 194 000.00 Badenhorst and Rix (2008)
5 Vaalkop Dam R 24 225 000.00 Rix et al. (2006)
6 Rust De Winter Dam R 21 318 000.00 van Wyk et al. (2008a)
7 Makotswane (Buffelsdoorn) Dam R 16 956 360.00 van Wyk et al. (2006)
8 Kromellenboog Dam R 19 157 426.40
Badenhorst and Trümpelmann
(2008)
9 Albert Falls Dam R 16 530 000.00 Badenhorst and van Wyk (2008)
10 Glen Brock Dam R 17 600 000.00 Chaloner (2009)
11 Wentzel Dam R 14 250 000.00 van Wyk and Badenhorst (2007)
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Table 5.5: Estimated cost of rehabilitation works for 11 case studies obtained from DWA design reports
Case
Dam
Year of Estimated cost - PW Annualised cost - AW
study
cost estimate (incl. VAT) (i = 7%, n = 50)
nr.
1a Bospoort Dam
2007 R 84 342 339.28 R 6 111 433.21/yr
(Gates Functioning)
1b Bospoort Dam
2007 R 84 342 339.28 R 6 111 433.21/yr
(Gates Not Functioning)
2 Klein Maricopoort Dam 2008 R 39 330 000.00 R 2 849 845.88/yr
3 Toleni Dam 2007 R 23 662 252.68 R 1 714 563.27/yr
4 Lakeside Dam 2008 R 25 194 000.00 R 1 825 553.45/yr
5 Vaalkop Dam 2006 R 24 225 000.00 R 1 755 339.86/yr
6 Rust De Winter Dam 2008 R 21 318 000.00 R 1 544 699.07/yr
7 Makotswane Dam 2006 R 16 956 360.00 R 1 228 655.29/yr
8 Kromellenboog Dam 2008 R 19 157 426.40 R 1 388 144.23/yr
9 Albert Falls Dam 2008 R 16 530 000.00 R 1 197 761.31/yr
10 Glen Brock Dam 2009 R 17 600 000.00 R 1 275 293.35/yr
11 Wentzel Dam 2007 R 14 250 000.00 R 1 032 552.86/yr
Using the SWTP-value, the initial probability of failure before rehabilitation works are conducted
and the estimated investment cost into rehabilitation works, the lowest number of expected lives lost
(LOLlbound ) for which an investment into dam rehabilitation works are required by society may be
obtained for each of the eleven case studies. From the LOLlbound , SWTP criterion lines are obtained
for each of the case studies as illustrated on an FN-diagram in Fig. 5.11.
From Fig. 5.11 it is seen that a bandwidth of SWTP criterion lines were developed for the eleven
case studies. Differences in the criteria are attributed to differences in the estimated investment cost
for rehabilitation works. As discussed in section 5.3.4, a decreased investment cost leads to more
stringent SWTP criteria. For Case Study 1a and 1b of Bospoort Dam, the criterion line is the least
stringent, and comparing the estimated investment cost for rehabilitation works at Bospoort Dam to
the other case studies it is seen that the investment cost for Bospoort Dam is the highest. The SWTP
criterion line obtained for Case Study 11 is the most stringent, with the estimated cost of implement-
ing rehabilitation measures the lowest.
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Figure 5.11: SWTP criterion lines developed for the DWA Case Studies
5.4.2 Evaluation of risk to life in terms of proposed SWTP-criteria for South African
case studies
For each of the eleven case studies the actual risk to human life, as the combination of the initial
probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )) and the estimated loss of life (LOL) in case of dam failure, were
obtained from DWA dam safety inspection reports and are shown in Table 4.7 of Chapter 4. The
risk to life for the case studies is plotted on the FN-diagram and are evaluated in terms of the SWTP
criterion lines as shown in Fig. 5.12.
In Fig. 5.12 the risk to human life for the eleven DWA case studies are mostly located below the
criterion lines developed using SWTP. Therefore, investments into life safety through dam rehabilita-
tion works were in most cases not required by society. Case Study 4 is located partially above its SWTP
criterion line and case study 11 is locate almost entirely above its SWTP criterion line, which implies
that in these cases, society does require the rehabilitation works from a life safety perspective.
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Figure 5.12: Evaluation of risk to human life for DWA case studies in terms of developed SWTP criterion lines
5.5 Comparing the SWTP criterion lines to ANCOLD conventional
acceptability criteria for risk to human life
In Chapter 4 the risk to human life for the eleven case studies of DWA owned dams were evaluated
in terms of proposed ANCOLD conventional acceptability criteria for existing dams. The risk to life
were in most cases within the unacceptable region of the criteria and it was therefore concluded
that the rehabilitation of these dams are justified. The same risk to life for the case studies were in
most cases within the acceptable region of the SWTP criterion lines developed in this study, where
investments into life safety is not considered efficient by society. In Fig. 5.13 both the bandwidth
of SWTP criterion lines and ANCOLD conventional criteria for risk to life are shown. The ANCOLD
criteria are much more stringent than the SWTP criterion lines. However, it must be noted that the
SWTP and ANCOLD criteria are two completely different sets of criteria and are therefore not directly
comparable.
The SWTP criteria only accounts for society’s preference to exchange money for life years. It does
not account for:
• economic motivations, such as the fact that the dam might be vital for farming or industrial
activities,
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Figure 5.13: Comparison between ANCOLD conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human life and
SWTP criterion lines developed for DWA case studies
• damages in case of failure,
• environmental implications of failure, and so forth.
These factors may all be good reasons to further increase dam safety above and beyond the lower
boundary defined by SWTP. DWA takes these additional factors into account by evaluating the accept-
ability of economic, environmental, social and socio-economic impacts and the risk level of dams in
case of failure on five additional graphs (see Fig. 2.6 of Chapter 2).
ANCOLD criteria are based on what is considered to be good engineering practice, based on his-
torically acceptable levels of safety, taking all of the above mentioned factors into account, albeit on
the basis of engineering judgement.
The ANCOLD criteria implicitly accounts for factors external to life safety. The SWTP criteria only
accounts for societal preferences for life safety, but further investments are allowed if it is desirable
due to economical, environmental or other reasons.
5.6 Summary of main findings
Since society essentially finances dam rehabilitation works through public taxes and charges they
should in some way benefit from the rehabilitation works through an improvement of life safety. In
127
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
this sense it must be noted that societal resources are limited and large investments into dam reha-
bilitation works should be worthwhile for society, i.e. if the costs of reducing risk to life is dispropor-
tionate to the actual reduction in risk to life, the same resources may need to be redirected into other
sectors where the same money may save more lives elsewhere.
Instead of independently evaluating risk to life and the investment cost into reducing risk to life,
Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) may be used as an effective tool to determine society’s prefer-
ence to exchange money for life-years, through investments into risk reduction measures. The SWTP
concept is based on the Life Quality Index (LQI) which is a measure of the life quality of a society. An
investment into life safety should lead to an improved life quality. The SWTP may be derived from the
LQI to define the absolute lower boundary for acceptable investments into life safety required by so-
ciety. An investment should be made to at least comply with the minimum requirement set by SWTP,
however, investments are not always driven by safety concerns and higher levels of investments are
allowed if it is economically desirable.
To apply the SWTP concept to South African dam safety an applicable SWTP-value had to be
defined. The SWTP-value is derived from the LQI using nation-specific social indicators, such as
the life expectancy at birth, GDP per person and the ratio of work to leisure time. In South Africa
it was found that the social indicators are influenced by several factors that violates the underlying
assumptions of the LQI derivation. This may cause the South African SWTP-value to not reflect the
true preference of our society, also leading to a SWTP-value which is a significant outlier compared to
SWTP-values obtained for other countries at similar levels of development. Consequently an Earth
value for SWTP (ESWTP) that was developed by Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011) was used in this
study.
Based on the principles of SWTP and the proposed ESWTP, FN-criterion lines were developed for
specific case studies of South African dams to define an absolute lower boundary of acceptable safety,
i.e. all life saving strategies which are considered efficient in terms of society’s preference to exchange
money for life years must be implemented. Since the available best practice technologies for reha-
bilitation works are different for each dam, a different lower bound for acceptable investments into
life safety required by society were defined for each dam. This lead to different FN-criterion lines
obtained at various levels of stringency for the case studies of South African dams.
The risk to human life estimated by DWA through risk analysis methods were evaluated in terms
of the SWTP criterion lines. For most of the DWA case studies further investments into reducing risk
to life through rehabilitation works were not required by society. Rehabilitation were only required
in two of the eleven cases. However, the SWTP criteria only accounts for society’s preferences for life
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safety and does not account for additional considerations such as economic motivations, damages
in case of dam failure, environmental implications and other factors. These may all be good reasons
for further investments into dam safety beyond the lower boundary defined by SWTP.
Since SWTP does not account for other factors which may be require further investments into
dam safety, it should not be used as the only criteria to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works. These
additional factors may be addressed by considering the impact graphs developed by DWA for evalu-
ating dams in terms of economic, environmental, socio-economic and other implications in case of
dam failure (Fig. 2.6 of Chapter 2).
In Chapter 4, the conventional acceptability criteria defined by ANCOLD implicitly takes eco-
nomic, environmental and other impacts in addition to life safety into account when evaluating the
dams for rehabilitation works. It is therefore concluded that either the ANCOLD criteria or the SWTP
criteria, with the additional consideration of economic, environmental and other factors, may be
used to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works.
The additional investments which are not driven by societal preferences for life safety may be
dictated by the decision maker or owner’s (public or private) preferences requiring economic opti-
misation. The economic optimum implies higher safety levels than the lower bound for investments
into life safety defined by SWTP requirements. However, should the economic optimum be at a lower
safety level than that dictated by SWTP, the SWTP minimum safety level must be enforced.
In the following chapter additional criteria based on economic optimisation is developed to eval-
uate dams for rehabilitation works.
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Chapter 6
Economic optimisation as a decision tool
for the evaluation of South African dam
rehabilitation works
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) for a marginal increase in life safety is used to eval-
uate if an investment into dam rehabilitation works is required by society. However, the criteria es-
tablished by SWTP only take societal preferences for life safety into account and further investments
could be required by the decision maker or the owner (public or private) to ensure that an economic
optimal solution for the rehabilitation works is obtained.
In this chapter, additional criteria are proposed to evaluate to what level investments should be
made into rehabilitation works to obtain an economic optimal solution.
The economic optimum is obtained by evaluating the profitability of a project and ensuring the
monetary net benefit is maximised. It must be noted that this criterion is primarily of interest to
the decision maker or owner (public or private) and is of little interest to society. In addition, in
determining the economic optimum the acceptability of risk to human life is not explicitly evaluated,
but the compensation costs for loss of human life due to dam failure are taken into account.
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The chapter is structured as follows:
• The basic principles of economic optimisation is described.
– The concept of satisfying the preferences of the decision maker or owner (public or pri-
vate) by ensuring that a maximum monetary net benefit is obtained through an invest-
ment into a project is discussed.
– The objective function for determining the economic optimum for a project is described.
– The need to ensure that a monetary optimal investment into a project also satisfy the
lower boundary for an investment established by SWTP is discussed.
• The principles of economic optimisation are applied to South African dam safety.
– Criteria based on economic optimisation are developed to evaluate investments into dam
rehabilitation works.
– Case studies of South African government owned dams that have been identified by DWA
to be in need of rehabilitation works are evaluated in terms of the proposed criteria to
evaluate if the investment is economically beneficial.
– The results are compared to the results obtained when evaluating the case studies in
terms of conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human life (Chapter 4) and accord-
ing to criteria established by SWTP for a marginal increase in life safety (Chapter 5).
• The ratio of the cost of rehabilitation works to the reduction in the probability of dam failure is
used to propose alternative life safety criteria with some measure of economic efficiency taken
into account.
• A summary of the main findings is provided.
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6.2 Background to economic optimisation
In this section the decision maker or owner’s requirements for an economically optimal investment
into a project is described. Thereafter, the objective function for determining if an investment into
a project is economically beneficial is presented. Lastly, the boundary condition for investments are
established through the minimum safety level defined by SWTP.
Satisfying the preferences of the decision maker or owner through economic optimisation:
In Chapter 5, SWTP for a marginal increase in life safety is used to determine the acceptable level of
expenditure that is required by society in exchange for a reduction in risk to human life and without
compromising the quality of life of a society. Therefore, the criteria established by SWTP only takes
societal preferences for life safety into account.
However, the acceptable level of expenditure into a project may also be defined by the decision
maker or owner (public or private) of the technical facility. The decision maker or owner may require
further investments to account for other factors, in addition to what is required by society for life
safety. These additional considerations could include:
• economic activities for which the dam is vital,
• repair and replacement costs in case of dam failure,
• compensation costs for lost lives on case of failure,
• environmental implications or rehabilitation needed in case of failure, and so forth.
To ensure that an economically optimal solution is obtained, the profitability of a project is eval-
uated and the monetary net benefit is maximised (Rackwitz, 2002).
Objective function for economic optimisation:
For typical engineering facilities, the monetary net benefit could be calculated using the objective
function shown in Eq. 6.2.1. All the quantities in Eq. 6.2.1 are measured in monetary units. In
addition, expected values, as the product of probability of occurrence and consequence, should be
taken for the parameters of the objective function (Rackwitz, 2002).
Z (p)=B(p)−C (p)−D(p) (6.2.1)
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Where,
B(p) = the benefit derived from the existence of the facility
C(p) = the cost of design and construction
D(p) = the expected cost of failure
p = the vector of all safety relevant factors
In the objective function, the investment costs (C) and the expected cost of failure (D) are sub-
tracted from benefit (B) to determine the profit (Z) (Lentz, 2007). The parameter p is the safety pa-
rameter and if it is increased, the investment costs C(p) will be increased, but the expected damage
costs D(p) will be reduced since a safer facility will reduce the probability of failure. An increase in
the safety parameter, p, will also have an effect on the benefit, B(p), since a safer facility reduces the
likelihood of down-times where no benefit or revenues may be generated.
According to Lentz (2007) the expected costs of failure D may consist of two factors; loss of invest-
ment goods or external damage. The loss of investment goods may include the complete loss of the
facility, requiring a total reconstruction. External damages may include the loss of off-site property
and compensation costs for the loss of human life. Therefore, unlike the previous two decision tools
developed in this study, i.e. conventional life safety criteria and SWTP criteria, the objective func-
tion does not evaluate the risk to human life, but the economic losses are considered. However, the
economic losses include compensation costs for the loss of human life in case of failure.
SWTP as a lower boundary for economic optimal investments:
Economic optimisation usually implies higher safety levels than what is required by SWTP for life
safety. However, if the economic optimum is at a lower safety level than what is required by SWTP,
the SWTP minimum safety level should be enforced.
In Fig. 6.1 the risk to life as a function of investment cost is shown as a technology curve. As the
investment into life safety increases, the risk to life decreases. Fig. 6.1 was obtained and adapted
from Fischer et al. (2011) and corresponds to the technology curve defined in Fig. 5.2 in Chapter 5.
The SWTP for a marginal increase in life safety is depicted as a gradiënt in Fig. 6.1. The point of
tangency where the SWTP equals the gradiënt of the technology curve, defines the lower boundary
for investments into life safety as required by society. Thus, society requires that investments should
be made to decrease the risk to human life at least to this point, i.e. where more lives per monetary
unit is saved than the SWTP threshold.
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Furthermore, according to Lentz (2007), if the monetary net benefit generated from the existence
of the technical facility is considered, feasible decisions for investments are decisions which lead to a
positive monetary net benefit as shown in Fig. 6.1. If no or a negative monetary benefit is generated
from the decision, it is not justified. The maximum point in the feasible domain is the point where
the monetary net benefit generated from the existence of the structure will be an economic optimum.
Monetary  
net benefit 
Risk to life, N 
Investment in 
life safety, C 
Acceptable 
 decisions 
 
Feasible decisions 
Economic  
Optimum 
1
SWTP
 Technology 
curve 
Figure 6.1: Technology and monetary net benefit curve - Adapted from Fischer et al. (2011)
If the economic optimum is not within the acceptable region defined by SWTP, it is not acceptable
to make investments only to achieve an economically optimal structure. The investment should be
increased to satisfy SWTP requirements. Fig. 6.2 illustrates the case where the economic optimum is
not within the acceptable region established by society. According to Rackwitz and Streicher (2002) it
is unlikely for structures to be economically optimal but not acceptable in terms of SWTP and hence
the condition in Fig. 6.2 is rarely encountered.
In summary, the acceptability of an investment into reducing risk to life is based on require-
ments set by society through SWTP. SWTP criteria enters the decision problem as a lower boundary
condition and determines the minimum level for investments which should be made into a technical
facility. Further investments are typically required by public or private decision makers to ensure a
maximised monetary net benefit.
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Figure 6.2: Case where the economic optimum does not comply with SWTP lower boundary for acceptable
decisions - Adapted from Fischer et al. (2011)
In the following section the theoretical background of economic optimisation is applied to South
African dam safety to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works.
6.3 Application of economic optimisation to South African dam safety
In this section criteria are developed to evaluate if investments into dam rehabilitation works are
economically beneficial. Case studies of South African government owned dams are evaluated in
terms of the proposed criteria. The results are compared to the results obtained when the same case
studies are evaluated according to conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human life (Chapter
4) and to criteria established by SWTP (Chapter 5).
6.3.1 Development of criteria based on economic optimisation for the evaluation of
South African dam rehabilitation works
To evaluate if an investment into dam rehabilitation works yields an economic optimal solution, the
objective function shown in Eq. 6.2.1 of section 6.2 are maximised for different decision alternatives.
The alternative with the highest monetary net benefit should be preferred.
For this study the decision problem considered consists of two decision alternatives, namely
whether a dam should be rehabilitated or not. The decision problem therefore does not vary with
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the safety parameter p shown in Eq. 6.2.1, but consists of two discrete possibilities; rehabilitate or
do-nothing. For each decision alternative the net benefit (Z) is calculated:
Z =B −C (6.3.1)
Where,
B = the benefit of rehabilitation works
= reduction in D, the expected cost of failure
C = the cost of rehabilitation works
The benefit (B) does not take the monetary benefit generated from the existence of the facility
into account but considers only the additional benefit derived from rehabilitating the dam, i.e. if a
dam is rehabilitated a decreased probability of failure is expected and the product of the reduced
probability and the cost of dam failure will result in a reduced expected cost of failure D.
For the do-nothing alternative, both B and C will be zero. For the rehabilitate alternative, the cost
of rehabilitation works (C) need to be less than the benefit (B) obtained through a reduced probability
of failure, for the alternative to be preferred.
The two alternatives are compared to each other in terms of expected cost of failure and the im-
plementation costs associated with each alternative as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Interrelation of the expected cost of failure and implementation costs associated with two different
decision alternatives when considering a dam for rehabilitation works
Decision
Alternative
Probability of
failure
Consequences
of failure
Expected cost of
failure
Cost of imple-
mentation
Do-Nothing High High High No costs
Rehabilitate Lowered High Lowered
Cost of
rehabilitation
In the following, a more detailed description of each component of the objective function in Eq.
6.3.1 is presented. However, in order to ensure the utility is calculated in a consistent manner, the
expected costs of failure and the estimated investment cost for rehabilitation works should be con-
verted to the same year in the timeline of the dam rehabilitation project.
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The timeline for a dam rehabilitation project is shown in Fig. 6.3. At point I the dam safety evalu-
ation is performed. At this point in time the risk analysis is performed, where the initial probability of
dam failure and the costs of dam failure are estimated. From the results of the dam safety evaluation,
the decision for rehabilitation works could be recommended. At point II the design for rehabilitation
works commence and the investment cost for the rehabilitation works are estimated. At point III the
rehabilitation works are completed and the dam has a lower probability of failure (final probability
of failure). The design life time for the rehabilitated dam is assumed to be 50 years, from points III to
IV.
For this study, the point in time where the rehabilitation works are completed, point III in Fig.
6.3, is used as a reference point and therefore all costs will be converted to this year.
II I III 
0 1 50 2 
 - Dam safety evaluation 
       (estimation of cost of failure, Cf) 
 - Design for rehabilitation works  
   (estimation of investment costs, C) 
 - Rehabilitation works completed 
 - End of design life time of dam  
I 
II 
III 
IV 
IV 
Time 
Figure 6.3: Timeline for dam rehabilitation project
Benefit (B)
The benefit of rehabilitation works B is the reduction in the expected cost of failure D, expressed as
the product of the reduced probability of dam failure and consequences of dam failure.
The change in the probability of failure (∆P f ) due to the dam rehabilitation works is calculated
as the difference between the initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )) before rehabilitation works are
conducted and the final probability of failure (P f ( f i nal )) after the dam has been rehabilitated. This
relationship is represented by Eq. 5.3.10 in Chapter 5. If the decision is to do-nothing, there will be
no change in the probability of failure which will lead to a zero benefit B.
The cost of failure (C f ) is determined considering the financial impacts if a dam fails. Accord-
ing to Oosthuizen (2002), in South African dam safety the cost of failure is estimated as the direct
and indirect economic losses due to dam failure, as described in section 2.3.4 of Chapter 2. The di-
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rect economic losses could include the damage to the structure, loss of agriculture and the costs of
emergency relief, while the indirect economic losses could include the loss of future benefits. The
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) estimates the direct and indirect financial impacts as part of the
risk analysis performed for dams in dam safety inspections, thus at point I in Fig. 6.3.
According to Lentz (2007), the financial impacts should also take the compensation cost for loss
of human life into account. The compensation costs are calculated as the product of the Societal
Value of a Statistical Life (SVSL) and the estimated loss of life (LOL) in the case of dam failure. The
estimated loss of life in case of dam failure may be obtained from the risk analysis performed by
DWA for dams as part of their dam safety evaluations, while the SVSL is the amount which should be
compensated for each fatality (Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez, 2011).
The LQI principles are used as a consistent basis for deriving the SVSL, similarly to how SWTP was
derived in Chapter 5. Where SWTP is expressed using Eq. 5.2.7, the SVSL may be derived similarly
from LQI as described by Holický (2009a) and Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011).
SV SL =GK E ($) (6.3.2)
Where,
G = the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person ($/person/year)
E = the age-averaged discounted life expectancy (years/person)
K = 1/q, where q is the parameter which reflects the trade-off placed on the consumption
and the value attached to the length of life.
The SWTP and SVSL should not be confused with each other. SWTP defines the acceptable level
for an investment into improving life safety as required by society, while SVSL is the amount of money
which should be compensated for each fatality when failure occurs. The SWTP enters cost optimisa-
tion as a boundary condition and the SVSL enters as a cost of failure (Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez,
2011).
In Chapter 5 an Earth value was used for the SWTP and for consistency an Earth value for SVSL
(ESVSL) is also used. The ESVSL obtained from Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011), assuming rate of
time preference for consumption of 3% per annum, is $US 629,000. The same rate of time preference
for consumption as used to define the ESWTP in section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5 is used. Using the same
average exchange rate for converting U.S. Dollars to Rand ($US 1 = R 7.83) as used in section 5.3.2 of
Chapter 5, the ESVSL becomes R 4.925 million.
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Taking the direct, indirect economic losses and the compensation costs for lives lost into account,
the total cost of failure may be calculated as shown:
C f =Di r ect Economi c Losses+ Indi r ect Economi c Losses+SV SL ·LOL (6.3.3)
The cost of failure C f is estimated as part of the dam safety evaluation, therefore at point I in
Fig. 6.3. C f is converted to the reference point in time used for this study, thus to the year where the
rehabilitation works are completed (point III in Fig. 6.3), by using basic economics principles (Blank
and Tarquin, 2008).
C f (I I I ) =C f (I ).(1+ i )n (6.3.4)
Where,
C f (I I I ) = Cost of failure at year of completed rehabilitation works (point III in Fig. 6.3) [R]
C f (I ) = Cost of failure at year of dam safety evaluation (point I in Fig. 6.3) [R]
i = the inflation rate [%] (assumed i = 7% in this study)
n = the number of years between C f (I I I ) and C f (I ) [yrs]
To determine the benefit, the reduction in the expected cost of failure C f (expected) need to be
determined. This expected cost represents a present worth (III) expected cost of failure and is deter-
mined from Eq. 6.3.8.
Failure can take place in any year of the design life of the dam, thus at any point between III and
IV in Fig. 6.3. The probability of failure in each year is determined according to Eq. 6.3.5 (Holický,
2011). The failure probability in year r is the product of the annual P f and the probability of the dam
not failing before year r:
P f (r )= P f .(1−P f )(r−1) (6.3.5)
The cost of failure in year r, discounted to the present worth at III, is determined from:
C f (I I I )(r )=C f .Q(i ,r ) (6.3.6)
Q(i,r) is a discount factor which converts the cost at year r to the start of the life time of the dam, thus
at point III in Fig. 6.3. Q(i,r) is expressed using basic economics theory (Blank and Tarquin, 2008):
Q(i ,r )= 1/(1+ i )r (6.3.7)
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The parameter i represents the inflation rate.
The expected cost of failure can be determined by finding the sum of the present worth expected
cost of failures over the life time of the dam:
C f (expected) =C f
n∑
r=1
P f (r )Q(i ,r ) (6.3.8)
Holický (2011) simplifies the formulation shown in Eq. 6.3.8 to:
C f (expected) =C f (I I I ).P f .PQ(i ,n) (6.3.9)
The factor PQ is a time factor accounting for the fact that failure can take place in any year of the
design life and adjusts the present worth annual expected cost of failure to a present worth expected
cost of failure at the start of the life time of the dam at point III in Fig. 6.3. The factor PQ is formulated
by Holický (2011) as follows:
PQ =
1− (1−P f )(1+i )
n
1− (1−P f )(1+i )
(6.3.10)
Where,
P f = the annual probability of failure
i = the inflation rate [%] (assumed i = 7% in this study)
n = the life time of the facility
Finally, the benefit, as the reduction in the expected cost of failure, may be calculated taking the
time factor PQ into account:
B =C f (I I I ).∆P f .PQ (6.3.11)
Where,
PQ = time factor accounting for the fact that failure can take place in any year of the
design life
∆P f = the change in annual probability of failure
C f (I I I ) = the cost of failure
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To summarize, the benefit is calculated by considering the following:
1. The change in the probability of failure is determined.
2. The cost of failure is obtained at the year of the dam safety evaluation.
3. The cost of failure is converted to the reference point in time considered for this study, at the
year when the rehabilitation works are completed.
4. The present worth annual expected cost of failure is determined as the product of the annual
probability of failure and the cost of failure.
5. By incorporating a time factor, the present worth annual expected cost of failure is adjusted to
a present worth expected cost of failure.
6. The benefit is the reduction in this present worth expected cost of failure due to a reduction in
the probability of failure.
Cost of rehabilitation works (C)
When considering the objective function for the decision problem to rehabilitate a dam or not, the
parameter C takes the estimated investment cost of the rehabilitation works into account.
The cost of the rehabilitation works is estimated when the design for the rehabilitation works are
conducted (at point II of Fig. 6.3). In order to be consistent, the estimated cost of rehabilitation works
are converted to the year where the rehabilitation works are completed, to point III in Fig. 6.3, using
basic economics principles (Blank and Tarquin, 2008).
C(I I I ) =C(I I ).(1+ i )n (6.3.12)
Where,
C(I I I ) = Cost of rehabilitation works at year of completed rehabilitation works (point III
in Fig. 6.3) [R]
C(I I ) = Cost of rehabilitation works at year of rehabilitation design (point II in Fig. 6.3) [R]
i = the inflation rate [%] (assumed i = 7% in this study)
n = the number of years between C(I I I ) and C(I I ) [yrs]
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In the following section the net benefit (Z) for two alternatives (rehabilitate and do-nothing) are com-
pared for case studies of South African dams to evaluate if the rehabilitation works are economically
beneficial.
6.3.2 Evaluation of South African case studies of dams in terms of proposed economic
optimisation criteria
In this section the same eleven case studies of South African government owned dams that were eval-
uated for rehabilitation works in terms of proposed methods in Chapter 4 and 5 are considered. For
each case study, the monetary net benefit of both decision alternatives, do-nothing or rehabilitate,
are compared to each other. The decision alternative with the maximum expected net benefit is pre-
ferred.
For the case studies the parameters B and C needed for the objective function, shown in Eq. 6.3.1,
are obtained as follow:
Benefit (B) for case studies of South African dams
To determine the benefit of rehabilitation works as shown in Eq. 6.3.11, the following input parame-
ters are needed:
• Time factor, PQ, determined using Eq. 6.3.10. For the calculation an inflation rate of i = 7% and
a life time of a dam of n = 50 years is assumed.
• The change in probability of failure, ∆P f , determined using Eq. 5.3.10 in Chapter 5.
• The cost of failure, C f , determined using Eq. 6.3.3.
For the rehabilitate alternative, the initial probability of failure P f (i ni t i al ) and the final probability
of failure P f ( f i nal ) are needed to determine the change in the probability of failure ∆P f . In Chapter
4 the initial probability for each of the eleven case studies of South African government owned dams
are shown in Table 4.7 as determined by DWA through the risk analysis conducted for dam safety
evaluations. As mentioned in Chapter 4, DWA estimates an interval for the initial probability of failure
and the maximum and minimum value of the interval are shown. The final probability of failure
after a dam has been rehabilitated (P f ( f i nal )) is assumed to be between 1E-5 and 1E-6 per year. This
interval is used by DWA for a well-engineered dam with no known deficiencies and it is assumed
that a dam which has been rehabilitated in full will be equivalent this (Oosthuizen, 2002). For the
do-nothing decision alternative there is no change in the probability of failure and ∆P f is zero.
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To determine the cost of failure C f , the financial impacts due to dam failure for each case study
need to be determined. As described in section 6.3.1 the financial impact takes the direct and indirect
economic losses as well as the compensation costs for loss of human life into account, where for the
compensation costs the loss of life (LOL) in case of dam failure is required.
The LOL was obtained from DWA dam safety evaluation reports and the maximum and minimum
value for the intervals for the case studies are shown in Chapter 4 in Table 4.7. The direct and indirect
economic losses were also obtained from DWA dam safety inspection reports and the values for the
intervals for the different case studies are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Estimated direct and indirect economic losses obtained for DWA case studies
Estimated economic losses
Case
Dam
At year of dam safety evaluation*
Study Year Min Max
Nr.
1a Bospoort Dam Direct 2005 R 3 mil. R 6 mil.
1b Indirect R 30 mil. R 60 mil.
2 Klein Maricopoort Dam Direct 1999 R 3.9 mil. R 39 mil.
Indirect R 39 mil. R 390 mil.
3 Toleni Dam Direct 2000 R 0.058 mil. R 0.58 mil.
Indirect R 0.58 mil. R 5.84 mil.
4 Lakeside Dam Direct 1999 R 6.71 mil. R 67.1 mil.
Indirect R 67.1 mil. R 671 mil.
5 Vaalkop Dam Direct 2000 R 15 mil. R 150 mil.
Indirect R 150 mil. R 1 500 mil.
6 Rust De Winter Dam Direct 1994 R 2.09 mil. R 20.85 mil.
Indirect R 20.85 mil. R 208.5mil.
7 Makotswane Dam Direct 2005 R 1.6 mil. R 18 mil.
Indirect R 16 mil. R 180 mil.
8 Kromellenboog Dam Direct 2005 R 70 mil. R 700 mil.
Indirect R 700 mil. R 7 000 mil.
9 Albert Falls Dam Direct 2004 R 20 mil. R 40 mil.
Indirect R 60 mil. R 2 000 mil.
10 Glen Brock Dam Direct 2006 R 5 mil. R 10 mil.
Indirect R 20 mil. R 40 mil.
11 Wentzel Dam Direct 1994 R 0.55 mil. R 5.5 mil.
Indirect R 5.5 mil. R 55 mil.
* Refer to point I in Fig. 6.3
Note that for Case Study 1 of Bospoort Dam, two different scenarios were considered by DWA for
the risk analysis: Case 1a where the gates will be functioning normally during failure, and Case 1b
where the gates will not be functioning normally during failure.
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Cost of rehabilitation works (C) for case studies of South African dams
The estimated costs of the rehabilitation works for each of the case studies are obtained from their
respective design reports for the rehabilitation works. The estimated investment costs are shown in
Table 5.4 in Chapter 5.
Both the estimated total costs of failure and the estimated investment costs for rehabilitation
works have to be converted to the year where the rehabilitation works were completed, at point III in
Fig. 6.3, in order to be consistent in determining the parameters for the objective function. For the
case studies, the years when the rehabilitation works were completed are shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Year of completed rehabilitation works at DWA dam case studies (Dube, 2012)
Case
Study Dam Year
Nr.
1a Bospoort Dam 2009
1b
2 Klein Maricopoort Dam 2011
3 Toleni Dam 2010
4 Lakeside Dam 2009
5 Vaalkop Dam 2007
6 Rust De Winter Dam 2010
7 Makotswane Dam 2008
8 Kromellenboog Dam 2009
9 Albert Falls Dam 2010
10 Glen Brock Dam 2010
11 Wentzel Dam 2008
The economic optimum for each decision alternative were calculated using the procedure described
in section 6.3.1. Since the economic losses, LOL and initial probability of failure are presented as
an interval, the economic optimum for each decision alternative are calculated for two extremes; a
minimum and maximum boundary. The minimum boundary will give the smallest estimate of the
monetary net benefit, while the maximum boundary will give the largest estimate of the net benefit.
The values which are used for the maximum and minimum boundary are shown in Table 6.4.
To obtain the maximum value for the ∆P f , the largest value for the P f (i ni t i al ) and the smallest
value for the P f ( f i nal ) are used. To obtain the minimum value for the ∆P f , the smallest value for the
P f (i ni t i al ) and the largest value for the P f ( f i nal ) are used.
For illustrative purposes, the monetary net benefit for the rehabilitate and do-nothing decision
alternatives for Case Study 2 of Klein Maricopoort Dam are calculated using the objective function,
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Table 6.4: Maximum and minimum boundary for each decision alternative
Minimum Boundary Maximum Boundary
Direct Economic Losses Min. Max.
Indirect Economic Losses Min. Max.
loss of life (LOL) Min. Max.
Change in probability of failure (∆P f ) Min. Max.
Initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )) Min. Max.
Final probability of failure (P f ( f i nal )) Max. Min.
Z = B - C, and the results are compared against each other. The calculation procedure for the two
decision alternatives, considering both the maximum and minimum boundary is shown in Table 6.5.
For both the maximum and minimum boundary, the Klein Maricopoort do-nothing decision al-
ternative yields in a higher monetary net benefit than the rehabilitate option. Therefore, the do-
nothing decision alternative should be preferred.
Table 6.5: Economic optimisation calculation procedure for Case Study 2 (Klein Maricpoort Dam)
REHABILITATE DO-NOTHING
MIN MAX MIN MAX
Probability of failure
Annual probability
P f (i ni t i al ) 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 1.00E-04 1.00E-03
of failure
P f ( f i nal ) 1.00E-05 1.00E-06 1.00E-04 1.00E-03
∆P f 9.00E-05 9.99E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Time factor (i = 7%, n = 50 years) PQ for ∆ P f 14.75 14.58 14.77 14.77
Costs of failure
Economic losses
Direct R 3.9 mil. R 39 mil. R 3.9 mil. R 39 mil.
Indirect R 39 mil. R 390 mil. R 39 mil. R 390 mil.
Total economic losses R 42.90 mil. R 429.00 mil. R 42.90 mil. R 429.00 mil.
Compensation costs for SVSL R 4.93 mil. R 4.93 mil. R 4.93 mil. R 4.93 mil.
loss of human life LOL 9 13 9 13
Total compensation costs R 14.78 mil. R 24.63 mil. R 14.78 mil. R 24.63 mil.
Total cost in case of failure at point I in Fig. 6.3 C f (I ) - In year 1999 R 57.68 mil. R 453.63 mil. R 57.68 mil. R 453.63 mil.
Total cost in case of failure at point III in Fig. 6.3 C f (I I I ) - In year 2011 R 129.90 mil. R 1 021.65 mil. R 129.90 mil. R 1 021.65 mil.
Cost of rehabilitation works
Cost of rehabilitation works at point II in Fig. 6.3 C(I I ) - In year 2008 R 39.33 mil. R 0.00 mil.
Cost of rehabilitation works at point III in Fig. 6.3 C(I I I ) - In year 2011 R 48.18 mil. R 0.00 mil.
Parameters of objective function
Benefit measure B = C f (I I I ).∆P f .PQ R 0.17 mil. R 14.88 mil. R 0.00 mil. R 0.00 mil.
Cost of rehabilitation works C = C(I I I ) R 48.18 mil. R 48.18 mil. R 0.00 mil. R 0.00 mil.
Monetary net benefit
Z = B - C R -48.01 mil. R -33.30 mil. R 0.00 mil. R 0.00 mil.
Preferred option Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
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Table 6.6 illustrates the preferred option (rehabilitate or do-nothing) obtained when the mon-
etary net benefit for the two decision alternatives for the eleven DWA case studies are compared
against each other.
Table 6.6: Preferred option (Rehabilitate or Do-Nothing) revealed from an economic optimisation procedure
for 11 DWA case studies of dams which have been rehabilitated
Dam MIN BOUNDARY MAX BOUNDARY
1a
Bospoort Dam
Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
Case A - Gates Functioning
1b
Bospoort Dam
Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
Case B - Gates Not Functioning
2 Klein-Maricopoort Dam Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
3 Toleni Dam Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
4 Lakeside Dam Do-Nothing Rehabilitate
5 Vaalkop Dam Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
6 Rust De Winter Dam Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
7 Makotswane Dam Do-Nothing Do-Nothing
8 Kromellenboog Dam Do-Nothing Rehabilitate
9 Albert Falls Dam Do-Nothing Rehabilitate
10 Glen Brock Dam Do-Nothing Rehabilitate
11 Wentzel Dam Rehabilitate Rehabilitate
It must be noted that the maximum boundary considers the scenario where it is most likely for
the preferred option to be to rehabilitate. Case studies 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 in Table 6.6 represents situations
where the rehabilitate alternative is preferred for the maximum boundary.
For the minimum boundary it is least likely for the rehabilitate option to be preferred. Case Study
11 in Table 6.6 represents the situation where the monetary net benefit for the rehabilitate option is
higher than for the do-nothing decision alternative for both the maximum and minimum boundary.
For the eleven case studies, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) originally recommended re-
habilitation works. However, when considering the monetary benefit obtained from the rehabilitate
and do-nothing decision alternative, the rehabilitation works for case studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7
are not justified.
In the following section the results that were obtained when considering economic optimisation
are compared to the results obtained when the case studies were evaluated in terms conventional
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acceptability criteria for risk to human life and according to SWTP criteria presented in Chapter 4
and 5 respectively.
6.3.3 Comparison of the recommendations for rehabilitation works through economic
optimisation criteria, ANCOLD life safety criteria and SWTP criterion lines
In this study, the eleven case studies of South African dams are evaluated for rehabilitation works in
terms of conventional acceptability criteria for risk to human life (Chapter 4), SWTP criteria (Chapter
5) and economic optimisation criteria (this chapter). The following results were obtained:
• Conventional criteria for risk to human life
In Chapter 4, the case studies of South African government owned dams were evaluated in
terms of the proposed ANCOLD conventional criteria for risk to human life. The risk to human
life for the eleven case studies of South African dams are mostly within the unacceptable region
of the ANCOLD criteria for existing dams as illustrated in Fig. 6.4. Case studies 2, 3, 5 and 6 are
located on the border of acceptable and unacceptable, but are still mostly within the unaccept-
able region. Therefore, the rehabilitation of the eleven case studies of dams to decrease the risk
to human life to comply with conventional criteria are justified.
• SWTP criteria
In Chapter 5, SWTP is introduced to evaluate if investments into life safety through rehabili-
tation works are required by society. SWTP criterion lines were developed for the eleven case
studies of dams which are also illustrated in Fig. 6.4. The risk to human life for the case stud-
ies are mostly located within the acceptable region of the SWTP criteria. However, the risk to
human life for case studies 4 and 11 are located within the unacceptable region and thus in-
vestments into life safety were required.
• Economic optimisation criteria
In this chapter the preferences of the decision maker or owner, who require an investment
into rehabilitation works to yield in an optimal economic solution, are considered. In Fig. 6.4
the preferred decision alternative, rehabilitate or do-nothing, determined when comparing the
monetary net benefit for the two decision alternatives of the eleven case studies are shown. The
key for the preferred options is also shown in Fig. 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Risk to human life for case studies compared to SWTP criterion lines and ANCOLD acceptability
criteria for risk to human life
Discussion of results:
Generally, case studies close to the SWTP criterion lines also require rehabilitation from the economic
optimisation perspective, while case studies far from the SWTP lines are less likely to require rehabil-
itation from an economic perspective, especially if these cases expect low LOL in case of failure. This
is due to the fact that lost lives are economically taken into account through compensation costs. All
of the case studies are mostly within the unacceptable region of the ANCOLD conventional criteria
for risk to human life. ANCOLD does not only consider human safety, but is based on engineering
judgement, i.e. it also takes economic considerations into account in a non-explicit way. However,
based on the current study, the ANCOLD requirements seem to be fairly conservative.
The following similarities in the results are observed:
Economic optimisation: Rehabilitate (maximum and minimum boundary)
Case Study 11 provides the only example for which economic optimisation required rehabilitation
for both the minimum and maximum boundary assumptions. In addition, the risk to human life
for Case Study 11 is unacceptable in terms of SWTP criteria and an investment into reducing risk to
human life through dam rehabilitation works to satisfy the preferences of society is required.
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Further, the risk to human life is located far within the unacceptable region of the ANCOLD cri-
teria for existing dams and rehabilitation works are justified when considering conventional criteria
for life safety. Therefore, when considering Case Study 11, rehabilitation works are justified in terms
of all three proposed decision tools.
Economic optimisation: Rehabilitate (maximum boundary)
For case studies 4, 8, 9 and 10, rehabilitation is required based on economic optimisation for the
maximum boundary assumptions defined in Table 6.4. The maximum boundary considers the situa-
tion where rehabilitation will be most likely recommended, i.e. the benefit, as the combination of the
maximum change in probability of failure and the maximum expected costs of failure will be large in
comparison to the costs of rehabilitation works.
The risk to human life for case studies 4, 9 and 10 are located close to the bandwidth of SWTP
criterion lines and rehabilitation also becomes a concern when societal preferences are considered.
The risk to life is also located in the unacceptable region of ANCOLD conventional acceptability cri-
teria on the FN-diagram. The rehabilitation works are thus justified in terms of the ANCOLD criteria
which explicitly evaluates risk to life, but also implicitly accounts for economic considerations.
For Case Study 8, although rehabilitation is recommended through economic optimisation, the
risk to human life is not located close to the bandwidth of SWTP criterion lines. Therefore an invest-
ment to reduce risk to human life to satisfy the lower boundary set by SWTP is not required. The
LOL estimated by DWA is low compared to the LOL estimated for other case studies. This leads to
low compensation costs for loss of human life. The estimated direct and indirect economic losses for
this dam are very high in comparison to the other case studies, as can be seen in Table 6.2. In ad-
dition, the estimated investment cost for rehabilitation works is low in comparison to the estimated
investment costs at other dam case studies. If the objective function Z = B - C is considered, a high
benefit (B) may be obtained for the investment cost into dam rehabilitation works (C), justifying the
recommendation for rehabilitation works.
Although the risk to life for Case Study 8 is located within the acceptable region of SWTP criteria,
it is still located within the unacceptable region of the ANCOLD acceptability criteria. Thus rehabili-
tation is justified to reduce risk to human life to satisfy this criteria, which does not only account for
societal considerations, but also accounts for additional considerations such as economy.
Economic optimisation: Do-nothing
In terms of the monetary net benefit obtained for the do-nothing and rehabilitate decision alterna-
tives for case studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7, the do-nothing decision alternative results in a higher net
149
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
benefit and should be preferred. In addition, the risk to human life presented on the FN-diagram for
the case studies are not located close to the SWTP criterion lines developed for the DWA case studies.
Therefore, investments to reduce life safety risks are also not required by the SWTP criteria. In terms
of ANCOLD acceptability criteria, the risk to human life for case study 1a, 1b, 3 and 7 is located within
the unacceptable region of the ANCOLD criteria and rehabilitation works are justified according to
this criteria. The risk to human life for case studies 2, 5 and 6 are located on the border between
acceptable and unacceptable in terms of criteria established by ANCOLD.
When considering the economic optimisation procedure, the factors which may have influenced
the preferred option to be to do-nothing are discussed for the following case studies:
• Case Study 1a (Bospoort Dam - Case A with gates functioning during flood conditions):
For Case Study 1a of Bospoort Dam, the situation where the sluice gates of the dam are func-
tioning normally during flooding is considered. For the objective function, Z = B - C, it is noted
that the investment cost to rehabilitate the dam (C) is very high in comparison to the benefit
(B) of rehabilitation works. Subsequently rehabilitation is not recommended.
• Case Study 1b (Bospoort Dam - Case B with gates not functioning during flood conditions):
For Case Study 1b of the same dam, the situation where the sluice gates are closed during flood-
ing is considered. The initial probability of dam failure is higher than the failure probability of
Case Study 1a. Thus, a higher reduction in the probability of failure is expected, leading to a
higher benefit obtained through rehabilitation. However, the investment cost to rehabilitate
the dam (C) is still high in comparison to the benefit (B) and thus rehabilitation is not recom-
mended.
• Case Study 2 (Klein Maricopoort Dam):
For Case Study 2, the initial probability of dam failure is low. Consequently the reduction in the
probability of failure through rehabilitation works is not very large. This leads to a low benefit
(B), as the combination of the changed probability of failure and the costs in case of failure.
Thus, the investment cost to rehabilitate the dam (C) is high in comparison to the benefit (B).
• Case Study 3 (Toleni Dam) :
For this case study, the LOL and direct and indirect economic losses are estimated to be fairly
low in comparison to other case studies. This leads to a fairly low reduction in the expected
cost of failure which causes the expected benefit (B) to be low.
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• Case Study 5 (Vaalkop Dam) :
For Case Study 5, the initial probability of failure is low in comparison to other case studies.
Even though the economic losses and LOL are failry high in comparison to other case studies,
rehabilitation works would lead to only a small reduction in the probability of dam failure. Thus
the benefit (B), in terms of improved safety, is low in comparison to the investment cost (C).
• Case Study 6 (Rust De Winter Dam) :
For Case Study 6, the initial probability of failure is also low leading to the small change in the
probability of failure when the dam is rehabilitated. When considering the objective function,
the investment cost to rehabilitate the dam (C) is thus high in comparison to the low expected
benefit (B).
• Case Study 7 (Makotswane Dam) :
For Case Study 7, the estimated LOL and economic losses in case of dam failure are low com-
pared to other case studies. Thus the expected benefit from rehabilitating the dam is low.
For the case studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7, although all three decision tools do not recommend
rehabilitation works, it must be noted that other factors identified by DWA may have lead to the
decision to rehabilitate these dams. As mentioned in Chapter 2, DWA evaluates different types of
consequences of dam failure in combination with the probability of failure through the risk analysis
methodology. The risks which are evaluated using multiple acceptability criteria include, in addition
to risk to human life and economic impacts, the social impacts, socio-economic impacts and envi-
ronmental impacts of dam failure. DWA also evaluates an additional factor in combination with the
other impacts, the risk level, which considers the expected fatalities per exposed hour against the an-
nual risk of both direct and indirect financial losses. The expected loss of life per exposed hour only
applies to humans directly exposed to the hazard and may include fishermen, motorists and workers
in the downstream area of the dambreak. The risk level were described in Chapter 2.
The risk analysis which forms part of the dam safety evaluations performed by DWA for these
dams (case studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7) are revisited to identify what other factors may have influ-
enced the decision to rehabilitate:
• Case Study 1a and 1b (Bospoort Dam): In the dam safety evaluation report performed for
Bospoort Dam (Hattingh, 2005), the risk analysis for the scenario where the radial gates are
functioning normally during overtopping (Case Study 1a) showed the following results;
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– the risk to human life, expressed as population at risk (PAR) by DWA, the social and the di-
rect financial impacts are evaluated as acceptable according criteria established by DWA.
– The indirect financial impacts and the socio-economic and environmental impacts are un-
acceptable according to DWA criteria.
– In addition the risk level were found to be completely unacceptable in terms of DWA cri-
teria.
For the scenario where the radial gates does not function normally during flood conditions
(Case Study 1b):
– All the impacts and the risk level are unacceptable in terms of DWA criteria.
– It could therefore be concluded that the decision to rehabilitate the dam was not only
influenced by the scenario where the gates are functioning during flooding where the in-
direct financial, socio-economic and environmental impacts are unacceptable, but could
also be influenced by the perceived likelihood of the scenario where the gates does not
function normally during overtopping.
– Also, the DWA criteria do no take the cost of rehabilitation measures into account.
• Case Study 2 (Klein Maricopoort Dam): In the dam safety evaluation report performed for
Klein Maricopoort Dam (Kelefetswe, 2005), the risk analysis showed the following results;
– The risk to human life and the financial impacts are on the border between acceptable
and unacceptable according to DWA criteria.
– The social and ecological impacts are moderate but still acceptable in terms of DWA crite-
ria.
– In addition, the risk level were found to be moderate to high but still acceptable in terms
of DWA criteria.
• Case Study 3 (Toleni Dam): In the dam safety evaluation report performed for Toleni Dam
(Muller, 2000), the risk analysis showed the following results;
– The risk to human life, socio-economic and social impacts are acceptable in terms of DWA
criteria.
– The financial impacts as well as the environmental impacts in case of dam failure are
borderline between acceptable and unacceptable in terms of DWA criteria.
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– In addition, the risk level is evaluated to be high but still acceptable according to DWA
criteria.
• Case Study 5 (Vaalkop Dam): In the dam safety evaluation report performed for Vaalkop Dam
(Nightingale, 2005), the risk analysis showed the following results;
– The risk level are acceptable in terms of DWA criteria.
– The risk to human life and socio-economic, social and environmental impacts are border-
line between acceptable and unacceptable in terms of DWA criteria.
– In addition, the direct and indirect economic losses are unacceptable according to DWA
criteria.
• Case Study 6 (Rust De Winter Dam) : In the dam safety evaluation report performed for Rust
De Winter Dam (Coetzer, 2003), the risk analysis showed the following results;
– The risk to human life, the economic impacts and risk level were moderate to high but still
acceptable in accordance to DWA criteria.
– The socio-economic impacts in case of dam failure are moderate but also still acceptable
in terms of DWA criteria.
• Case Study 7 (Makotswane Dam): In the dam safety evaluation report performed for Makotswane
Dam (Naidoo, 2005), the risk analysis showed the following results;
– All the evaluated risks, including risk to human life, economic, socio-economic, social,
environmental and risk level, were borderline between acceptable and unacceptable in
terms of DWA criteria.
When comparing the recommendations for rehabilitation works for the eleven case studies using
the three different decision tools proposed in this study (conventional acceptability criteria for risk
to human life, lower boundary for investments into life safety defined SWTP and economic optimi-
sation) the decision to rehabilitate the dams are not always justified in terms of all three methods. All
three methods may be used to assess the dam for rehabilitation works, but it must be noted that the
additional factors such as the socio-economic, social and environmental impacts and the risk level
may influence the decision to rehabilitate the dam. Therefore, the three decision tools proposed in
this study can not be used as the only decision support tools for rehabilitation. On the other hand,
the current DWA criteria do not take the cost of rehabilitation works into account in any way and this
should be remedied.
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In most cases the risk to life were evaluated as acceptable according to the lower boundary criteria
defined by SWTP. However, higher safety levels were required for some cases, based on economic op-
timisation evaluations. This confirms the observation described in section 6.2, that it unlikely for the
SWTP boundary to govern the investment into rehabilitation works and that economic optimisation
would typically dictate the decision. Thus, criteria which effectively incorporate this consideration
into the decision process is needed.
In the following section alternative criteria are developed to instead of independently evaluate
societal preferences for life safety through SWTP criteria and the economic efficiency of dam rehabil-
itation works, incorporate both considerations into a single-evaluation criteria for evaluating dams
for rehabilitation works.
6.4 Development of single-evaluation life safety criteria which
incorporates some measure of economic efficiency
The SWTP criteria only consider societal preferences for investments into life safety, while the eco-
nomic optimisation criteria consider the decision maker or owner’s preferences for a maximised
monetary net benefit through an investment into rehabilitation works. For the case studies of dams,
the risk to life were in most cases acceptable in terms of SWTP criteria, thereby complying with the
lower bound constraint for dam safety levels. However, for some cases rehabilitation were recom-
mended through economic optimisation and thus economic optimisation dictated the decision to
rehabilitate the dam.
It could be argued that a three phase approach would be the best, where the acceptability of risk
to life is first evaluated using SWTP, followed by economic optimisation as possible motivation to re-
habilitate and finally incorporating environmental, socio-economic, social and risk level considera-
tions into the decision. On the other hand, the first two steps could be replaced by a single-evaluation
criteria, which accounts for both considerations and would be more convenient and easy to use. In
this section, a single-evaluation criteria is proposed as an alternative, where the risk to human life
are primarily assessed (through FN-criteria), but with some measure of economic efficiency of reha-
bilitation taken into account by setting less stringent criteria for dams where rehabilitation works are
excessively expensive or achieves little improvement in safety. This is similar to what ANCOLD does
by defining two criterion lines for new and existing dams.
To differentiate between the efficiency of rehabilitation works for different dams, the ratio of the
investment cost for the dam rehabilitation to the reduction in the probability of dam failure (C/∆P f )
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is proposed as an efficiency measure. If a large ∆P f can be achieved at a small cost, this is very effi-
cient and it is therefore reasonably practicable to implement more stringent safety criteria for these
dams. On the other hand, if only a small ∆P f is achieved at a large cost, it might not be reasonably
practicable to rehabilitate and less stringent criteria should apply to such cases.
Note that ∆P f does not fully describe the benefit of rehabilitation works, since in some cases
(even with a large ∆P f ) the benefit may be low due to small losses in case of dam failure. However, to
calculate the benefit requires the involved considerations of section 6.3.1.
In the following, FN-criteria, with different stringency levels are developed based on a "low",
"medium" and "large" efficiency ratio (C/∆P f ).
To develop this FN-criteria, C/∆P f ratios are determined for the eleven DWA case studies consid-
ered for this study. This is done by dividing the annual cost of the rehabilitation works by the average
reduction in the probability of failure to obtain a cost per percentage reduction in probability of fail-
ure.
The annual cost of rehabilitation works (Annual Worth (AW)) has been determined for the eleven
case studies of dams and are shown in Table 5.5 in Chapter 5 of this study. The average change in the
probability of failure (∆P f ) due to the dam rehabilitation works are calculated as the difference be-
tween the average initial probability of failure (P f (i ni t i al )) before rehabilitation works are conducted
and the average final probability of failure (P f ( f i nal )) after the dam has been rehabilitated. The aver-
age initial probability of failure is determined by finding the average of the maximum and minimum
interval of the P f (i ni t i al ) shown in Chapter 4 in Table 4.7. The average final probability of failure after
a dam has been rehabilitated (P f ( f i nal )) is assumed to be the average of 1E-5 and 1E-6 per year.
The C/∆P f ratio, as a cost per percentage reduction in the probability of failure, is obtained for
the eleven DWA case studies as shown in Table 6.7. In order to differentiate between the efficiency
of the rehabilitation works, the ratios obtained in Table 6.7 are divided into a "small", "medium"
and "large" intervals as shown in Table 6.8. In this way, the case studies are used to obtain practical
intervals for what can be considered as "small", "medium" and "large" ratios.
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Table 6.7: Investment cost for a reduction in probability of failure for the case studies of South African govern-
ment owned dams, expressed as a cost to ∆P f ratio
Case
Dam
Average∆P f Cost estimate (AW) C/∆P fStudy
Nr. [ %year ] [
R
year ] [R/%]
1a Bospoort Dam (Case A) 5.49E-01 R 6.11 mil./yr R 11.12 mil./%
1b Bospoort Dam (Case B) 5.50E+00 R 6.11 mil./yr R 1.11 mil./%
2 Klein-Maricopoort Dam 5.45E-02 R 2.85 mil./yr R 52.34 mil./%
3 Toleni Dam 2.74E-01 R 1.71 mil./yr R 6.25 mil./%
4 Lakeside Dam 1.09E-01 R 1.83 mil./yr R 16.68 mil./%
5 Vaalkop Dam 1.05E-02 R 1.76 mil./yr R 167.98 mil./%
6 Rust De Winter Dam 2.7E-02 R 1.54 mil./yr R 57.32 mil./%
7 Makotswane Dam 1.64E-01 R 1.23 mil./yr R 747.13 mil./%
8 Kromellenboog Dam 1.09E-01 R 1.39 mil./yr R 12.68 mil./%
9 Albert Falls Dam 5.45E-02 R 1.20 mil./yr R 22.00 mil./%
10 Glen Brock Dam 5.45E-01 R 1.28 mil./yr R 2.32 mil./%
11 Wentzel Dam 6.10E-01 R 1.03 mil./yr R 1.69 mil./%
Table 6.8: Intervals defined for C/∆P f
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
Case
Study
Nr.
Dam C/∆P f [R/ %]
R1 mil./%
< (C/∆P f )
< R10
mil./%
R10 mil./%
< (C/∆P f )
< R100 mil.
/%
(C/∆P f )>
R100
mil./%
1a Bospoort Dam (Case A) R 11.12 mil./% Y
1b Bospoort Dam (Case B) R 1.11 mil./% Y
2 Klein-Maricopoort Dam R 52.34 mil./% Y
3 Toleni Dam R 6.25 mil./% Y
4 Lakeside Dam R 16.68 mil./% Y
5 Vaalkop Dam R 167.98 mil./% Y
6 Rust De Winter Dam R 57.32 mil./% Y
7 Makotswane Dam R 7.47 mil./% Y
8 Kromellenboog Dam R 12.69 mil./% Y
9 Albert Falls Dam R 22.00 mil./% Y
10 Glen Brock Dam R 2.32 mil./% Y
11 Wentzel Dam R 1.69 mil./% Y
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In Chapter 4 of this study, the ANCOLD FN-criteria, which based on what is considered to be
good engineering practice, were proposed as conventional criteria for evaluating the risk to human
life imposed by dams. The ANCOLD criterion line for new dams is one factor of 10 more stringent
than the criterion line for existing dams. This criterion line is suggested as the criterion line for the
case studies where the investment is "small" for a reduction in the probability of failure, since it is
very efficient and reasonably practicable to implement more stringent safety criteria for these dams.
The ANCOLD criterion line for existing dams is suggested as the criterion line for the case studies
with a "medium" investment for a reduced probability of failure. The case studies are more likely to
fall within the acceptable region of the less stringent criterion line and hence the decision to rehabil-
itate may not always be justified.
A new criterion line one factor of 10 higher than the ANCOLD acceptability criterion line for ex-
isting dams is suggested as the criterion line for a "large" C/∆P f ratio. Since only a small ∆P f is
achieved at a large cost, the decision to rehabilitate may not always be reasonably practicable and
the least stringent criteria should apply to such cases. The "small", "medium" and "large" criterion
lines are illustrated on an FN-diagram in Fig. 6.5.
The risk to human life for the 11 case studies are presented on the FN-diagram. DWA estimates
the risk to life in the form of a block representing the level of confidence of the data, thus an interval
for the loss of life (LOL) and the probability of failure is defined. For this investigation, the average of
the two intervals are obtained and these corresponding values are plotted as co-ordinate points on
an FN-diagram instead of using an interval for the loss of life (LOL) and the probability of failure.
The co-ordinate points for the 11 DWA case studies are shown on an FN-diagram in Fig. 6.5. The
efficiency of an investment to reduce the probability of dam failure in terms of the "small", "medium"
or "large" intervals defined in Table 6.8 are shown for each case study (with "S" for "small", "M" for
"medium" and "L" for "large").
If the case studies are evaluated in terms of the newly defined "small", "medium" and "large"
FN-criterion lines;
• All of the DWA case studies which were analysed to be in the "small" interval, will fall in the
unacceptable region of the "small" C /∆P f criterion line and should be rehabilitated.
• All of the DWA case studies which were analysed to be in the "medium" interval are within the
unacceptable region of the "medium" criterion line. However, these case studies are located
closer to the border of the criterion line.
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Figure 6.5: Proposed FN-criteria based on C/∆P f ratio
• The DWA case study which were analysed to be in the "large" interval, falls on the border be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable for the criterion line.
For the C/∆P f criteria, all the case studies require rehabilitation. This corresponds to the DWA
decisions that were taken. Based on the SWTP evaluation together with the outcomes of the eco-
nomic optimisation evaluation for the eleven case studies, some dams should not have been rehabil-
itated and thus there may be some reason to argue that these suggested criterion lines can be moved
one factor of 10 higher. However, more case studies will be necessary refine this criteria.
The C/∆P f criteria are suggested as a first step to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works. It re-
quires a single evaluation which incorporates life safety and economic considerations, which is easy
and convenient to use, and does not require a refined estimation for the cost of rehabilitation works.
Thereafter, if it is necessary, the rehabilitation decision could be confirmed by evaluating the dam in
terms of SWTP and economic optimisation criteria, which requires a more involved estimation of the
failure costs and the investment cost for rehabilitation works.
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However, it should be noted that the C/∆P f criteria are by no means perfect. For example, when
developing the criteria, only the investment cost for a reduced probability of failure is considered,
while through economic optimisation the benefit of an investment into rehabilitation works addi-
tionally considers the costs of dam failure.
It should also be noted that this criteria does not account for other factors, such as the socio-
economic, social and environmental impacts and the risk level, which may influence the decision to
rehabilitate the dam. These factors should be considered separately and requires expertise in differ-
ent areas. DWA addresses these factors in the risk analysis performed for dam safety evaluations, and
the multiple criteria which may be used to evaluate these factors are illustrated in Fig. 2.6 in Chapter
2.
6.5 Summary of main findings
The principles of economic optimisation are applied to this study as an additional tool to evaluate if
rehabilitation works at a dam is economically beneficial. The monetary net benefit for two decision
alternatives, do-nothing or rehabilitate, is obtained for case studies of South African government
owned dams and the decision alternative with the maximum monetary net benefit should be pre-
ferred.
For the eleven South African dam case studies, the recommendation for rehabilitation works
through economic optimisation was compared to the recommendations through the other deci-
sion tools proposed in this study, including the ANCOLD conventional acceptability criteria for risk
to human life suggested in Chapter 4, and the lower boundary for investments defined by SWTP
for a marginal increase in life safety suggested in Chapter 5. The DWA decision to rehabilitate the
dams were not always justified in terms of all three methods. Additional factors such as the socio-
economic, social and environmental impacts often influenced the decision to rehabilitate the dam.
Consequently the three methods proposed in this study can not be used exclusively as decision sup-
port tools for rehabilitation.
When considering the eleven DWA case studies, the economic optimisation always resulted in
safety levels higher than what was required by SWTP. This confirms the observation in literature,
which states that SWTP is generally a lower bound constraint which rarely governs the design (Rack-
witz and Streicher, 2002). Thus, economic optimisation would typically dictate whether or not a dam
should be rehabilitated and we need criteria that would effectively incorporate this consideration in
the decision process. The current DWA criteria do not take the costs of rehabilitation measures into
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account.
A single evaluation criteria is developed where life safety is primarily assessed through FN-criteria,
but with some measure of economic efficiency of rehabilitation taken into account. The ratio of the
costs of rehabilitation works to the reduction in the probability of failure C/∆P f is proposed as an
efficiency measure. When a large ∆P f can be achieved at a small cost, it is very efficient and there-
fore reasonably practicable to implement more stringent safety criteria for these dams. On the other
hand, if only a small∆P f is achieved at a large cost, it might not be reasonably practicable to rehabil-
itate and less stringent criteria should apply to such cases.
The C/∆P f criteria developed in this chapter are suggested as a first step to evaluate South African
dams for rehabilitation works. This set of life safety criteria are easy and convenient to use. The reha-
bilitation decision could then be further validated by applying the SWTP and economic optimisation
criteria, but these methods require more involved estimations of rehabilitation and failure costs.
It should be noted that the C/∆P f criteria are by no means perfect since it does not incorporate
the economic impacts of dam failure. It also does not incorporate other factors, such as the socio-
economic, social and environmental impacts and the risk level, which could require dam rehabilita-
tion works. These factors should be considered separately and requires expertise in different areas.
DWA evaluates these additional factors through multiple acceptability criteria which is illustrated in
Fig. 2.6 in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Recommendations
In addition to the number of roles dams play in society, the development of large dams enhances the
quality of life of society. However, dams are inherently associated with safety issues and although
dam safety related incidents may be rare, there are serious cases of human fatalities and economic
losses that have been caused by dam failures, both internationally and in South Africa. This necessi-
tates the proper management and control of dam safety.
Internationally there are a number of dam safety organisations, regulators, governments or dam
owners responsible for providing standards for the management of dam safety. In South Africa, the
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) is the custodian of a large number of dams and is responsible for
all aspects of law regarding dam safety.
The purpose of the South African dam safety legislation is to improve the safety of dams by de-
termining the level of control over dams and requiring regular dam safety evaluations. In addition
to the establishment of the dam safety legislation, a risk-based model aiding decisions regarding the
adequacy of dam safety levels has been developed and is currently applied by DWA. Although not
specifically required by the dam safety legislation, it has become standard to perform a risk analysis
as part of dam safety evaluations.
For a specific dam, the risk analysis methodology combines the estimated probability of dam
failure and the different consequences of dam failure to quantitatively define risks. These risks are
evaluated against multiple acceptability criteria to assess the risk to human life and the economic,
social, socio-economic and environmental impacts in case of dam failure. If the risks are evaluated
as unacceptable in terms of the criteria, the rehabilitation of dams to improve their safety may be
recommended.
According to DWA, dam building reached its peak in South Africa in the 1980’s. Since then there
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has been a shift in dam engineering from the design of dams to the maintenance and rehabilitation of
dams. In the years 2004/2005, DWA identified 166 of the 314 South African government owned dams
to be in need of rehabilitation works. This encouraged the initiation of the dam safety rehabilitation
program by DWA in the years 2005/2006. It is estimated for the total expenditure for rehabilitation
works since the start of the program up until the 2011/2012 financial year to be more than R 1.5
billion.
DWA recently identified the need for reviewing decision criteria for the prioritisation of South
African dams for rehabilitation. More specifically DWA required the criteria for acceptability of as-
sessed risk to human life to be evaluated.
In this study, current criteria used by DWA were evaluated by comparing to international best
practice methods for evaluating the acceptability of risk to human life. Further, the lower bound
for investments into life safety required by society was identified using SWTP as a utility function.
In addition, the motivation for further investments, above the lower bound for life safety defined
by SWTP, was investigated. These motivations for further investments could include the economic
motivations for which the dam is vital, the damage costs in case of dam failure and environmental,
socio-economic and social implications of dam dailure. Finally, single-evaluation criteria were pro-
posed to primarily evaluate life safety, but with some measure of economic efficiency incorporated.
International best practice methods for evaluating risk to human lives:
Internationally, risk to life is most commonly quantitatively assessed through conventional accept-
ability criteria. The acceptability criteria are commonly presented as FN-criteria on an FN-diagram,
with the x-axis representing the number of fatalities (N) and the y-axis the probability (F) of N or
more fatalities occurring. The life safety risks are evaluated against the FN-criteria, where the risks
are expressed as the expected fatalities per year.
FN-criteria are mostly defined by two properties; namely the intersection with the y-axis and the
slope of the criterion line. The slope of the criterion line describes risk aversion. Risk aversion is
the additional public opposition to an event which kills a large number of people over a series of
smaller events which collectively result in the same number of fatalities. Risk aversion is not only
influenced by the accidents itself, but also by the attention brought about by the media and politics.
An FN-criterion line with a slope of -1 represents a "risk neutral" society, while an increased slope,
for example -2, is more stringent and describes "risk aversion".
In addition, the stringency levels of FN-criteria could be influenced by the As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP) principle, where if the cost of a safety measure is disproportionate to the actual
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risk reduction, it is not reasonably practicable to accept more stringent criteria.
Internationally criteria have been developed for life safety risks associated with large scale facili-
ties, including nuclear and offshore facilities and the transport of dangerous goods. Through investi-
gation it was found that there are similarities between the criteria used in the different industries in
terms of the anchor point and the slope of the criterion line. Generally a slope of -1, corresponding to
risk neutrality, is regarded as good practice. According to Ball and Floyd (1998) there is no compelling
rational for incorporating risk aversion into the criteria.
The criteria for these industries may not be directly applied to dam safety since it may be im-
practicable to accept the same safety levels. In international dam safety, the application of life safety
criteria in different countries are presented by ICOLD (2005). Many countries acknowledge that risk-
based tools are useful within dam safety, but there are many contradicting views and opinions and
some countries are hesitant to explicitly define FN-criteria for life safety.
In Australia, the Australian National Committee On Large Dams (ANCOLD) proposed FN-criteria
for new and existing dams. Several other dam safety organisations, such as the New South Wales
Dam Safety Committee (NSW-DSC) also in Australia and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
in the USA, have based their criteria on the ANCOLD criteria. In this study it was therefore decided
to compare South African dam safety criteria for risk to human life to the ANCOLD criteria. The
following properties were observed from ANCOLD criteria:
• An internationally recommended slope of -1 is used.
• Different criteria are defined for new and existing dams, since the marginal cost of reducing
the risk for an existing dam is generally more than for new dams. Thus, it is not reasonably
practicable to reduce risks to life for existing dams to the same safety levels of new dams.
• The criteria have a lower probability of failure cut-off due to technology not allowing for the
construction of dams with lower probabilities of failure, and thus it is not reasonably practica-
ble to reduce dam safety levels to more stringent criteria.
• ANCOLD criteria are based on engineering judgement, and implicitly incorporate additional
considerations, such as cost considerations for reasonable practice.
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Evaluation of South African dam safety criteria for risk to human lives:
The Department of Water Affairs (DWA) quantitatively estimates life safety risks as the combination
of the probability of dam failure and the population at risk (PAR) in case of dam failure. The PAR
is the number of people exposed to the dambreak flood. These risks are evaluated against criteria
presented on a PAR-diagram. However, international methods assess risk to life most commonly as
the expected fatalities due to dam failure. This provided a challenge for evaluating South African
dam safety criteria by comparing to ANCOLD criteria, since two different consequence measures are
used.
DWA uses their own in-house developed models for predicting what portion of the population at
risk would become lives lost, based on assumptions related to warning times available to the pop-
ulation at risk in the event of a dam break. The DWA criteria were therefore compared to ANCOLD
criteria by finding the implied warning times needed for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD cri-
teria, i.e. for a certain probability of failure, the implied warning time needed such that the DWA
predicted loss of life would correspond to that of ANCOLD.
The DWA criteria were compared to ANCOLD criteria for both new and existing dams. For exist-
ing dams, at high probabilities of failure, large warning times are needed for DWA criteria to adhere
to ANCOLD criteria. These high warning times are not always realistically achievable and thus such
DWA dams are accepted at less stringent safety levels than ANCOLD dams. At low probabilities of
failure, the warning times needed for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria decreases and
becomes very small. Consequently DWA overdesigns for low probability events.
A similar pattern was observed when the implied warning times needed for new dams were com-
puted. As the probability of failure decreases, the implied warning times decrease. As expected, the
warning times which are needed for the criteria to correspond are higher than for existing dams, im-
plying that new DWA dams are accepted at less stringent safety levels than ANCOLD criteria for new
dams. This is expected because DWA does not differentiate between new and existing dams in their
acceptance criteria. Again, the large warning times required may not be achievable, implying that a
higher risk to human life is accepted by South African dam safety criteria.
The DWA model for predicting loss of life was developed based on historical data for dam failures.
However, the statistical basis is not documented and unknown. Other life loss prediction models are
available internationally and it was suggested to validate the DWA prediction model by comparing to
an international best practice prediction model.
The DeKay and McClelland (1993) model uses a regression approach to predict the loss of life in
case of dam failure from the population at risk and assumptions related to the warning time, similar
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to the DWA model. An additional factor is incorporated by the DeKay and McClelland (1993) model,
namely a force factor, accounting for the severity of the dambreak flood on the predicted life loss.
Unlike the DWA model, it has a well-documented scientific basis which can be validated; it is based
on the statistical analysis of actual historical data compiled from the 1950’s onwards which applies to
a wide range of population at risk, and the DeKay and McClelland (1993) predicted life loss compares
well with the actual historical data.
The DeKay and McClelland (1993) predicted loss of life was compared to DWA predicted values
for a range of population at risk and for different warning times. For both high force and low force
flood conditions, the DeKay and McClelland (1993) model predicts the loss of life within a more nar-
row range than the DWA method. For high force conditions, DWA generally overpredicts the loss of
life for small and medium warning times. This may lead to conservative decision making regarding
life safety where severe consequences are expected. In this way DWA unwittingly incorporates risk
aversion in decision making. For low force conditions DWA severely overpredicts the loss of life for
small and medium warning times. Thus, the DWA predictions are too conservative for low force con-
ditions where low consequences are expected. For large warning times, DWA generally underpredicts
the LOL in comparison to DeKay and McClelland (1993).
The conservative life safety decisions implied by the DWA life loss prediction model may to some
extent off-set the unconservative life safety decisions of DWA that is implied when the warning times
needed for DWA criteria to correspond to ANCOLD criteria were computed. However, it is proposed
that the current DWA life loss prediction model is replaced by the DeKay and McClelland (1993)
model, since this life loss prediction model has a well-documented and rational scientific basis.
Further comparisons of the DWA criteria to ANCOLD were made by using the DeKay and Mc-
Clelland (1993) prediction model to convert "population at risk" to "loss of life". In this way, DWA
equivalent FN-criteria were developed which can be directly compared to ANCOLD criteria. Differ-
ent DWA criterion lines were obtained, depending on assumptions regarding the available warning
time and flood severity condition.
This result is unwanted as it implies a fundamental flaw in the currently used DWA criteria: while
warning time and flood severity will influence the level of risk that is imposed by a given dam, the
criteria that dictates what level of risk is deemed to be acceptable should be independent of the un-
derlying characteristics of individual dams. The ALARP principle may be used as an argument to
define different acceptability criteria for broad categories where reasonable practice may dictate less
stringent safety requirements. This is for example the argument behind ANCOLD’s different criterion
lines for new and existing dams. However, warning time and flood severity certainly do not qualify as
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rational parameters that would influence reasonable practice in broad.
For a small warning time and high force conditions the DWA equivalent FN-criteria were less
stringent than the ANCOLD criteria. Thus less stringent safety levels are implied by DWA criteria in
cases where severe consequences are expected. For a large warning time and low force conditions,
the DWA equivalent criteria were more stringent, which implies too conservative decision making in
cases where low consequences are expected.
Further, the gradient of the DWA FN-criterion lines were steeper than -1, which is in opposition
to the risk neutral slope of -1 which is generally accepted as good practice internationally.
Thus, several problems with the current formulation of DWA life safety criteria came to light by
comparing to ANCOLD criteria. It is therefore suggested to eliminate these by switching to ANCOLD
life safety criteria, which;
• Evaluates risk to life using fatalities as a consequence measure, which is most commonly used
internationally. Using PAR as a consequence measure is fundamentally flawed because the
number of fatalities which may come from the PAR is greatly dependent on factors such as
warning time and flood severity, which is dam specific.
• The gradient of the ANCOLD criteria is -1, which implies risk neutral decision making, as rec-
ommended internationally.
• The criteria has a lower probability of occurrence cut-off and also defines different criteria for
new and existing dams, thus incorporating measures of reasonable practicality.
Switching to ANCOLD would not imply an enormous change in the current DWA safety levels.
However it would imply a more consistent treatment of risk across the board of different warning
times and flood severity levels. Further, using ANCOLD criteria would not imply more risk analysis
effort than what is currently required, since DWA already estimates the loss of life as part of their
standard risk analysis procedures.
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Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) as a lower bound constraint on dam safety levels:
The levels of investments into dam rehabilitation works are large. Further, since the rehabilitation
works are essentially financed by society through public taxes or charges and these societal resources
are limited, the investments should be worthwhile for society. If the cost of reducing the risk to hu-
man life is disproportionate to the actual reduction in risk to life through dam rehabilitation works,
these resources may be redirected into other sectors, for example into health care, transportation
services and education, which may better the quality of life of society, i.e. the same money may save
more lives elsewhere.
Societal Willingness To Pay (SWTP) is a utility function which effectively determines the lower
bound for investments into life safety required by society. It is based on the Life Quality Index (LQI)
which jointly considers the social indicators of a nation, including the life expectancy at birth, GDP
per person and the work to leisure time ratio, to give a measure of the quality of life of a society. An
investment into life safety should lead to an improved life quality.
To apply SWTP to South African dam safety a reasonable SWTP values had to be used. In South
Africa, the relationship between our life expectancy and GDP per person is an outlier compared to
values obtained for other countries at similar levels of development. Our life expectancy is artificially
low due to HIV and our GDP is artificially high due to our richness in mineral resources. In addition,
the low employment rate in South Africa leads to the wrong interpretation of the work to leisure time
ratio. In effect, these South African social indicators violate the underlying assumptions of the LQI
derivation, and the SWTP-value for South Africa may not be a true reflection of our society’s prefer-
ence regarding investments into life safety. Instead, an Earth value for SWTP (ESWTP) developed by
Faber and Virguez-Rodriguez (2011) was used in this study. The ESWTP is based on observations for
more than 70% of the Earth population and conforms well to LQI principles.
Based on the ESWTP, criteria were developed for different case studies of dams for which DWA
required rehabilitation works to define the lower bound for investments into life safety. The SWTP
criteria developed for the different case studies were presented as criterion lines on an FN-diagram,
and the risk to life for the case studies could be evaluated in terms of these criterion lines to de-
termine if investments into life safety are required. Since the available best practice technologies
for rehabilitation works are case specific, the investment cost for reducing risk to life depends on
the dam under consideration and consequently different SWTP criterion lines are obtained for each
dam. Fortunately, the positions of these lines were within one span (factor of 10) of each other, which
implies a fairly low level of sensitivity of the SWTP criteria to factors such as the rehabilitation cost
and the SWTP value, i.e. as long as these values are estimated within the correct order of magnitude,
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useful criteria may be derived.
Only two of the eleven case studies required rehabilitation works on the basis of the SWTP criteria.
The SWTP criteria only account for societal preferences for life safety. Further investments into
safety should be made if it is required by other considerations, such as economic motivations for the
existence of the facility, damage costs in case of dam failure or environmental implications. Thus,
SWTP criteria cannot be used exclusively to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works, and these other
factors should be taken into account. This could be done by using SWTP criteria in conjunction
with the DWA criteria evaluating the acceptability of economic, environmental, social and socio-
economic impacts of dam failure and the risk level of dams.
The level of additional investments may be dictated by the decision maker or owner of the facility
on the basis of economic optimisation.
Economic optimisation as a decision tool for evaluating South African dams for rehabilitation:
Economic optimisation requires evaluating the profitability of a project and ensuring that a maxi-
mum benefit is obtained at the lowest cost. It accounts for other considerations, in addition to the
societal requirements for life safety, including economic motivations for which the dam is vital, dam-
age costs of dam failure and compensation costs for lives lost due to dam failure. It typically dictates
higher safety levels than what is required by SWTP. However, should the economic optimum be at a
lower level than what is dictated by SWTP, the SWTP minimum safety level must be enforced.
The principles of economic optimisation were used to evaluate if investments into dam rehabil-
itation works were economically beneficial. The objective function for determining the monetary
net benefit included the benefit of rehabilitating the dam and the investment cost of rehabilitation
works. The benefit does not consider the incomes generated from the existence of the facility, but
considers only the additional benefit derived from rehabilitation works, i.e. a reduced probability of
dam failure which in combination with the cost of failure results in reduced expected cost of failure.
The cost of failure include the estimated economic losses and the compensation costs for lives lost in
case of dam failure. The compensation cost is determined as the product of the estimated lives lost
and the Societal Value of a Statistical Life (SVSL) . SVSL is derived from the LQI concept, similar to
SWTP. However, SWTP and SVSL should not be confused with each other. SVSL is the amount which
should be compensated for each fatality, while SWTP defines the acceptable level for investments
into life safety.
In each case study two decision alternatives were considered for economic optimisation, the do-
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nothing or rehabilitate alternative. The alternative with the highest monetary net benefit should be
preferred. For the rehabilitate alternative the costs of rehabilitation works should be less than the
benefit obtained through rehabilitation works for the alternative to be preferred.
Five of the eleven case studies required rehabilitation on the basis of economic optimisation. The
DWA assessment reports for the other cases reveals that two cases did not really require rehabilita-
tion based on DWA criteria (although a number of risks were judged to be fairly high in these cases).
The four remaining cases were rehabilitated based on environmental, social, socio-economic and
risk level considerations.
Case studies of South African dams evaluated in terms of proposed decision tools:
Eleven case studies of South African government owned dams that were originally recommended for
rehabilitation works by DWA, were evaluated in terms of the three decision tools proposed for this
study namely; ANCOLD criteria for existing dams, SWTP criteria and economic optimisation.
The risk to life for the case studies were mostly within the unacceptable region of the ANCOLD
criteria, justifying the recommendation for rehabilitation works. ANCOLD primarily evaluates life
safety but incorporates economic considerations in a non-explicit way.
When the case studies were evaluated according to SWTP criteria, which only takes societal pref-
erences for life safety into account, the risk to life were mostly within the acceptable region of the
criteria. Thus investments into rehabilitation works were not required, i.e. the lower boundary for
life safety were satisfied.
For five cases the economic optimisation criteria required further investments into dam rehabil-
itation works, above the lower boundary defined by SWTP.
In effect, rehabilitation was not always recommended in terms of all three decision tools. Addi-
tional factors considered by DWA, such as the socio-economic, social and environment impacts of
dam failure and the risk level, could and should also influence the decision to rehabilitate. There-
fore, the three decision tools should not be used as the only decision support tools for rehabilitation
works.
Since economic optimisation in most cases recommended higher safety levels than what is re-
quired by society through SWTP, criteria which effectively incorporate these observations into the
decision process are needed. Also, the current DWA evaluation does not take the cost of rehabilita-
tion works into account in any way and this could be improved.
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Recommended FN-criteria for evaluating DWA dams for rehabilitation works:
It could be argued that a three phase approach would be the best, where the acceptability of risk to
life is first evaluated using SWTP, followed by economic optimisation as possible motivation to re-
habilitate and finally incorporating environmental, socio-economic and social considerations into
the decision. However, both of the first two tools require fairly involved calculations, since the in-
vestment cost for rehabilitation works and the expected failure cost have to be estimated as input
parameters.
Instead it is proposed to replace the first two steps by a single-evaluation criteria, which accounts
for both considerations and would be more convenient and easy to use. To this purpose FN-criteria
were developed to primarily evaluate risk to life, but which implicitly incorporates the economic ef-
ficiency of rehabilitation works. The FN-criteria are fairly similar to ANCOLD criteria, but instead of
using descriptive differentiation as in the case of ANCOLD ("new vs. "existing" dams), the ratio of
the investment costs for rehabilitation works to the reduction in the probability of failure C/∆P f is
used as an efficiency measure, based on which stringency levels for safety are required. If a large re-
duction in the probability of failure could be obtained at a small investment cost, the safety measure
is economically efficient and it is reasonably practicable to reduce the risk to more stringent safety
levels. In contrast, if only a small reduction in the probability of failure could be obtained at a large
cost, the safety measure is not as efficient and thus it is not reasonably practicable to accept stringent
safety levels. FN-criteria were developed with different levels of stringency for "small", "medium"
and "large" efficiency ratios (C/∆P f ).
The case studies considered in this study were used to define practical ranges for the efficiency
ratios. The "small" efficiency ratio was defined to coincide with the ANCOLD criterion line for new
dams, the "medium" efficiency ratio with the ANCOLD criterion line for existing dams, and an ad-
ditional "large" efficiency ratio criterion line, one factor of 10 less stringent than previous two were
defined.
If the case studies are evaluated in terms of this newly developed criteria, rehabilitation works are
required for all the cases, corresponding to the original DWA decision.
Based on the outcomes when the dams were evaluated in terms of SWTP and economic optimi-
sation criteria, some dams should not have been rehabilitated. This could suggest an argument for
moving the criterion lines to an even less stringent safety level, but for this to be properly motivated
more case studies should be considered.
The above FN-criteria are proposed as a first step to evaluate dams for rehabilitation works. It
is well-aligned with ANCOLD criteria which is based on good engineering practice and engineering
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judgement. The additional DWA considerations for rehabilitation decisions, including the economic,
socio-economic, social and environmental impacts in case of dam failure as well as the risk level
should be accounted for as a second step. Thereafter, if further validation is required, the SWTP and
economic criteria could be considered additionally.
In summary, when evaluating South African dams for rehabilitation works, the diagram shown in Fig.
7.1 could be considered. The DWA estimated risks, as the combined probability and consequences
of dam failure, could be evaluated against the FN-criteria proposed in this study, which primarily
evaluates risk to life, but implicitly incorporates a measure of economic efficiency. In addition, the
risks should be evaluated against DWA multiple acceptability criteria for economic, environmental,
social and socio-economic impacts of dam failure and the risk level of dams. From these evaluations
the rehabilitation decision could be recommended. If a more refined analysis is required, the risks
together with a detailed estimated investment cost for rehabilitation works could be used to addi-
tionally evaluate the rehabilitation decision in terms of SWTP and economic optimisation criteria.
When developing criteria for life safety, it should be noted that life safety risks are highly complex.
Life safety risks are estimated as the combination of the probability of failure and the consequence
(in this study the loss of life in case of dam failure). Both of these factors are based on a joint consid-
eration of analytical and historical aspects, requiring expert judgement. Consequently these factors
are subject to high degrees of uncertainties. However, determining the life safety risks were beyond
the scope if this study and instead the decision problem of what could be regarded as acceptable life
safety risks was investigated.
To develop life safety criteria proves to be a difficult task since the values, needs and preferences
of society need to be well comprehended. Fundamental principles, such as the principles developed
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as ethical principles for life safety should also
be accounted for. Additionally, acceptable safety levels are not only dictated by societal preferences,
but the preferences of the decision maker or owner could also influence the decisions in terms of the
economic efficiency of the safety measures.
The tools developed in this study are therefore inherently associated with uncertainties, where
there is always a possibility for refining the criteria. One way of doing this could be by incorporating
more case studies of South African government owned dams in the development of the criteria.
The decision tools could also be applied to other fields in the industry. However, this could not
be done directly, and the criteria should be calibrated to industry specific acceptable safety levels. It
should also incorporate the available best practice technologies for reducing risks and the associated
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Figure 7.1: Proposed decision model to evaluate South African dams for rehabilitation works
costs within the specific industry.
The tools developed in this study do not serve as absolute criteria, but are guidelines, which
should be considered in conjunction with engineering expert judgement. The criteria serve as useful
tools for validating the decision to rehabilitate dams. In addition, these tools are useful for priori-
tising dam rehabilitation works. Through this, DWA could make informed decisions and efficiently
allocate financial resources to the improvement of dam safety in South Africa.
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